THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 


PRESIDENTIAL  PROBLEMS 


PRESIDENTIAL 
PROBLEMS 


BY 


GROVER  CLEVELAND 


NEW  YORK 

THE  CENTURY  CO. 

1904 


C  i~i~ 


Copyright,  1904,  by  THE  CENTURY  Co. 


Copyright,  1900,  1901.  by 
GEOVIK  CLEVELAH u 

Copyright,  1504,  hj 
TBX  S.  8.  McCLtJKl  Co 

Copyright,  1904,  by 
THE  CCETH  I'DBLISEIKO  COKPAKT 


Published  October,  1904 


PUBLISHER'S  NOTE 

Of  the  four  essays  comprised  in  this 
volume,  two  were  originally  delivered 
as  addresses  at  Princeton  University. 
The  other  two  appeared  first  in  the 
magazines. 

All  have  now  been  revised  thor- 
oughly by  Mr.  Cleveland,  in  prepa- 
ration for  their  appearance  in  book 
form. 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  PAGH 

i  THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE  EXECUTIVE  ...      3 

H  THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE  CHICAGO  STRIKE 

OF  1894 79 

HI  THE  BOND  ISSUES 121 

iv  THE  VENEZUELAN  BOUNDARY  CONTROVERSY    .  173 


PREFACE 

IN  considering  the  propriety  of  publishing 
this  book,  the  fact  has  not  been  overlooked 
that  the  push  and  activity  of  our  people's  life 
lead  them  more  often  to  the  anticipation  of  new 
happenings  than  to  a  review  of  events  which 
have  already  become  a  part  of  the  nation's  his- 
tory. This  condition  is  so  naturally  the  result  of 
an  immense  development  of  American  enter- 
prise that  it  should  not  occasion  astonishment, 
and  perhaps  should  not  be  greatly  deprecated, 
so  long  as  a  mad  rush  for  wealth  and  individ- 
ual advantage  does  not  stifle  our  good  citi- 
zenship nor  weaken  the  patriotic  sentiment 
which  values  the  integrity  of  our  Government 
and  the  success  of  its  mission  immeasurably 
above  all  other  worldly  possessions. 

The  belief  that,  notwithstanding  the  over- 
weening desire  among  our  people  for  personal 

ix 


Preface 

and  selfish  rewards  of  effort,  there  still  exists, 
underneath  it  all,  a  sedate  and  unimpaired  in- 
terest in  the  things  that  illustrate  the  design, 
the  traditions,  and  the  power  of  our  Govern- 
ment, has  induced  me  to  present  in  this  volume 
the  details  of  certain  incidents  of  national  ad- 
ministration concerning  which  I  have  the  know- 
ledge of  a  prominent  participant. 

These  incidents  brought  as  separate  topics  to 
the  foreground  of  agitation  and  discussion  the 
relations  between  the  Chief  Executive  and  the 
Senate  in  making  appointments  to  office,  the 
vindication  and  enforcement  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  the  protection  of  the  soundness  and 
integrity  of  our  finances  and  currency,  and  the 
right  of  the  general  Government  to  overcome 
all  obstructions  to  the  exercise  of  its  functions 
in  every  part  of  our  national  domain. 

Those  of  our  people  whose  interest  in  the 
general  features  of  the  incidents  referred  to 
was  actively  aroused  at  the  time  of  their  oc- 
currence will  perhaps  find  the  following  pages 
of  some  value  for  reference  or  as  a  means  of 
more  complete  information. 


Preface 

I  shall  do  no  more  in  advocacy  of  the  merits 
of  this  book  than  to  say  that  as  a  narrative  of 
facts  it  has  been  prepared  with  great  care,  and 
that  I  believe  it  i o  be  complete  and  accurate  in 
every  essential  detail. 

GKOVER  CLEVELAND. 


XI 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE 
EXECUTIVE 


THE  INDEPENDENCE  OF  THE 
EXECUTIVE 


IN  dealing  with  "The  Independence  of  the 
Executive,"  I  shall  refer  first  of  all  to 
the  conditions  in  which  the  Presidency  of  the 
United  States  had  its  origin,  and  shall  after- 
ward relate  an  incident  within  my  own  experi- 
ence involving  the  preservation  and  vindication 
of  an  independent  function  of  this  high  office. 

When  our  original  thirteen  States,  actuated 
by  "a  decent  respect  for  the  opinions  of  man- 
kind, ' '  presented  to  the  world  the  causes  which 
impelled  them  to  separate  from  the  mother 
country  and  to  cast  off  all  allegiance  to  the 
Crown  of  England,  they  gave  prominence  to 
the  declaration  that ' '  the  history  of  the  present 
King  of  Great  Britain  is  a  history  of  repeated 
injuries  and  usurpations,  all  having  in  direct 
object  the  establishment  of  an  absolute  tyranny 

3 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

over  these  States."  This  was  followed  by  an 
indictment  containing  not  less  than  eighteen 
counts  or  accusations,  all  leveled  at  the  King 
and  the  King  alone.  These  were  closed  or 
clenched  by  this  asseveration :  "  A  Prince  whose 
character  is  thus  marked  by  every  act  which 
may  define  a  tyrant  is  unfit  to  be  the  ruler  of  a 
free  people."  In  this  arraignment  the  Eng- 
lish Parliament  was  barely  mentioned,  and  then 
only  as  "others,"  with  whom  the  King  had 
conspired  by  "giving  his  assent  to  their  act  of 
pretended  legislation,"  and  thus  giving  opera- 
tive force  to  some  of  the  outrages  which  had 
been  put  upon  the  colonies. 

It  is  thus  apparent  that  in  the  indictment  pre- 
sented by  the  thirteen  colonies  they  charged 
the  King,  who  in  this  connection  may  properly 
be  considered  as  the  Chief  Executive  of  Great 
Britain,  with  the  crimes  and  offenses  which 
were  their  justification  for  the  following  solemn 
and  impressive  decree : 

We,  therefore,  the  Representatives  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  in  General  Congress  assembled, 
appealing  to  the  Supreme  Judge  of  the  World  for 
the  rectitude  of  our  intentions,  do,  in  the  name  and 
by  the  authority  of  the  good  People  of  these  Colonies, 
solemnly  publish  and  declare  that  these  United  Colo- 
nies are,  and  of  right  ought  to  be,  free  and  indepen- 

4 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

dent  States;  that  they  are  absolved  from  all  alle- 
giance to  the  British  Crown,  and  that  all  political 
connection  between  them  and  the  State  of  Great 
Britain  is,  and  ought  to  be,  totally  dissolved;  and 
that  as  free  and  independent  States  they  have  full 
power  to  levy  war,  conclude  peace,  contract  alli- 
ances, establish  commerce,  and  do  all  other  acts  and 
things  which  independent  States  may  of  right  do. 
And  for  the  support  of  this  Declaration,  with  a  firm 
reliance  on  the  protection  of  Divine  Providence,  we 
mutually  pledge  to  each  other  our  lives,  our  for- 
tunes, and  our  sacred  honor. 

To  this  irrevocable  predicament  had  the  thir- 
teen States  or  colonies  been  brought  by  their 
resistance  to  the  oppressive  exercise  of  execu- 
tive power. 

In  these  circumstances  it  should  not  surprise 
us  to  find  that  when,  on  the  footing  of  the  Dec- 
laration of  Independence,  the  first  scheme  of 
government  was  adopted  for  the  revolted 
States,  it  contained  no  provision  for  an  execu- 
tive officer  to  whom  should  be  intrusted  ad- 
ministrative power  and  duty.  Those  who  had 
suffered  and  rebelled  on  account  of  the  tyranny 
of  an  English  King  were  evidently  chary  of 
subjecting,  themselves  to  the  chance  of  a  repeti- 
tion of  their  woes  through  an  abuse  of  the  power 
that  might  necessarily  devolve  upon  an  Ameri- 
can President. 

5 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

Thus,  under  the  Articles  of  Confederation, 
"The  United  States  of  America,"  without  an 
executive  head  as  we  understand  the  term,  came 
to  the  light;  and  in  its  charter  of  existence 
it  was  declared  that  "the  articles  of  this  Con- 
federation shall  be  inviolably  observed  by 
every  State,  and  the  Union  shall  be  perpetual. ' ' 

Let  us  not  harbor  too  low  an  opinion  of  the 
Confederation.  Under  its  guidance  and  direc- 
tion the  war  of  the  Eevolution  was  fought  to 
a  successful  result,  and  the  people  of  the  States 
which  were  parties  to  it  became  in  fact  free 
and  independent.  But  the  Articles  of  Confed- 
eration lacked  the  power  to  enforce  the  decree 
they  contained  of  inviolable  observance  by 
every  State;  and  the  union,  which  under  their 
sanction  was  to  be  permanent  and  lasting,  early 
developed  symptoms  of  inevitable  decay. 

It  thus  happened  that  within  ten  years  after 
the  date  of  the  Articles  of  Confederation  their 
deficiencies  had  become  so  manifest  that  repre- 
sentatives of  the  people  were  again  assembled 
in  convention  to  consider  the  situation  and  to 
devise  a  plan  of  government  that  would  form 
"a  more  perfect  union"  in  place  of  the  crum- 
bling structure  which  had  so  lately  been  pro- 
claimed as  perpetual. 

The  pressing  necessity  for  such  action  cannot 
6 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

be  more  forcibly  portrayed  than  was  done  by 
Mr.  Madison  when,  in  a  letter  written  a  short 
time  before  the  convention,  he  declared: 

Our  situation  is  becoming  every  day  more  and 
more  critical.  No  money  comes  into  the  Federal 
treasury ;  no  respect  is  paid  to  the  Federal  authority ; 
and  people  of  reflection  unanimously  agree  that  the 
existing  Confederacy  is  tottering  to  its  foundation. 
Many  individuals  of  weight,  particularly  in  the  East- 
ern district,  are  suspected  of  leaning  towards  mon- 
archy. Other  individuals  predict  a  partition  of  the 
States  into  two  or  more  confederacies. 

It  was  at  this  time  universally  conceded  that 
if  success  was  to  follow  the  experiment  of  popu- 
lar government  among  the  new  States,  the  crea- 
tion of  an  Executive  branch  invested  with 
power  and  responsibility  would  be  an  abso- 
lutely essential  factor.  Madison,  in  referring 
to  the  prospective  work  of  the  convention,  said : 

A  national  executive  will  also  he  necessary.  I 
have  scarcely  ventured  to  form  my  own  opinion  yet, 
either  of  the  manner  in  which  it  ought  to  be  consti- 
tuted, or  of  the  authorities  with  which  it  ought  to  be 
clothed. 

We  know  that  every  plan  of  government 
proposed  or  presented  to  the  convention  em- 
bodied in  some  form  as  a  prominent  feature 

7 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

the  establishment  of  an  effective  Executive ; 
and  I  think  it  can  be  safely  said  that  no  sub- 
ject was  submitted  which  proved  more  per- 
plexing and  troublesome.  We  ought  not  to 
consider  this  as  unnatural.  Many  members  of 
the  convention,  while  obliged  to  confess  that  the 
fears  and  prejudices  that  refused  executive 
power  to  the  Confederacy  had  led  to  the  most 
unfortunate  results,  were  still  confronted  with 
a  remnant  of  those  fears  and  prejudices,  and 
were  not  yet  altogether  free  from  the  suspicion 
that  the  specter  of  monarchy  might  be  con- 
cealed behind  every  suggestion  of  executive 
force.  Others  less  timid  were  nevertheless  tre- 
mendously embarrassed  by  a  lack  of  definite 
and  clear  conviction  as  to  the  manner  of  creat- 
ing the  new  office  and  fixing  its  limitations. 
Still  another  difficulty,  which  seems  to  have  been 
all-pervading  and  chronic  in  the  convention, 
and  which  obstinately  fastened  itself  to  the 
discussion  of  the  subject,  was  the  jealousy  and 
suspicion  existing  between  the  large  and  small 
States.  I  am  afraid,  also,  that  an  unwillingness 
to  trust  too  much  to  the  people  had  its  influence 
in  preventing  an  easy  solution  of  the  executive 
problem.  The  first  proposal  made  in  the  con- 
vention that  the  President  should  be  elected  by 
the  people  was  accompanied  by  an  apologetic 

8 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

statement  by  the  member  making  the  suggestion 
that  he  was  almost  unwilling  to  declare  the 
mode  of  selection  he  preferred,  "being  appre- 
hensive that  it  might  appear  chimerical. ' '  An- 
other favored  the  idea  of  popular  election,  but 
thought  it  "impracticable";  another  was  not 
clear  that  the  people  ought  to  act  directly  even 
in  the  choice  of  electors,  being,  as  alleged,  ' '  too 
little  informed  of  personal  characters  in  large 
districts,  and  liable  to  deception ' ' ;  and  again,  it 
was  declared  that ' '  it  would  be  as  unnatural  to 
refer  the  choice  of  a  proper  character  for  Chief 
Magistrate  to  the  people  as  it  would  to  refer  a 
trial  of  colors  to  a  blind  man." 

A  plan  was  first  adopted  by  the  convention 
which  provided  for  the  selection  of  the  Presi- 
dent by  the  Congress,  or,  as  it  was  then  called, 
by  the  National  Legislature.  Various  other 
plans  were  proposed,  but  only  to  be  summarily 
rejected  in  favor  of  that  which  the  convention 
had  apparently  irrevocably  decided  upon. 
There  were,  however,  among  the  members, 
some  who,  notwithstanding  the  action  taken, 
lost  no  opportunity  to  advocate,  with  energy 
and  sound  reasons,  the  substitution  of  a  mode 
of  electing  the  President  more  in  keeping  with 
the  character  of  the  office  and  the  genius  of  a 
popular  government.  This  fortunate  persis- 

9 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

tence  resulted  in  the  reopening  of  the  subject 
and  its  reference,  very  late  in  the  sessions  of  the 
convention,  to  a  committee  who  reported  in 
favor  of  a  procedure  for  the  choice  of  the  Ex- 
ecutive substantially  identical  with  that  now  in 
force ;  and  this  was  adopted  by  the  convention 
almost  unanimously. 

This  imperfect  review  of  the  incidents  that 
led  up  to  the  establishment  of  the  office  of  Pres- 
ident, and  its  rescue  from  dangers  which  sur- 
rounded its  beginning,  if  not  otherwise  useful, 
ought  certainly  to  suggest  congratulatory  and 
grateful  reflections.  The  proposition  that  the 
selection  of  a  President  should  rest  entirely 
with  the  Congress,  which  came  so  near  adop- 
tion, must,  I  think,  appear  to  us  as  something 
absolutely  startling;  and  we  may  well  be  sur- 
prised that  it  was  ever  favorably  considered  by 
the  convention. 

In  the  scheme  of  our  national  Government 
the  Presidency  is  preeminently  the  people's 
office.  Of  course,  all  offices  created  by  the  Con- 
stitution, and  all  governmental  agencies  exist- 
ing under  its  sanction,  must  be  recognized,  in  a 
sense,  as  the  offices  and  agencies  of  the  people 
— considered  either  as  an  aggregation  consti- 
tuting the  national  body  politic,  or  some  of  its 
divisions.  When,  however,  I  now  speak  of  the 

10 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

Presidency  as  being  preeminently  the  people's 
office,  I  mean  that  it  is  especially  the  office  re- 
lated to  the  people  as  individuals,  in  no  general, 
local,  or  other  combination,  but  standing  on  the 
firm  footing  of  manhood  and  American  citizen- 
ship. The  Congress  may  enact  laws;  but  they 
are  inert  and  vain  without  executive  impulse. 
The  Federal  courts  adjudicate  upon  the  rights 
of  the  citizen  when  their  aid  is  invoked.  But 
under  the  constitutional  mandate  that  the  Presi- 
dent ' '  shall  take  care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully 
executed,"  every  citizen,  in  the  day  or  in  the 
night,  at  home  or  abroad,  is  constantly  within 
the  protection  and  restraint  of  the  Executive 
power— none  so  lowly  as  to  be  beneath  its  scru- 
pulous care,  and  none  so  great  and  powerful 
as  to  be  beyond  its  restraining  force. 

In  view  of  this  constant  touch  and  the  rela- 
tionship thus  existing  between  the  citizen  and 
the  Executive,  it  would  seem  that  these  consid- 
erations alone  supplied  sufficient  reason  why 
his  selection  should  rest  upon  the  direct  and 
independent  expression  of  the  people's  choice. 
This  reason  is  reinforced  by  the  fact  that  inas- 
much as  Senators  are  elected  by  the  State  legis- 
latures, Representatives  in  Congress  by  the 
votes  of  districts  or  States,  and  judges  are  ap- 
pointed by  the  President,  it  is  only  in  the  se- 

ii 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

lection  of  the  President  that  the  body  of  the 
American  people  can  by  any  possibility  act  to- 
gether and  directly  in  the  equipment  of  their 
national  Government.  Without  at  least  this 
much  of  participation  in  that  equipment,  we 
could  hardly  expect  that  a  ruinous  discontent 
and  revolt  could  be  long  suppressed  among  a 
people  who  had  been  promised  a  popular  and 
representative  government. 

I  do  not  mean  to  be  understood  as  conceding 
that  the  selection  of  a  President  through  elec- 
tors chosen  by  the  people  of  the  several  States, 
according  to  our  present  plan,  perfectly  meets 
the  case  as  I  have  stated  it.  On  the  contrary, 
it  has  always  seemed  to  me  that  this  plan  is 
weakened  by  an  unfortunate  infirmity.  Though 
the  people  in  each  State  are  permitted  to  vote 
directly  for  electors,  who  shall  give  voice  to  the 
popular  preference  of  the  State  in  the  choice  of 
President,  the  voters  throughout  the  nation 
may  be  so  distributed,  and  the  majorities  given 
for  electors  in  the  different  States  may  be  such, 
that  a  minority  of  all  the  voters  in  the  land  can 
determine,  and  in  some  cases  actually  have  de- 
termined, who  the  President  should  be.  I  be- 
lieve a  way  should  be  devised  to  prevent  such 
a  result. 

It  seems  almost  ungracious,  however,  to  find 
12 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

fault  with  our  present  method  of  electing  a 
President  when  we  recall  the  alternative  from 
which  we  escaped,  through  the  final  action  of 
the  convention  which  framed  the  Constitution. 
It  is  nevertheless  a  curious  fact  that  the  plan 
at  first  adopted,  vesting  in  Congress  the  presi- 
dential election,  was  utterly  inconsistent  with 
the  opinion  of  those  most  prominent  in  the  con- 
vention, as  well  as  of  all  thoughtful  and  patri- 
otic Americans  who  watched  for  a  happy  result 
from  its  deliberations,  that  the  corner-stone  of 
the  new  Government  should  be  a  distinct  divi- 
sion of  powers  and  functions  among  the  Legis- 
lative, Executive,  and  Judicial  branches,  with 
the  independence  of  each  amply  secured. 
Whatever  may  have  been  the  real  reasons  for 
giving  the  choice  of  the  President  to  Congress, 
I  am  sure  those  which  were  announced  in  the 
convention  do  not  satisfy  us  in  this  day  and  gen- 
eration that  such  an  arrangement  would  have 
secured  either  the  separateness  or  independence 
of  the  Executive  department.  I  am  glad  to  be- 
lieve this  to  be  so  palpable  as  to  make  it  unnec- 
essary for  me  to  suggest  other  objections,  which 
might  subject  me  to  the  suspicion  of  question- 
ing the  wisdom  or  invariably  safe  motives  of 
Congress  in  this  relation.  It  is  much  more 
agreeable  to  acknowledge  gratefully  that  a 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

danger  was  avoided,  and  a  method  finally 
adopted  for  the  selection  of  the  Executive  head 
of  the  Government  which  was  undoubtedly  the 
best  within  the  reach  of  the  convention. 

The  Constitution  formed  by  this  convention 
has  been  justly  extolled  by  informed  and  lib- 
erty-loving men  throughout  the  world.  The 
statesman  who,  above  all  his  contemporaries 
of  the  past  century,  was  best  able  to  pass  judg- 
ment on  its  merits  formulated  an  unchallenged 
verdict  when  he  declared  that  ''the  Ameri- 
can Constitution  is  the  most  wonderful  work 
ever  struck  off  at  a  given  time  by  the  brain  and 
purpose  of  man." 

We  dwell  with  becoming  pride  upon  the  in- 
tellectual greatness  of  the  men  who  composed 
the  convention  which  created  this  Constitution. 
They  were  indeed  great;  but  the  happy  result 
of  their  labor  would  not  have  been  saved  to 
us  and  to  humanity  if  to  intellectual  great- 
ness there  had  not  been  added  patriotism,  pa- 
tience, and,  last  but  by  no  means  least,  for- 
bearing tact.  To  these  traits  are  we  especially- 
indebted  for  the  creation  of  an  Executive  de- 
partment, limited  against  every  possible  danger 
of  usurpation  or  tyranny,  but,  at  the  same  time,  j 
strong  and  independent  within  its  limitations.  ! 

The  Constitution  declares:  "The  executive 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

power  shall  be  vested  in  a  President  of  the 
United  States  of  America, ' '  and  this  is  followed 
by  a  recital  of  the  specific  and  distinctly  de- 
clared duties  with  which  he  is  charged,  and  the 
powers  with  which  he  is  invested.  The  mem- 
bers of  the  convention  were  not  willing,  how- 
ever, that  the  executive  power  which  they  had 
vested  in  the  President  should  be  cramped  and 
embarrassed  by  any  implication  that  a  specific 
statement  of  certain  granted  powers  and  duties 
excluded  all  other  executive  functions;  nor 
were  they  apparently  willing  that  the  claim  of 
such  exclusion  should  have  countenance  in  the 
strict  meaning  which  might  be  given  to  the 
words  " executive  power."  Therefore  we  find 
that  the  Constitution  supplements  a  recital  of 
the  specific  powers  and  duties  of  the  President 
with  this  impressive  and  conclusive  additional 
requirement :  ' '  He  shall  take  care  that  the  laws 
be  faithfully  executed. ' '  This  I  conceive  to  be 
equivalent  to  a  grant  of  all  the  power  necessary 
to  the  performance  of  his  duty  in  the  faithful 
execution  of  the  laws. 

The  form  of  Constitution  first  proposed  to  the 
convention  provided  that  the  President  elect, 
before  entering  upon  the  duties  of  his  office, 
should  take  an  oath,  simply  declaring:  "I  will 
faithfully  execute  the  office  of  President  of  the 

'5 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

United  States."  To  this  brief  and  very  gen- 
eral obligation  there  were  added  by  the  conven- 
tion the  following  words :  ' '  and  will  to  the  best 
of  my  judgment  and  power  preserve,  protect, 
and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States."  Finally,  the  "Committee  on  Style," 
appointed  by  the  convention,  apparently  to  ar- 
range the  order  of  the  provisions  agreed  upon, 
and  to  suggest  the  language  in  which  they 
would  be  best  expressed,  reported  in  favor  of 
an  oath  in  these  terms:  "I  will  faithfully  exe- 
cute the  office  of  President  of  the  United  States, 
and  will  to  the  best  of  my  ability  preserve,  pro- 
tect, and  defend  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States";  and  this  form  was  adopted  by  the 
convention  without  discussion,  and  continues  to 
this  day  as  the  form  of  obligation  which  binds 
the  conscience  of  every  incumbent  of  our  Chief 
Magistracy. 

It  is  therefore  apparent  that  as  the  Consti- 
tution, in  addition  to  its  specification  of  especial 
duties  and  powers  devolving  upon  the  Presi- 
dent, provides  that  "he  shall  take  care  that  the 
laws  be  faithfully  executed,"  and  as  this  was 
evidently  intended  as  a  general  devolution  of 
power  and  imposition  of  obligation  in  respect 
to  any  condition  that  might  arise  relating  to 
the  execution  of  the  laws,  so  it  is  likewise  ap- 

16 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

parent  that  the  convention  was  not  content  to 
rest  the  sworn  obligation  of  the  President  solely 
upon  his  covenant  to  "faithfully  execute  the 
office  of  President  of  the  United  States,"  but 
added  thereto  the  mandate  that  he  should  pre- 
serve, protect,  and  defend  the  Constitution,  to 
the  best  of  his  judgment  and  power,  or,  as  it 
was  afterward  expressed,  to  the  best  of  his  abil- 
ity. Thus  is  our  President  solemnly  required 
not  only  to  exercise  every  power  attached  to 
his  office,  to  the  end  that  the  laws  may  be  faith- 
fully executed,  and  not  only  to  render  obedi- 
ence to  the  demands  of  the  fundamental  law 
and  executive  duty,  but  to  exert  all  his  official 
strength  and  authority  for  the  preservation, 
protection,  and  defense  of  the  Constitution. 

I  have  thus  far  presented  considerations 
which  while  they  have  to  do  with  my  topic  are 
only  preliminary  to  its  more  especial  and  dis- 
tinct discussion.  In  furtherance  of  this  discus- 
sion it  now  becomes  necessary  to  quote  from 
the  Constitution  the  following  clause  found 
among  its  specification  of  presidential  duty  and 
authority : 

AL  d  he  shall  nominate,  and  by  and  with  the  advice 
of  the  Senate  shall  appoint  ambassadors,  other  pub- 
lic ministers  and  consuls,  judges  of  the  Supreme 

17 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

Court,  and  all  other  officers  of  the  United  States 
whose  appointments  are  not  herein  otherwise  pro- 
vided for,  and  which  shall  be  established  by  law. 

This  clause  was  the  subject  of  a  prolonged 
and  thorough  debate  in  Congress  which  oc- 
curred in  the  year  1789  and  during  the  first 
session  of  that  body  assembled  under  the  new 
Constitution. 


18 


II 


The  question  discussed  involved  distinctly 
and  solely  the  independent  power  of  the  Presi- 
dent under  the  Constitution  to  remove  an  officer 
appointed  by  him  by  and  with  the  advice  of  the 
Senate.  The  discussion  arose  upon  a  bill  then 
before  the  Congress,  providing  for  the  organi- 
zation of  the  State  Department,  which  contained 
a  provision  that  the  head  of  the  department 
to  be  created  should  be  removable  from  of- 
fice by  the  President.  This  was  opposed  by 
a  considerable  number  on  the  ground  that 
as  the  Senate  cooperated  in  the  appointment, 
it  should  also  be  consulted  in  the  matter  of 
removal;  it  was  urged  by  others  that  the 
power  of  removal  in  such  cases  was  already 
vested  in  the  President  by  the  Constitution,  and 
that  the  provision  was  therefore  unnecessary; 
and  it  was  also  contended  that  the  question 
whether  the  Constitution  permitted  such  re- 
moval or  not  should  be  left  untouched  by  legis- 
lative action,  and  be  determined  by  the  courts. 
Those  insisting  upon  retaining  in  the  bill  the 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

clause  permitting  removal  by  the  President 
alone,  claimed  that  such  legislation  would  re- 
move all  doubt  on  the  subject,  though  they  as- 
serted that  the  absolute  investiture  of  all  execu- 
tive power  in  the  President,  reinforced  by  the 
constitutional  command  that  he  should  take 
care  that  the  laws  be  faithfully  executed,  justi- 
fied their  position  that  the  power  already  ex- 
isted, especially  in  the  absence  of  any  adverse 
expression  in  the  Constitution.  They  also  in- 
sisted that  the  removal  of  subordinate  officers 
was  an  act  so  executive  in  its  character,  and 
so  intimately  related  to  the  faithful  execu- 
tion of  the  laws,  that  it  was  clearly  among 
the  President's  constitutional  prerogatives,  and 
that  if  it  was  not  sufficiently  declared  in  the 
Constitution,  the  omission  should  be  supplied 
by  the  legislation  proposed. 

In  support  of  these  positions  it  was  said  that 
the  participation  of  the  Senate  in  the  removal 
of  executive  officers  would  be  a  dangerous  step 
toward  breaking  down  the  partitions  between 
the  different  departments  of  the  Government 
which  had  been  carefully  erected,  and  were  re- 
garded by  every  statesman  of  that  time  as  ab- 
solutely essential  to  our  national  existence ;  and 
stress  was  laid  upon  the  unhappy  condition  that 
would  arise  in  case  a  removal  desired  by  the 

20 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

President  should  be  refused  by  the  Senate,  and 
he  thus  should  be  left,  still  charged  with  the  re- 
sponsibility of  the  faithful  execution  of  the 
laws,  while  deprived  of  the  loyalty  and  con- 
stancy of  his  subordinates  and  assistants,  who, 
if  resentful  of  his  efforts  for  their  removal, 
would  lack  devotion  to  his  work,  and  who,  hav- 
ing learned  to  rely  upon  another  branch  of  the 
Government  for  their  retention,  would  be  in- 
vited to  defiant  insubordination. 

At  the  time  of  this  discussion  the  proceedings 
of  the  Senate  took  place  behind  closed  doors, 
and  its  debates  were  not  published,  but  its  de- 
terminations upon  such  questions  as  came  be- 
fore it  were  made  public. 

The  proceedings  of  the  other  branch  of  the 
Congress,  however,  were  open,  and  we  are  per- 
mitted through  their  publication  to  follow  the 
very  interesting  discussion  of  the  question  re- 
ferred to  in  the  House  of  Representatives. 

The  membership  of  that  body  included  a 
number  of  those  who  had  been  members  of  the 
Constitutional  Convention,  and  who,  fresh  from 
its  deliberations,  were  necessarily  somewhat  fa- 
miliar with  its  purposes  and  intent.  Mr.  Madi- 
son was  there,  who  had  as  much  to  do  as  any 
other  man  with  the  inauguration  of  the  conven- 
tion and  its  successful  conclusion.  He  was  not 
21 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

only  especially  prominent  in  its  deliberations, 
but  increased  his  familiarity  with  its  pervading 
spirit  and  disposition  by  keeping  a  careful 
record  of  its  proceedings.  In  speaking  of  his 
reasons  for  keeping  this  record  he  says: 

The  curiosity  I  had  felt  during  my  researches  into 
the  history  of  the  most  distinguished  confederacies, 
particularly  those  of  antiquity,  and  the  deficiency  I 
found  in  the  means  of  satisfying  it,  more  especially 
in  what  related  to  the  process,  the  principles,  the  rea- 
sons and  the  anticipations  which  prevailed  in  the 
formation  of  them,  determined  me  to  preserve  as  far 
as  I  could  an  exact  account  of  what  might  pass  in  the 
convention  while  executing  its  trust,  with  the  mag- 
nitude of  which  I  was  duly  impressed,  as  I  was  by 
the  gratification  promised  to  future  curiosity,  by  an 
authentic  exhibition  of  the  objects,  the  opinions  and 
the  reasonings  from  which  a  new  system  of  govern- 
ment was  to  receive  its  peculiar  structure  and  organi- 
zation. Nor  was  I  unaware  of  the  value  of  such  a 
contribution  to  the  fund  of  materials  for  the  history 
of  a  Constitution  on  which  would  be  staked  the  hap- 
piness of  a  people  great  in  its  infancy  and  possibly 
the  cause  of  liberty  throughout  the  world. 

This  important  debate  also  gains  great  sig- 
nificance from  the  fact  that  it  occurred  within 
two  years  after  the  completion  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  before  political  rancor  or  the  tempta- 
tions of  partizan  zeal  had  intervened  to  vex  our 
congressional  counsels. 
It  must  be  conceded,  I  think,  that  all  the 
22 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

accompanying  circumstances  gave  tremendous 
weight  and  authority  to  this  first  legislative 
construction  of  the  Constitution  in  the  first  ses- 
sion of  the  first  House  of  Representatives,  and 
that  these  circumstances  fully  warranted  Mr. 
Madison's  declaration  during  the  debate: 

I  feel  the  importance  of  the  question,  and  know 
that  our  decision  will  involve  the  decision  of  all  sim- 
ilar cases.  The  decision  that  is  at  this  time  made  will 
become  the  permanent  exposition  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, and  on  a  permanent  exposition  of  the  Constitu- 
tion will  depend  the  genius  and  character  of  the 
whole  Government. 

The  discussion  developed  the  fact  that  from 
the  first  a  decided  majority  were  of  the  opinion 
that  the  Executive  should  have  power  of  inde- 
pendent removal,  whether  already  derived  from 
the  Constitution  or  to  be  conferred  by  supple- 
mentary legislation.  It  will  be  recalled  that 
the  debate  arose  upon  the  clause  in  a  pending 
bill  providing  that  the  officer  therein  named 
should  "be  removable  by  the  President,"  and 
that  some  of  the  members  of  the  House,  holding 
that  such  power  of  removal  was  plainly  granted 
to  the  Constitution,  insisted  that  it  would  be 
useless  and  improper  to  assume  to  confer  it  by 
legislative  enactment.  Though  a  motion  to 
strike  from  the  bill  the  clause  objected  to  had 

23 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

been  negatived  by  a  large  majority,  it  was 
afterward  proposed,  in  deference  to  the  opin- 
ions of  those  who  suggested  that  the  House 
should  go  no  further  than  to  give  a  legislative 
construction  to  the  Constitution  in  favor  of  ex- 
ecutive removal,  that  in  lieu  of  the  words  con- 
tained in  the  bill,  indicating  a  grant  of  the 
power,  there  should  be  inserted  a  provision  for 
a  new  appointment  in  case  of  a  vacancy  occur- 
ring in  the  following  manner: 

Whenever  the  said  principal  officer  shall  be  re- 
moved from  office  by  the  President  of  the  United 
States,  or  in  any  other  case  of  vacancy. 

This  was  universally  acknowledged  to  be  a 
distinct  and  unequivocal  declaration  that,  un- 
der the  Constitution,  the  right  of  removal  was 
conferred  upon  the  President;  and  those  sup- 
porting that  proposition  voted  in  favor  of  the 
change,  which  was  adopted  by  a  decisive  major- 
ity. The  bill  thus  completed  was  sent  to  the 
Senate,  where,  if  there  was  opposition  to  it  on 
the  ground  that  it  contained  a  provision  in  dero- 
gation of  senatorial  right,  it  did  not  avail;  for 
the  bill  was  passed  by  that  body,  though  grudg- 
ingly, and,  as  has  been  disclosed,  only  by  the 
vote  of  the  Vice-President,  upon  an  equal  di- 
vision of  the  Senate.  It  may  not  be  amiss  to 

24 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

mention,  as  adding  significance  to  the  concur- 
rence of  the  House  and  the  Senate  in  the  mean- 
ing and  effect  of  the  clause  pertaining  to  re- 
moval as  embodied  in  this  bill,  that  during  that 
same  session  two  other  bills  creating  the  Treas- 
ury Department  and  the  War  Department,  con- 
taining precisely  the  same  provision,  were 
passed  by  both  Houses. 

I  hope  I  shall  be  deemed  fully  justified  in  de- 
tailing at  some  length  the  circumstances  that 
led  up  to  a  legislative  construction  of  the  Con- 
stitution, as  authoritative  as  any  surroundings 
could  possibly  make  it,  in  favor  of  the  constitu- 
tional right  of  the  President  to  remove  Federal 
officials  without  the  participation  or  interfer- 
ence of  the  Senate. 

This  was  in  1789.  In  1886,  ninety-seven 
years  afterward,  this  question  was  again  raised 
in  a  sharp  contention  between  the  Senate  and 
the  President.  In  the  meantime,  as  was  quite 
natural  perhaps,  partizanship  had  grown  more 
pronounced  and  bitter,  and  it  was  at  that  par- 
ticular time  by  no  means  softened  by  the  fact 
that  the  party  that  had  become  habituated  to 
power  by  twenty-four  years  of  substantial  con- 
trol of  the  Government,  was  obliged,  on  the 
4th  of  March,  1885,  to  make  way  in  the  execu- 
tive office  for  a  President  elected  by  the  oppo- 

25 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

site  party.  He  came  into  office  fully  pledged  to 
the  letter  of  Civil  Service  reform ;  and  passing 
beyond  the  letter  of  the  law  on  that  subject,  he 
had  said: 

There  is  a  class  of  government  positions  which  are 
not  within  the  letter  of  the  Civil  Service  statute,  but 
which  are  so  disconnected  with  the  policy  of  an  ad- 
ministration, that  the  removal  therefrom  of  present 
incumbents,  in  my  opinion,  should  not  be  made  dur- 
ing the  terms  for  which  they  were  appointed,  solely 
on  partizan  grounds,  and  for  the  purpose  of  putting 
in  their  places  those  who  are  in  political  accord  with 
the  appointing  power. 

The  meaning  of  this  statement  is,  that  while, 
among  the  officers  not  affected  by  the  Civil  Ser- 
vice law,  there  are  those  whose  duties  are  so 
related  to  the  enforcement  of  the  political  pol- 
icy of  an  administration  that  they  should  be  in 
full  accord  with  it,  there  are  others  whose  du- 
ties are  not  so  related,  and  who  simply  perform 
executive  work;  and  these,  though  beyond  the 
protection  of  Civil  Service  legislation,  should 
not  be  removed  merely  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
warding the  party  friends  of  the  President,  by 
putting  them  in  the  positions  thus  made  vacant. 
An  adherence  to  this  rule,  based  upon  the  spirit 
instead  of  the  letter  of  Civil  Service  reform, 
I  believe  established  a  precedent,  which  has 

26 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

since    operated   to   check  wholesale   removals 
solely  for  political  reasons. 

The  declaration  which  I  have  quoted  was, 
however,  immediately  followed  by  an  important 
qualification,  in  these  terms : 

But  many  men  holding  such  positions  have  for- 
feited all  just  claim  to  retention,  because  they  have 
used  their  places  for  party  purposes,  in  disregard  of 
their  duty  to  the  people;  and  because,  instead  of 
being  decent  public  servants,  they  have  proved  them- 
selves offensive  partizans  and  unscrupulous  manipu- 
lators of  local  party  management. 

These  pledges  were  not  made  without  a  full 
appreciation  of  the  difficulties  and  perplexities 
that  would  follow  in  their  train.  It  was  antici- 
pated that  party  associates  would  expect,  not- 
withstanding Executive  pledges  made  in  ad- 
vance, that  there  would  be  a  speedy  and  liberal 
distribution  among  them  of  the  offices  from 
which  they  had  been  inexorably  excluded  for 
nearly  a  quarter  of  a  century.  It  was  plainly 
seen  that  many  party  friends  would  be  disap- 
pointed, that  personal  friends  would  be  alien- 
ated, and  that  the  charge  of  ingratitude,  the 
most  distressing  and  painful  of  all  accusations, 
would  find  abundant  voice.  Nor  were  the  diffi- 
culties overlooked  that  would  sometimes  accom- 
pany a  consistent  and  just  attempt  to  determine 

27 


Tbe  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

the  cases  in  which  incumbents  in  office  had  for- 
feited their  claim  to  retention.  That  such  cases 
were  numerous,  no  one  with  the  slightest  claim 
to  sincerity  could  for  a  moment  deny. 

With  all  these  things  in  full  view,  and  with 
an  alternative  of  escape  in  sight  through  an 
evasion  of  pledges,  it  was  stubbornly  deter- 
mined by  the  new  Executive  that  the  practical 
enforcement  of  the  principle  involved  was 
worth  all  the  sacrifices  which  were  anticipated. 
And  while  it  was  not  expected  that  the  Senate, 
which  was  the  only  stronghold  left  to  the  party 
politically  opposed  to  the  President,  would  con- 
tribute an  ugly  dispute  to  a  situation  already 
sufficiently  troublesome,  I  am  in  a  position  to 
say  that  even  such  a  contingency,  if  early  made 
manifest,  would  have  been  contemplated  with 
all  possible  fortitude. 

The  Tenure  of  Office  act,  it  will  be  remem- 
bered, was  passed  in  1867  for  the  express  pur- 
pose of  preventing  removals  from  office  by 
President  Johnson,  between  whom  and  the  Con- 
gress a  quarrel  at  that  time  raged,  so  bitter  that 
it  was  regarded  by  sober  and  thoughtful  men  as 
a  national  affliction,  if  not  a  scandal. 

An  amusing  story  is  told  of  a  legislator  who, 
endeavoring  to  persuade  a  friend  and  colleague 
to  aid  him  in  the  passage  of  a  certain  measure 

28 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

in  which  he  was  personally  interested,  met  the 
remark  that  his  bill  was  unconstitutional  with 
the  exclamation,  "What  does  the  Constitution 
amount  to  between  friends?"  It  would  be  un- 
seemly to  suggest  that  in  the  heat  of  strife  the 
majority  in  Congress  had  deliberately  deter- 
mined to  pass  an  unconstitutional  law,  but  they 
evidently  had  reached  the  point  where  they 
considered  that  what  seemed  to  them  the  public 
interest  and  safety  justified  them,  whatever  the 
risk  might  be,  in  setting  aside  the  congressional 
construction  given  to  the  Constitution  seventy- 
eight  years  before. 

The  law  passed  in  1867  was  exceedingly  radi- 
cal, and  in  effect  distinctly  purported  to  confer 
upon  the  Senate  the  power  of  preventing  the 
removal  of  officers  without  the  consent  of  that 
body.  It  was  provided  that  during  a  recess  of 
the  Senate  an  officer  might  be  suspended  only 
in  case  it  was  shown  by  evidence  satisfactory  to 
the  President,  that  the  incumbent  was  guilty  of 
misconduct  in  office  or  crime,  or  when  for  any 
reason  he  should  become  incapable  or  legally 
disqualified  to  perform  his  duties;  and  that 
within  twenty  days  after  the  beginning  of  the 
next  session  of  the  Senate,  the  President  should 
report  to  that  body  such  suspension,  with  the 
evidence  and  reasons  for  his  action  in  the  case, 

29 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

and  the  name  of  the  person  designated  by  the 
President  to  perform  temporarily  the  duties 
of  the  office.  Then  follows  this  provision : 

And  if  the  Senate  shall  concur  in  such  suspen- 
sion and  advise  and  consent  to  the  removal  of  such 
officer,  they  shall  so  certify  to  the  President,  who 
may  thereupon  remove  said  officer,  and  by  and  with 
the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  appoint  another 
person  to  such  office.  But  if  the  Senate  shall  refuse 
to  concur  in  such  suspension,  such  officer  so  sus- 
pended shall  forthwith  resume  the  functions  of  his 
office. 

On  the  5th  of  April,  1869,  a  month  and  a  day 
after  President  Johnson  was  succeeded  in  the 
Presidency  by  General  Grant,  that  part  of  the 
act  of  1867  above  referred  to,  having  answered 
the  purpose  for  which  it  was  passed,  was  re- 
pealed, and  other  legislation  was  enacted  in  its 
place.  It  was  provided  in  the  new  statute  that 
the  President  might  "in  his  discretion,"  dur- 
ing the  recess  of  that  body,  suspend  officials  un- 
til the  end  of  the  next  session  of  the  Senate,  and 
designate  suitable  persons  to  perform  the  du- 
ties of  such  suspended  officer  in  the  meantime ; 
and  that  such  designated  persons  should  be 
subject  to  removal  in  the  discretion  of  the  Pres- 
ident by  the  designation  of  others.  The  fol- 
lowing, in  regard  to  the  effect  of  such  suspen- 

30 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

sion,  was  inserted  in  lieu  of  the  provision  on 
that  subject  in  the  law  of  1867  which  I  have 
quoted  : 

And  it  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  President  within 
thirty  days  after  the  commencement  of  each  session 
of  the  Senate,  except  for  any  office  which  in  his  opin- 
ion ought  not  to  be  filled,  to  nominate  persons  to  fill 
all  vacancies  in  office  which  existed  at  the  meeting  of 
the  Senate,  whether  temporarily  filled  or  not,  and 
also  in  the  place  of  all  officers  suspended ;  and  if  the 
Senate,  during  such  session,  shall  refuse  to  advise 
and  consent  to  an  appointment  in  the  place  of  any 
suspended  officer,  then,  and  not  otherwise,  the  Presi- 
dent shall  nominate  another  person  as  soon  as  practi- 
cable to  said  session  of  the  Senate  for  said  office. 

This  was  the  condition  of  the  so-called  tenure 
of  office  legislation  when  a  Democratic  Presi- 
dent was  inaugurated  and  placed  in  expected 
cooperation  with  a  Republican  majority  in  the 
Senate— well  drilled,  well  organized,  with  parti- 
zanship  enough  at  least  to  insure  against  in- 
difference to  party  advantage,  and  perhaps 
with  here  and  there  a  trace  of  post-election  irri- 
tation. 

Whatever  may  be  said  as  to  the  constitution- 
ality of  the  Tenure  of  Office  laws  of  1867  and 
1869,  certainly  the  latter  statute  did  not  seem, 
in  outside  appearance,  to  be  charged  with  explo- 
sive material  that  endangered  Executive  pre- 
31 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

rogative.  It  grew  out  of  a  bill  for  the  absolute 
and  unconditional  repeal  of  the  law  of  1867  re- 
lating to  removals  and  suspensions.  This  bill 
originated  in  the  House  of  Representatives,  and 
passed  that  body  so  nearly  unanimously  that 
only  sixteen  votes  were  recorded  against  it.  In 
the  Senate,  however,  amendments  were  pro- 
posed, which  being  rejected  by  the  House,  a 
committee  of  conference  was  appointed  to  ad- 
just, by  compromise  if  possible,  the  controversy 
between  the  two  bodies.  This  resulted  in  an 
agreement  by  the  committee  upon  the  provi- 
sions of  the  law  of  1869,  as  a  settlement  of  the 
difficulty.  In  the  debate  in  the  House  of  Repre- 
sentatives on  the  report  of  the  committee,  great 
uncertainty  and  differences  of  opinion  were  de- 
veloped as  to  its  meaning  and  effect.  Even  the 
House  conferees  differed  in  their  explanation 
of  it.  Members  were  assured  that  the  proposed 
modifications  of  the  law  of  1867,  if  adopted, 
would  amount  to  its  complete  repeal ;  and  it  was 
also  asserted  with  equal  confidence  that  some  of 
its  objectionable  limitations  upon  executive  au- 
thority would  still  remain  in  force.  In  this 
state  of  confusion  and  doubt  the  House  of 
Representatives,  which  a  few  days  before  had 
passed  a  measure  for  unconditional  repeal,  with 
only  sixteen  votes  against  it,  adopted  the  report 

32 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

of  the  conference  committee  with  sixty-seven 
votes  in  the  negative. 

So  far  as  removals  following  suspensions  are 
concerned,  the  language  of  the  law  of  1869  cer- 
tainly seems  to  justify  the  understanding  that 
in  this  particular  it  virtually  repealed  the  exist- 
ing statute. 

The  provision  permitting  the  President  to 
suspend  only  on  certain  specified  grounds  was 
so  changed  as  to  allow  him  to  make  such  suspen- 
sions "in  his  discretion."  The  requirements 
that  the  President  should  report  to  the  Senate 
'  *  the  evidence  and  reasons  for  his  action  in  the 
case,"  and  making  the  advice  and  consent  of 
the  Senate  necessary  to  the  removal  of  a  sus- 
pended officer,  were  entirely  eliminated;  and 
in  lieu  of  the  provision  in  the  law  of  1867  that 
"if  the  Senate  shall  refuse  to  concur  in  such 
suspension,  such  officer  so  suspended  shall 
forthwith  resume  the  functions  of  his  office," 
the  law  of  1869,  after  requiring  the  President  to 
send  to  the  Senate  nominations  to  fill  the  place 
of  officers  who  had  been  "in  his  discretion"  sus- 
pended, declared  "that  if  the  Senate,  during 
such  session,  shall  refuse  to  advise  and  consent 
to  an  appointment  in  the  place  of  any  sus- 
pended officer,"— that  is,  shall  refuse  to  confirm 
the  person  appointed  by  the  President  in  place 
8  33 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

of  the  officer  suspended,— not  that  "such  officer 
so  suspended  shall  resume  the  functions  of  his 
office,"  but  that  "then,  and  not  otherwise,  the 
President  shall  nominate  another  person  as 
soon  as  practicable  to  said  session  of  the  Senate 
for  said  office." 

It  seems  to  me  that  the  gist  of  the  whole  mat- 
ter is  contained  in  a  comparison  of  these  two 
provisions.  Under  the  law  of  1867  the  incum- 
bent is  only  conditionally  suspended,  still  hav- 
ing the  right  to  resume  his  office  in  case  the 
Senate  refuses  to  concur  in  the  suspension ;  but 
under  the  law  of  1869  the  Senate  had  no  con- 
cern with  the  suspension  of  the  incumbent,  nor 
with  the  discretion  vested  in  the  President  in 
reference  thereto  by  the  express  language  of 
the  statute;  and  the  suspended  incumbent  was 
beyond  official  resuscitation.  Instead  of  the 
least  intimation  that  in  any  event  he  might 
"resume  the  functions  of  his  office,"  as  pro- 
vided in  the  law  of  1867,  it  is  especially  de- 
clared that  in  case  the  Senate  shall  refuse  to 
advise  and  consent  to  the  appointment  of  the 
particular  person  nominated  by  the  President 
in  place  of  the  suspended  official,  he  shall  nomi- 
nate another  person  to  the  Senate  for  such 
office.  Thus  the  party  suspended  seems  to  be 
eliminated  from  consideration,  the  Senate  is 

34 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

relegated  to  its  constitutional  rights  of  confirm- 
ing or  rejecting  nominations  as  it  sees  fit,  and 
the  President  is  reinstated  in  his  undoubted 
constitutional  power  of  removal  through  the 
form  of  suspension. 

In  addition  to  what  is  apparent  from  a  com- 
parison of  these  two  statutes,  it  may  not  be 
improper  to  glance  at  certain  phases  of  execu- 
tive and  senatorial  action  since  the  passage  of 
the  law  of  1869  as  bearing  upon  the  theory  that, 
so  far  as  it  dealt  with  suspensions  and  their  ef- 
fect, if  it  did  not  amount  to  a  repeal  of  the  law 
of  1867,  it  at  least  extinguished  all  its  harmful 
vitality  as  a  limitation  of  executive  prerogative. 
It  has  been  stated,  apparently  by  authority, 
that  President  Grant  within  seven  weeks  after 
his  inauguration  on  the  4th  of  March,  1869,  sent 
to  the  Senate  six  hundred  and  eighty  cases  of 
removals  or  suspensions,  all  of  which  I  assume 
were  entirely  proper  and  justifiable.  I  cannot 
tell  how  many  of  the  cases  thus  submitted  to  the 
Senate  were  suspensions,  nor  how  many  of  them 
purported  to  be  removals;  nor  do  I  know  how 
many  nominations  of  new  officers  accompany- 
ing them  were  confirmed.  It  appears  that 
ninety-seven  of  them  were  withdrawn  before 
they  were  acted  upon  by  the  Senate ;  and  inas- 
much as  the  law  of  1867  was  in  force  during 

35 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

four  of  the  seven  weeks  within  which  these  re- 
movals and  suspensions  were  submitted,  it  is 
barely  possible  that  these  withdrawals  were 
made  during  the  four  weeks  when  the  law 
of  1867  was  operative,  to  await  a  more  con- 
venient season  under  the  law  of  1869.  At- 
tention should  be  here  called,  however,  to  the 
dissatisfaction  of  President  Grant,  early  in  his 
incumbency,  with  the  complexion  of  the  situa- 
tion, even  under  the  repealing  and  amendatory 
law  of  1869.  In  his  first  annual  message  to  the 
Congress  in  December,  1869,  he  complained  of 
that  statute  as  1 1  being  inconsistent  with  a  faith- 
ful and  efficient  administration  of  the  Govern- 
ment," and  recommended  its  repeal.  Perhaps 
he  was  led  to  apprehend  that  the  Senate  would 
claim  under  its  provisions  the  power  to  prevent 
the  President  from  putting  out  of  office  an  un- 
desirable official  by  suspension.  This  is  indi- 
cated by  the  following  sentence  in  his  message : 
"What  faith  can  an  Executive  put  in  officials 
forced  upon  him,  and  those,  too,  whom  he  has 
suspended  for  reason  T'  Or  it  may  be  possible 
that  he  did  not  then  appreciate  how  accommo- 
datingly the  law  might  be  construed  or  enforced 
when  the  President  and  Senate  were  in  political 
accord.  However  these  things  may  be,  it  is  im- 

36 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

portant  to  observe,  in  considering  the  light  in 
which  the  law  of  1869  came  to  be  regarded  by 
both  the  Executive  and  the  Senate,  that  Presi- 
dent Grant  did  not  deem  it  necessary  afterward 
to  renew  his  recommendation  for  its  repeal, 
and  that  at  no  time  since  its  enactment  has  its 
existence  been  permitted  to  embarrass  execu- 
tive action  prior  to  the  inauguration  of  a  Presi- 
dent politically  opposed  to  the  majority  in  the 
Senate. 

The  review  which  I  have  thus  made  of  the 
creation  of  our  national  Executive  office,  and 
of  certain  events  and  incidents  which  inter- 
preted its  powers  and  functions,  leads  me  now 
to  a  detailed  account  of  the  incident  mentioned 
by  me  at  the  beginning  as  related  to  the  general 
subject  under  discussion  and  in  which  I  was 
personally  concerned.  But  before  proceeding 
further,  I  desire  to  say  that  any  allusion  I  may 
have  made,  or  may  hereafter  make,  recognizing 
the  existence  of  partizanship  in  certain  quarters 
does  not  arise  from  a  spirit  of  complaint  or  con- 
demnation. I  intend  no  more  by  such  allusions 
than  to  explain  and  illustrate  the  matters  with 
which  I  have  to  deal  by  surrounding  conditions 
and  circumstances.  I  fully  appreciate  the  fact 
that  partizanship  follows  party  organization, 

37 


The  Independence  oftbe  Executive 

that  it  is  apt  to  be  unduly  developed  in  all  par- 
ties, and  that  it  often  hampers  the  best  aspira- 
tions and  purposes  of  public  life ;  but  I  hope  I 
have  reached  a  condition  when  I  can  recall  such 
adverse  partizanship  as  may  have  entered  into 
past  conflicts  and  perplexities,  without  mislead- 
ing irritation  or  prejudice. 


Ill 


Immediately  after  the  change  of  administra- 
tion in  1885,  the  pressure  began  for  the  oust- 
ing of  Republican  office-holders  and  the  sub- 
stitution of  Democrats  in  their  places.  While 
I  claim  to  have  earned  a  position  which  en- 
titles me  to  resent  the  accusation  that  I  either 
openly  or  covertly  favor  swift  official  decapi- 
tation for  partizan  purposes,  I  have  no  sym- 
pathy with  the  intolerant  people  who,  without 
the  least  appreciation  of  the  meaning  of  party 
work  and  service,  superciliously  affect  to  de- 
spise all  those  who  apply  for  office  as  they 
would  those  guilty  of  a  flagrant  misdemeanor. 
It  will  indeed  be  a  happy  day  when  the  ascen- 
dancy of  party  principles,  and  the  attainment 
of  wholesome  administration,  will  be  univer- 
sally regarded  as  sufficient  rewards  of  individ- 
ual and  legitimate  party  service.  Much  has 
already  been  accomplished  in  the  direction  of 
closing  the  door  of  partizanship  as  an  entrance 
to  public  employment ;  and  though  this  branch 
of  effort  in  the  public  interest  may  well  be  still 

39 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

further  extended,  such  extension  certainly 
should  be  supplemented  by  earnest  and  persua- 
sive attempts  to  correct  among  our  people  long- 
cherished  notions  concerning  the  ends  that 
should  be  sought  through  political  activity,  and 
by  efforts  to  uproot  pernicious  and  office-re- 
warding political  methods.  I  am  not  sure  that 
any  satisfactory  progress  can  be  made  toward 
these  results,  until  our  good  men  with  unani- 
mity cease  regarding  politics  as  necessarily 
debasing,  and  by  active  participation  shall  dis- 
place the  selfish  and  unworthy  who,  when  unin- 
terrupted, control  party  operations.  In  the 
meantime,  why  should  we  indiscriminately  hate 
those  who  seek  office?  They  may  not  have  en- 
tirely emancipated  themselves  from  the  belief 
that  the  offices  should  pass  with  party  victory; 
but  even  if  this  is  charged  against  them,  it  can 
surely  be  said  that  in  all  other  respects  they  are 
in  many  instances  as  honest,  as  capable,  and  as 
intelligent  as  any  of  us.  There  may  be  reasons 
and  considerations  which  properly  defeat  their 
aspirations,  but  their  applications  are  not  al- 
ways disgraceful.  I  have  an  idea  that  some- 
times the  greatest  difference  between  them  and 
those  who  needlessly  abuse  them  and  gloat  over 
their  discomfiture,  consists  in  the  fact  that  the 
office-seekers  desire  office,  and  their  critics,  be- 

40 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

ing  more  profitably  employed,  do  not.  I  feel 
constrained  to  say  this  much  by  way  of  de- 
fending, or  at  least  excusing,  many  belonging 
to  a  numerous  contingent  of  citizens,  who,  after 
the  4th  of  March,  1885,  made  large  drafts  upon 
my  time,  vitality,  and  patience ;  and  I  feel  bound 
to  say  that  in  view  of  their  frequent  disap- 
pointments, and  the  difficulty  they  found  in 
appreciating  the  validity  of  the  reasons  given 
for  refusing  their  applications,  they  accepted 
the  situation  with  as  much  good  nature  and  con- 
tentment as  could  possibly  have  been  antici- 
pated. It  must  be  remembered  that  they  and 
their  party  associates  had  been  banished  from 
Federal  office-holding  for  twenty-four  years. 

I  have  no  disposition  to  evade  the  fact  that 
suspensions  of  officials  holding  presidential 
commissions  began  promptly  and  were  quite 
vigorously  continued;  but  I  confidently  claim 
that  every  suspension  made  was  with  honest 
intent  and,  I  believe,  in  accordance  with  the 
requirements  of  good  administration  and  con- 
sistent with  prior  executive  pledges.  Some  of 
these  officials  held  by  tenures  unlimited  as  to 
their  duration.  Among  these  were  certain  in- 
ternal-revenue officers  who,  it  seemed  to  me, 
in  analogy  with  others  doing  similar  work  but 
having  a  limited  tenure,  ought  to  consider  a  like 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

limited  period  of  incumbency  their  proper  term 
of  office ;  and  there  were  also  consular  officials 
and  others  attached  to  the  foreign  service  who, 
I  believe  it  was  then  generally  understood, 
should  be  politically  in  accord  with  the  admin- 
istration. 

By  far  the  greater  number  of  suspensions, 
however,  were  made  on  account  of  gross  and 
indecent  partizan  conduct  on  the  part  of  the 
incumbents.  The  preceding  presidential  cam- 
paign, it  will  be  recalled,  was  exceedingly 
bitter,  and  governmental  officials  then  in  place 
were  apparently  so  confident  of  the  continued 
supremacy  of  their  party  that  some  of  them 
made  no  pretense  of  decent  behavior.  In  nu- 
merous instances  the  post-offices  were  made 
headquarters  for  local  party  committees  and  or- 
ganizations and  the  centers  of  partizan  schem- 
ing. Party  literature  favorable  to  the  postmas- 
ters '  party,  that  never  passed  regularly  through 
the  mails,  was  distributed  through  the  post-of- 
fices as  an  item  of  party  service,  and  matter  of  a 
political  character,  passing  through  the  mails 
in  the  usual  course  and  addressed  to  patrons  be- 
longing to  the  opposite  party,  was  withheld; 
disgusting  and  irritating  placards  were  promi- 
nently displayed  in  many  post-offices,  and  the 
attention  of  Democratic  inquirers  for  mail  mat- 

42 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

ter  was  tauntingly  directed  to  them  by  the  post- 
master ;  and  in  various  other  ways  postmasters 
and  similar  officials  annoyed  and  vexed  those 
holding»  opposite  political  opinions,  who,  in 
common  with  all  having  business  at  public  of- 
fices, were  entitled  to  considerate  and  obliging 
treatment.  In  some  quarters  official  incumbents 
neglected  public  duty  to  do  political  work,  and 
especially  in  Southern  States  they  frequently 
were  not  only  inordinately  active  in  question- 
able political  work,  but  sought  to  do  party  ser- 
vice by  secret  and  sinister  manipulation  of  col- 
ored voters,  and  by  other  practices  inviting 
avoidable  and  dangerous  collisions  between  the 
white  and  colored  population. 

I  mention  these  things  in  order  that  what  I 
shall  say  later  may  be  better  understood.  I  by 
no  means  attempt  to  describe  all  the  wrong- 
doing which  formed  the  basis  of  many  of  the 
suspensions  of  officials  that  followed  the  inau- 
guration of  the  new  administration.  I  merely 
mention  some  of  the  accusations  which  I  recall 
as  having  been  frequently  made,  by  way  of  il- 
lustrating in  a  general  way  certain  phases  of 
pernicious  partizanship  that  seemed  to  me  to 
deserve  prompt  and  decisive  treatment.  Some 
suspensions,  however,  were  made  on  proof  of 
downright  official  malfeasance.  Complaints 

43 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

against  office-holders  based  on  personal  trans- 
gression or  partizan  misconduct  were  usually 
made  to  the  Executive  and  to  the  heads  of  de- 
partments by  means  of  letters,  ordinarily  per- 
sonal and  confidential,  and  also  often  by  means 
of  verbal  communications.  Whatever  papers, 
letters,  or  documents  were  received  on  the  sub- 
ject, either  by  the  President  or  by  any  head  of 
department,  were,  for  convenience  of  reference, 
placed  together  on  department  files.  These 
complaints  were  carefully  examined;  many 
were  cast  aside  as  frivolous  or  lacking  support, 
while  others,  deemed  of  sufficient  gravity  and 
adequately  established,  resulted  in  the  suspen- 
sion of  the  accused  officials. 

Suspensions  instead  of  immediate  removals 
were  resorted  to,  because  under  the  law  then 
existing  it  appeared  to  be  the  only  way  that 
during  a  recess  of  the  Senate  an  offending  of- 
ficial could  be  ousted  from  his  office,  and  his 
successor  installed  pending  his  nomination  to 
the  Senate  at  its  next  session.  Though,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  the  law  permitted  suspen- 
sions by  the  President  "in  his  discretion,"  I 
considered  myself  restrained  by  the  pledges  I 
had  made  from  availing  myself  of  the  discretion 
thus  granted  without  reasons,  and  felt  bound  to 

44 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

make  suspensions  of  officials  having  a  definite 
term  to  serve,  only  for  adequate  cause. 

It  will  be  observed  further  on  that  no  resis- 
tance was  then  made  to  the  laws  pertaining  to 
executive  removals  and  suspensions,  on  the 
ground  of  their  unconstitutionality ;  but  I  have 
never  believed  that  either  the  law  of  1867  or  the 
law  of  1869,  when  construed  as  permitting  in- 
terference with  the  freedom  of  the  President  in 
making  removals,  would  survive  a  judicial  test 
of  its  constitutionality. 

Within  thirty  days  after  the  Senate  met  in 
December,  1885,  the  nominations  of  the  persons 
who  had  been  designated  to  succeed  officials 
suspended  during  the  vacation  were  sent  to  that 
body  for  confirmation,  pursuant  to  existing 
statutes. 

It  was  charged  against  me  by  the  leader  of 
the  majority  in  the  Senate  that  these  nomina- 
tions of  every  kind  and  description,  represent- 
ing the  suspensions  made  within  ten  months 
succeeding  the  4th  of  March,  1885,  numbered 
six  hundred  and  forty-three.  I  have  not  veri- 
fied this  statement,  but  I  shall  assume  that  it  is 
correct.  Among  the  officials  suspended  there 
were  two  hundred  and  seventy-eight  postmas- 
ters, twenty-eight  district  attorneys,  and 

45 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

twenty-four  marshals,  and  among  those  who 
held  offices  with  no  specified  term  there  were 
sixty-one  internal-revenue  officers  and  sixty-five 
consuls  and  other  persons  attached  to  the  for- 
eign service. 

It  was  stated  on  the  floor  of  the  Senate,  after 
it  had  been  in  session  for  three  months,  that 
of  the  nominations  submitted  to  that  body  to 
fill  the  places  of  suspended  officials  fifteen  had 
been  confirmed  and  two  rejected. 

Quite  early  in  the  session  frequent  requests 
in  writing  began  to  issue  from  the  different 
committees  of  the  Senate  to  which  these  nomi- 
nations were  referred,  directed  to  the  heads  of 
the  several  departments  having  supervision  of 
the  offices  to  which  the  nominations  related,  ask- 
ing the  reasons  for  the  suspension  of  officers 
whose  places  it  was  proposed  to  fill  by  means 
of  the  nominations  submitted,  and  for  all 
papers  on  file  in  their  departments  which 
showed  the  reasons  for  such  suspensions. 
These  requests  foreshadowed  what  the  sena- 
torial construction  of  the  law  of  1869  might 
be,  and  indicated  that  the  Senate,  notwithstand- 
ing constitutional  limitations,  and  even  in  the 
face  of  the  repeal  of  the  statutory  provision 
giving  it  the  right  to  pass  upon  suspensions 
by  the  President,  was  still  inclined  to  insist,  di- 

46 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

rectly  or  indirectly,  upon  that  right.  These  re- 
quests, as  I  have  said,  emanated  from  commit- 
tees of  the  Senate,  and  were  addressed  to  the 
heads  of  departments.  As  long  as  such  requests 
were  made  by  committees  I  had  no  oppor- 
tunity to  discuss  the  questions  growing  out  of 
such  requests  with  the  Senate  itself,  or  to  make 
known  directly  to  that  body  the  position  on  this 
subject  which  I  felt  bound  to  assert.  Therefore 
the  replies  made  to  committees  by  the  different 
heads  of  departments  stated  that  by  direction 
of  the  President  they  declined  furnishing  the 
reasons  and  papers  so  requested,  on  the  ground 
that  the  public  interest  would  not  be  thereby 
promoted,  or  on  the  ground  that  such  reasons 
and  papers  related  to  a  purely  executive  act. 
Whatever  language  was  used  in  these  replies, 
they  conveyed  the  information  that  the  Presi- 
dent had  directed  a  denial  of  the  requests  made, 
because  in  his  opinion  the  Senate  could  have  no 
proper  concern  with  the  information  sought  to 
be  obtained. 

It  may  not  be  amiss  to  mention  here  that 
while  this  was  the  position  assumed  by  the  Ex- 
ecutive in  relation  to  suspensions,  all  the  in- 
formation of  any  description  in  the  possession 
of  the  Executive  or  in  any  of  the  departments, 
which  would  aid  in  determining  the  character 

47 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

and  fitness  of  those  nominated  in  place  of  sus- 
pended officials,  was  cheerfully  and  promptly 
furnished  to  the  Senate  or  its  committees  when 
requested. 

In  considering  the  requests  made  for  the 
transmission  of  the  reasons  for  suspensions, 
and  the  papers  relating  thereto,  I  could  not 
avoid  the  conviction  that  a  compliance  with  such 
requests  would  be  to  that  extent  a  failure  to 
protect  and  defend  the  Constitution,  as  well  as 
a  wrong  to  the  great  office  I  held  in  trust  for 
the  people,  and  which  I  was  bound  to  transmit 
unimpaired  to  my  successors;  nor  could  I  be 
unmindful  of  a  tendency  in  some  quarters  to 
encroach  upon  executive  functions,  or  of  the 
eagerness  with  which  executive  concession 
would  be  seized  upon  as  establishing  precedent. 

The  nominations  sent  to  the  Senate  remained 
neglected  in  the  committees  to  which  they  had 
been  referred;  the  requests  of  the  committees 
for  reasons  and  papers  touching  suspensions 
were  still  refused,  and  it  became  daily  more 
apparent  that  a  sharp  contest  was  impending. 
In  this  condition  of  affairs  it  was  plainly  in- 
timated by  members  of  the  majority  in  the  Sen- 
ate that  if  all  charges  against  suspended  officials 
were  abandoned  and  their  suspensions  based 
entirely  upon  the  ground  that  the  spoils  be- 

48 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

longed  to  the  victors,  confirmations  would  fol- 
low. This,  of  course,  from  my  standpoint, 
would  have  been  untruthful  and  dishonest ;  but 
the  suggestion  indicated  that  in  the  minds  of 
some  Senators,  at  least,  there  was  a  determina- 
tion to  gain  a  partizan  advantage  by  discredit- 
ing the  professions  of  the  President,  who,  for  the 
time,  represented  the  party  they  opposed.  This 
manifestly  could  be  thoroughly  done  by  induc- 
ing him  to  turn  his  back  upon  the  pledges  he  had 
made,  and  to  admit,  for  the  sake  of  peace,  that 
his  action  arose  solely  from  a  desire  to  put  his 
party  friends  in  place. 

Up  to  this  stage  of  the  controversy,  not  one 
of  the  many  requests  made  for  the  reasons  of 
suspensions  or  for  the  papers  relating  to  them 
had  been  sent  from  the  Senate  itself;  nor 
had  any  of  them  been  addressed  to  the  Presi- 
dent. It  may  seem  not  only  strange  that,  in 
the  existing  circumstances,  the  Senate  should 
have  so  long  kept  in  the  background,  but  more 
strange  that  the  Executive,  constituting  a  coor- 
dinate branch  of  the  Government,  and  having 
such  exclusive  concern  in  the  pending  differ- 
ences, should  have  been  so  completely  ignored. 
I  cannot  think  it  uncharitable  to  suggest  in  ex- 
planation that  as  long  as  these  requests  and 
refusals  were  confined  to  Senate  committees 

49 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

and  heads  of  departments,  a  public  communica- 
tion stating  the  position  of  the  President  in  the 
controversy  would  probably  be  avoided;  and 
that,  as  was  subsequently  made  more  apparent, 
there  was  an  intent,  in  addressing  requests  to 
the  heads  of  departments,  to  lay  a  foundation 
for  the  contention  that  not  only  the  Senate  but 
its  committees  had  a  right  to  control  these  heads 
of  departments  as  against  the  President  in  mat- 
ters relating  to  executive  duty. 

On  the  17th  of  July,  1885,  during  the  recess 
of  the  Senate,  one  George  M.  Duskin  was  sus- 
pended from  the  office  of  District  Attorney  for 
the  Southern  District  of  Alabama,  and  John 
D.  Burnett  was  designated  as  his  successor. 
The  latter  at  once  took  possession  of  the  office, 
and  entered  upon  the  discharge  of  its  duties; 
and  on  the  14th  of  December,  1885,  the  Senate 
having  in  the  meantime  convened  in  regular 
session,  the  nomination  of  Burnett  was  sent  to 
that  body  for  confirmation.  This  nomination, 
pursuant  to  the  rules  and  customs  of  the  Senate, 
was  referred  to  its  Committee  on  the  Judiciary. 
On  the  26th  of  December,  that  committee  then 
having  the  nomination  under  consideration,  one 
of  its  members  addressed  a  communication  to 
the  Attorney-General  of  the  United  States,  re- 
questing him,  "on  behalf  of  the  Committee  on 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

the  Judiciary  of  the  Senate  and  by  its  direc- 
tion, ' '  to  send  to  such  member  of  the  committee 
all  papers  and  information  in  the  possession  of 
the  Department  of  Justice  touching  the  nomi- 
nation of  Burnett, ' '  also  all  papers  and  informa- 
tion touching  the  suspension  and  proposed  re- 
moval from  office  of  George  M.  Duskin."  On 
the  llth  of  January,  1886,  the  Attorney-Gen- 
eral responded  to  this  request  in  these  terms : 

The  Attorney-General  states  that  he  sends  here- 
with all  papers,  etc.,  touching  the  nomination  re- 
ferred to;  and  in  reference  to  the  papers  touching 
the  suspension  of  Duskin  from  office,  he  has  as  yet 
received  no  direction  from  the  President  in  relation 
to  their  transmission. 

At  this  point  it  seems  to  have  been  decided 
for  the  first  time  that  the  Senate  itself  should 
enter  upon  the  scene  as  interrogator.  It  was 
not  determined,  however,  to  invite  the  Presi- 
dent to  answer  this  new  interrogator,  either  for 
the  protection  and  defense  of  his  high  office 
or  in  self-vindication.  It  appears  to  have  been 
also  decided  at  this  time  to  give  another  form 
to  the  effort  the  Senate  itself  was  to  undertake 
to  secure  the  "papers  and  information"  which 
its  Committee  had  been  unable  to  secure.  In 
pursuance  of  this  plan  the  following  resolution 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

was  adopted  by  the  Senate  in  executive  session 
on  the  25th  of  January,  1886 : 

Kesolved,  That  the  Attorney-General  of  the  United 
States  be,  and  he  hereby  is,  directed  to  transmit  to 
the  Senate  copies  of  all  documents  and  papers  that 
have  been  filed  in  the  Department  of  Justice  since 
the  1st  day  of  January,  A.D.  1885,  in  relation  to  the 
conduct  of  the  office  of  District  Attorney  of  the 
United  States  for  the  Southern  District  of  Alabama. 

The  language  of  this  resolution  is  more  adroit 
than  ingenuous.  While  appearing  reasonable 
and  fair  upon  its  face,  and  presenting  no  indi- 
cation that  it  in  any  way  related  to  a  case  of 
suspension,  it  quickly  assumes  its  real  com- 
plexion when  examined  in  the  light  of  its  sur- 
roundings. The  requests  previously  made  on 
behalf  of  Senate  committees  had  ripened  into  a 
* '  demand ' '  by  the  Senate  itself.  Herein  is  found 
support  for  the  suggestion  I  have  made,  that 
from  the  beginning  there  might  have  been  an 
'intent  on  the  part  of  the  Senate  to  claim  that 
the  heads  of  departments,  who  are  members  of 
the  President's  Cabinet  and  his  trusted  asso- 
ciates and  advisers,  owed  greater  obedience  to 
the  Senate  than  to  their  executive  chief  in  af- 
fairs which  he  and  they  regarded  as  exclusively 
within  executive  functions.  As  to  the  real 
meaning  and  purpose  of  the  resolution,  a  glance 

52 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

at  its  accompanying  conditions  and  the  inci- 
dents preceding  it  makes  manifest  the  insuf- 
ficiency of  its  disguise.  This  resolution  was 
adopted  by  the  Senate  in  executive  session, 
where  the  entire  senatorial  business  done  is  the 
consideration  of  treaties  and  the  confirmation 
of  nominations  for  office.  At  the  time  of  its 
adoption  Duskin  had  been  suspended  for  more 
than  six  months,  his  successor  had  for  that 
length  of  time  been  in  actual  possession  of  the 
office,  and  this  successor 's  nomination  was  then 
before  the  Senate  in  executive  session  for 
confirmation.  The  demand  was  for  copies  of 
documents  and  papers  in  relation  to  the  con- 
duct of  the  office  filed  since  January  1,  1885, 
thus  covering  a  period  of  incumbency  almost 
equally  divided  between  the  suspended  officer 
and  the  person  nominated  to  succeed  him.  The 
documents  and  papers  demanded  could  not  have 
been  of  any  possible  use  to  the  Senate  in  ex- 
ecutive session,  except  as  they  had  a  bearing 
either  upon  the  suspension  of  the  one  or  the 
nomination  of  the  other.  But  as  we  have  al- 
ready seen,  the  Attorney-General  had  previ- 
ously sent  to  a  committee  of  the  Senate  all  the 
papers  he  had  in  his  custody  in  any  way  re- 
lating to  the  nomination  and  the  fitness  of  the 
nominee,  whether  such  papers  had  reference 

53 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

to  the  conduct  of  the  office  or  otherwise.  Ex- 
cluding, therefore,  such  documents  and  papers 
embraced  in  the  demand  as  related  to  the  pend- 
ing nomination,  and  which  had  already  been 
transmitted,  it  was  plain  that  there  was  nothing 
left  with  the  Attorney-General  that  could  be  in- 
cluded in  the  demand  of  the  Senate  in  its  execu- 
tive session  except  what  had  reference  to  the 
conduct  of  the  previous  incumbent  and  his  sus- 
pension. It  is  important  to  recall  in  this  con- 
nection the  fact  that  this  subtle  demand  of  the 
Senate  for  papers  relating  "to  the  conduct  of 
the  office"  followed  closely  upon  a  failure  to 
obtain  "all  papers  and  information"  touching 
said  suspension,  in  response  to  a  plain  and 
blunt  request  specifying  precisely  what  was  de- 
sired. 


IV 


I  have  referred  to  these  matters  because  it 
seems  to  me  they  indicate  the  animus  and  intent 
which  characterized  the  first  stages  of  a  dis- 
cussion that  involved  the  rights  and  functions 
of  the  Executive  branch  of  the  Government. 
It  was  perfectly  apparent  that  the  issue  was 
between  the  President  and  the  Senate,  and  that 
the  question  constituting  that  issue  was  whether 
or  not  the  Executive  was  invested  with  the  right 
and  power  to  suspend  officials  without  the  in- 
terference of  the  Senate  or  any  accountability 
to  that  body  for  the  reasons  of  his  action.  It 
was  also  manifest  if  it  was  desired  to  deal  with 
this  issue  directly  and  fairly,  disembarrassed 
by  any  finesse  for  position,  it  could  at  any  time 
have  been  easily  done,  if  only  one  of  the  many 
requests  for  reasons  for  suspensions,  which 
were  sent  by  committees  of  the  Senate  to  heads 
of  departments,  had  been  sent  by  the  Senate  it- 
self to  the  President. 

Within  three  days  after  the  passage  by  the 
Senate,  in  executive  session,  of  the  resolution 

55 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

directing  the  Attorney-General  to  transmit  to 
that  body  the  documents  and  papers  on  file  re- 
lating to  the  management  and  conduct  of  the 
office  from  which  Mr.  Duskin  had  been  re- 
moved, and  to  which  Mr.  Burnett  had  been 
nominated,  the  Attorney-General  replied  there- 
to as  follows : 

In  response  to  the  said  resolution,  the  President  of 
the  United  States  directs  me  to  say  that  the  papers 
that  were  in  this  department  relating  to  the  fitness  of 
John  D.  Burnett,  recently  nominated  to  said  office, 
having  already  been  sent  to  the  Senate  Committee  on 
the  Judiciary,  and  the  papers  and  documents  which 
are  mentioned  in  the  said  resolution,  and  still  remain- 
ing in  the  custody  of  this  department,  having  exclu- 
sive reference  to  the  suspension  by  the  President  of 
George  M.  Duskin,  the  late  incumbent  of  the  office  of 
District  Attorney  for  the  Southern  District  of  Ala- 
bama, it  is  not  considered  that  the  public  interests 
will  be  promoted  by  a  compliance  with  said  resolu- 
tion and  the  transmission  of  the  papers  and  docu- 
ments therein  mentioned  to  the  Senate  in  executive 
session. 

This  response  of  the  Attorney-General  was 
referred  to  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Ju- 
diciary. Early  in  February,  1886,  a  majority 
of  the  committee  made  a  report  to  the  Senate, 
in  which  it  seems  to  have  been  claimed  that  all 
papers— whatever  may  be  their  personal,  pri- 
vate, or  confidential  character— if  placed  on 
file,  or,  in  other  words,  if  deposited  in  the  office 

56 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

of  the  head  of  a  department,  became  thereupon 
official  papers,  and  that  the  Senate  had  there- 
fore a  right  to  their  transmittal  when  they  had 
reference  to  the  conduct  of  a  suspended  official, 
and  when  that  body  had  under  advisement  the 
confirmation  of  his  proposed  successor.  Much 
stress  was  laid  upon  the  professions  made  by 
the  President  of  his  adherence  to  Civil  Service 
reform  methods,  and  it  was  broadly  hinted  that, 
in  the  face  of  six  hundred  and  forty-three  sus- 
pensions from  office,  these  professions  could 
hardly  be  sincere.  Instances  were  cited  in 
which  papers  and  information  had  been  de- 
manded and  furnished  in  previous  administra- 
tions, and  these  were  claimed  to  be  precedents 
in  favor  of  the  position  assumed  by  the  ma- 
jority of  the  committee.  Almost  at  the  outset 
of  the  report  it  was  declared : 

The  important  question,  then,  is  whether  it  is 
within  the  constitutional  competence  of  either  House 
of  Congress  to  have  access  to  the  official  papers  and 
documents  in  the  various  public  offices  of  the  United 
States,  created  by  laws  enacted  by  themselves. 

In  conclusion,  the  majority  recommended  the 
adoption  by  the  Senate  of  the  following  resolu- 
tions : 

Kesolved,  That  the  Senate  hereby  expresses  its 
condemnation  of  the  refusal  of  the  Attorney-General, 
under  whatever  influence,  to  send  to  the  Senate 

57 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

copies  of  papers  called  for  by  its  resolution  of  the 
25th  of  January  and  set  forth  in  the  report  of  the 
Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  as  in  violation  of  his 
official  duty  and  subversive  of  the  fundamental  prin- 
ciples of  the  Government,  and  of  a  good  administra- 
tion thereof. 

Resolved,  That  it  is  under  these  circumstances  the 
duty  of  the  Senate  to  refuse  its  advice  and  consent 
to  proposed  removals  of  officers,  the  documents  and 
papers  in  reference  to  the  supposed  official  or  per- 
sonal misconduct  of  whom  are  withheld  by  the  Ex- 
ecutive or  any  head  of  a  department  when  deemed 
necessary  by  the  Senate  and  called  for  in  considering 
the  matter. 

Eesolved,  That  the  provision  of  Section  1754  of 
the  Revised  Statutes,  declaring  that  persons  honor- 
ably discharged  from  the  military  or  naval  service 
by  reason  of  disability  resulting  from  wounds  or 
sickness  incurred  in  the  line  of  duty  shall  be  pre- 
ferred for  appointment  to  civil  offices  provided  they 
are  found  to  possess  the  business  capacity  necessary 
for  the  proper  discharge  of  the  duties  of  such  offices, 
ought  to  be  faithfully  and  fully  put  in  execution, 
and  that  to  remove  or  to  propose  to  remove  any  such 
soldier  whose  faithfulness,  competency,  and  char- 
acter are  above  reproach,  and  to  give  place  to  another 
who  has  not  rendered  such  service,  is  a  violation  of 
the  spirit  of  the  law  and  of  the  practical  gratitude 
the  people  and  the  Government  of  the  United  States 
owe  to  the  defenders  of  constitutional  liberty  and  the 
integrity  of  the  Government. 

The  first  of  these  resolutions  contains  charges 
which,  if  true,  should  clearly  furnish  grounds 

58 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

for  the  impeachment  of  the  Attorney-General 
—if  not  the  President  under  whose  " influence" 
he  concededly  refused  to  submit  the  papers  de- 
manded by  the  Senate.  A  public  officer  whose 
acts  are  "in  violation  of  his  official  duty  and 
subversive  of  the  fundamental  principles  of  the 
Government,  and  of  a  good  administration 
thereof, ' '  can  scarcely  add  anything  to  his  pre- 
dicament of  guilt. 

The  second  resolution  has  the  merit  of  hon- 
esty in  confessing  that  the  intent  and  object  of 
the  demand  upon  the  Attorney-General  was  to 
secure  the  demanded  papers  and  documents  for 
the  purpose  of  passing  upon  the  President's 
reasons  for  suspension.  Beyond  this,  the  dec- 
laration it  contains,  that  it  was  the  "duty  of 
the  Senate  to  refuse  its  advice  and  consent  to 
proposed  removals  of  officers ' '  when  the  papers 
and  documents  relating  to  their  "supposed  of- 
ficial or  personal  misconduct"  were  withheld, 
certainly  obliged  the  Senate,  if  the  resolution 
should  be  adopted,  and  if  the  good  faith  of  that 
body  in  the  controversy  should  be  assumed, 
to  reject  or  ignore  all  nominations  made  to 
succeed  suspended  officers  unless  the  documents 
and  papers  upon  which  the  suspension  was 
based  were  furnished  and  the  Senate  was 
thus  given  an  opportunity  to  review  and  re- 

59 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

verse  or  confirm  the  President's  executive  act, 
resting,  by  the  very  terms  of  existing  law,  "in 
his  discretion.'* 

The  third  resolution  is  grandly  phrased, 
and  its  sentiment  is  patriotic,  noble,  and  in- 
spiriting. Inasmuch,  however,  as  the  removal 
of  veteran  soldiers  from  office  did  not  seem  to 
assume  any  considerable  prominence  in  the 
arraignment  of  the  administration,  the  object 
of  the  resolution  is  slightly  obscure,  unless, 
as  was  not  unusual  in  those  days,  the  cause  of 
the  old  soldier  was  impressed  into  the  service 
of  the  controversy  for  purposes  of  general 
utility. 

A  minority  report  was  subsequently  submit- 
ted, signed  by  all  the  Democratic  members  of 
the  committee,  in  which  the  allegations  of  the 
majority  report  were  sharply  controverted.  It 
was  therein  positively  asserted  that  no  instance 
could  be  found  in  the  practice  of  the  Govern- 
ment whose  similarity  in  its  essential  features 
entitled  it  to  citation  as  an  authoritative  prece- 
dent ;  and  that  neither  the  Constitution  nor  the 
existing  law  afforded  any  justification  for  the 
action  of  the  Senate  in  the  promises. 

These  two  reports,  of  course,  furnished 
abundant  points  of  controversy.  About  the 
time  of  their  submission,  moreover,  another 

60 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

document  was  addressed  to  the  Senate,  which, 
whatever  else  may  be  said  of  it,  seems  to  have 
contributed  considerably  to  the  spirit  and  ani- 
mation of  the  discussion  that  ensued.  This  was 
a  message  from  the  President,  in  which  his  posi- 
tion concerning  the  matter  in  dispute  was 
defined.  In  this  communication  the  complete 
and  absolute  responsibility  of  the  President  for 
all  suspensions  and  the  fact  that  the  Executive 
had  been  afforded  no  opportunity  to  speak  for 
himself  was  stated  in  the  following  terms : 

Though  these  suspensions  are  my  executive  acts 
based  upon  considerations  addressed  to  me  alone, 
and  for  which  I  am  wholly  responsible,  I  have  had 
no  invitation  from  the  Senate  to  state  the  position 
which  I  have  felt  constrained  to  assume  in  relation 
to  the  same,  or  to  interpret  for  myself  my  acts  and 
motives  in  the  premises.  In  this  condition  of  affairs 
I  have  forborne  addressing  the  Senate  upon  the  sub- 
ject, lest  I  might  be  accused  of  thrusting  myself  un- 
bidden upon  the  attention  of  that  body. 

This  statement  was  accompanied  by  the  ex- 
pression of  a  hope  that  the  misapprehension 
of  the  Executive  position,  indicated  in  the  ma- 
jority report  just  presented  and  published, 
might  excuse  his  then  submitting  a  communica- 
tion. He  commented  upon  the  statement  in  the 
report  that  "the  important  question,  then,  is 

61 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

whether  it  is  within  the  constitutional  compe- 
tence of  either  House  of  Congress  to  have  ac- 
cess to  the  official  papers  and  documents  in  the 
various  public  offices  of  the  United  States, 
created  by  laws  enacted  by  themselves, ' '  by  sug- 
gesting that  though  public  officials  of  the  United 
States  might  be  created  by  laws  enacted  by  the 
two  Houses  of  Congress,  this  fact  did  not  neces- 
•  sarily  subject  their  offices  to  congressional  con- 
trol, but,  on  the  contrary,  that  "these  instru- 
mentalities were  created  for  the  benefit  of  the 
people,  and  to  answer  the  general  purposes  of 
government  under  the  Constitution  and  the 
laws;  and  that  they  are  unencumbered  by  any 
lien  in  favor  of  either  branch  of  Congress  grow- 
ing out  of  their  construction,  and  unembar- 
rassed by  any  obligation  to  the  Senate  as  the 
price  of  their  creation."  While  not  conceding 
that  the  Senate  had  in  any  case  the  right  to  re- 
view Executive  action  in  suspending  officials, 
the  President  disclaimed  any  intention  to  with- 
hold official  papers  and  documents  when  re- 
quested ;  and  as  to  such  papers  and  documents, 
he  expressed  his  willingness,  because  they  were 
official,  to  continue,  as  he  had  theretofore  done 
in  all  cases,  to  lay  them  before  the  Senate  with- 
out inquiry  as  to  the  use  to  be  made  of  them, 
and  relying  upon  the  Senate  for  their  legi- 

62 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

timate  utilization.  The  proposition  was 
expressly  denied,  however,  that  papers  and  doc- 
uments inherently  private  or  confidential,  ad- 
dressed to  the  President  or  a  head  of  depart- 
ment, having  reference  to  an  act  so  entirely 
executive  in  its  nature  as  the  suspension  of  an 
official,  and  which  was  by  the  Constitution  as 
well  as  by  existing  law  placed  within  the  discre- 
tion of  the  President,  were  changed  in  their 
nature  and  instantly  became  official  when  placed 
for  convenience  or  for  other  reasons  in  the 
custody  of  a  public  department.  The  conten- 
tion of  the  President  was  thus  stated: 

There  is  no  mysterious  power  of  transmutation  in 
departmental  custody,  nor  is  there  magic  in  the  un- 
defined and  sacred  solemnity  of  departmental  files. 
If  the  presence  of  these  papers  in  the  public  office 
is  a  stumbling-block  in  the  way  of  the  performance 
of  senatorial  duty,  it  can  be  easily  removed. 

The  Senate's  purposes  were  characterized  in 
the  message  as  follows : 

The  requests  and  demands  which  by  the  score 
have  for  nearly  three  months  been  presented  to  the 
different  departments  of  the  Government,  whatever 
may  be  their  form,  have  but  one  complexion.  They 
assume  the  right  of  the  Senate  to  sit  in  judgment 
upon  the  exercise  of  my  exclusive  discretion  and  Ex- 
ecutive function,  for  which  I  am  solely  responsible  to 

63 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

the  people  from  whom  I  have  so  lately  received  the 
sacred  trust  of  office.  My  oath  to  support  and  de- 
fend the  Constitution,  my  duty  to  the  people  who 
have  chosen  me  to  execute  the  powers  of  their  great 
office  and  not  relinquish  them,  and  my  duty  to  the 
chief  magistracy  which  I  must  preserve  unimpaired 
in  all  its  dignity  and  vigor,  compel  me  to'  refuse  com- 
pliance with  these  demands. 

This  was  immediately  supplemented  by  the 
following  concession  of  the  independent  and 
unlimited  power  of  the  Senate  in  the  matter  of 
confirmation : 

To  the  end  that  the  service  may  be  improved,  the 
Senate  is  invited  to  the  fullest  scrutiny  of  the  per- 
sons submitted  to  them  for  public  office,  in  recog- 
nition of  the  constitutional  power  of  that  body  to 
advise  and  consent  to  their  appointment.  I  shall 
continue,  as  I  have  thus  far  done,  to  furnish,  at  the 
request  of  the  confirming  body,  all  the  information 
I  possess  touching  the  fitness  of  the  nominees  placed 
before  them  for  their  action,  both  when  they  are 
proposed  to  fill  vacancies  and  to  take  the  place  of  sus- 
pended officials.  Upon  a  refusal  to  confirm,  I  shall 
not  assume  the  right  to  ask  the  reasons  for  the  action 
of  the  Senate  nor  question  its  determination.  I  can- 
not think  that  anything  more  is  required  to  secure 
worthy  incumbents  in  public  office  than  a  careful 
and  independent  discharge  of  our  respective  duties 
within  their  well-defined  limits. 

As  it  was  hardly  concealed  that  by  no  means 
the  least  important  senatorial  purpose  in  the 

64 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

pending  controversy  was  to  discredit  the  Civil 
Service  reform  pledges  and  professions  of  the 
Executive,  this  issue  was  thus  distinctly  in- 
vited at  the  close  of  the  message : 

Every  pledge  I  have  made  by  which  I  have 
placed  a  limitation  upon  my  exercise  of  executive 
power  has  been  faithfully  redeemed.  Of  course  the 
pretense  is  not  put  forth  that  no  mistakes  have  been 
committed;  but  not  a  suspension  has  been  made  ex- 
cept it  appeared  to  my  satisfaction  that  the  public 
welfare  would  be  promoted  thereby.  Many  applica- 
tions for  suspension  have  been  denied,  and  an  ad- 
herence to  the  rule  laid  down  to  govern  my  action  as 
to  such  suspensions  has  caused  much  irritation  and 
impatience  on  the  part  of  those  who  have  insisted 
upon  more  changes  in  the  offices. 

The  pledges  I  have  made  were  made  to  the  peo- 
ple, and  to  them  I  am  responsible  for  the  manner  in 
which  they  have  been  redeemed.  I  am  not  respon- 
sible to  the  Senate,  and  I  am  unwilling  to  submit 
my  actions  and  official  conduct  to  them  for  judgment. 

There  are  no  grounds  for  an  allegation  that  the 
fear  of  being  found  false  to  my  professions  influ- 
ences me  in  declining  to  submit  to  the  demands  of  the 
Senate.  I  have  not  constantly  refused  to  suspend 
officials  and  thus  incurred  the  displeasure  of  political 
friends,  and  yet  wilfully  broken  faith  with  the  peo- 
ple, for  the  sake  of  being  false  to  them. 

Neither  the  discontent  of  party  friends  nor  the 
allurements,  constantly  offered,  of  confirmation  of 
appointees  conditioned  upon  the  avowal  that  suspen- 
sions have  been  made  on  party  grounds  alone,  nor 
the  threat  proposed  in  the  resolutions  now  before  the 

65 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

Senate  that  no  confirmation  will  be  made  unless  the 
demands  of  that  body  be  complied  with,  are  suffi- 
cient to  discourage  or  deter  me  from  following  in  the 
way  which  I  am  convinced  leads  to  better  govern- 
ment for  the  people. 

The  temper  and  disposition  of  the  Senate 
may  be  correctly  judged,  I  think,  from  the  re- 
marks made  upon  the  presentation  of  this  mes- 
sage by  the  chairman  of  the  Committee  on  the 
Judiciary  and  the  acknowledged  leader  of  the 
majority.  On  a  formal  motion  that  the  mes- 
sage be  printed  and  lie  upon  the  table,  he 
moved  as  an  amendment  that  it  be  referred  to 
the  committee  of  which  he  was  chairman,  and 
said: 

I  merely  wish  to  remark,  in  moving  to  refer  this 
document  to  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  that 
it  very  vividly  brought  to  my  mind  the  communica- 
tions of  King  Charles  I  to  the  Parliament,  telling 
them  what,  in  conducting  their  affairs,  they  ought  to 
do  and  ought  not  to  do ;  and  I  think  I  am  safe  in  say- 
ing that  it  is  the  first  time  in  the  history  of  the  re- 
publican United  States  that  any  President  of  the 
United  States  has  undertaken  to  interfere  with  the 
deliberations  of  either  House  of  Congress  on  ques- 
tions pending  before  them,  otherwise  than  by  mes- 
sages on  the  state  of  the  Union  which  the  Constitu- 
tion commands  him  to  make  from  time  to  time.  This 
message  is  devoted  simply  to  a  question  for  the  Sen- 
ate itself,  in  regard  to  itself,  that  it  has  under  con- 
sideration. That  is  its  singularity.  I  think  it  will 

66 


Tbe  Independence  of  the  Executive 

strike  reflecting  people  in  this  country  as  somewhat 
extraordinary — if  in  this  day  of  reform  anything  at 
all  can  be  thought  extraordinary. 

King  Charles  I  fared  badly  at  the  hands  of 
the  Parliament ;  but  it  was  most  reassuring  to 
know  that,  after  all  said  and  done,  the  Senate  of 
the  United  States  was  not  a  bloodthirsty  body, 
and  that  the  chairman  of  its  Committee  on  the 
Judiciary  was  one  of  the  most  courteous  and 
amiable  of  men— at  least  when  outside  of  the 
Senate. 

The  debate  upon  the  questions  presented  by 
the  report  and  resolutions  recommended  by  the 
majority  of  the  committee,  and  by  the  minority 
report  and  the  presidential  message,  occupied 
almost  exclusively  the  sessions  of  the  Senate  for 
over  two  weeks.  More  than  twenty-five  Sena- 
tors participated,  and  the  discussion  covered 
such  a  wide  range  of  argument  that  all  consid- 
erations relevant  to  the  subject,  and  some  not 
clearly  related  to  it,  seem  to  have  been  pre- 
sented. At  the  close  of  the  debate,  the  resolu- 
tion condemning  the  Attorney-General  for  with- 
holding the  papers  and  documents  which  the 
Senate  had  demanded  was  passed  by  thirty-two 
votes  in  the  affirmative  and  twenty-five  in  the 
negative;  the  next  resolution,  declaring  it  to 
be  the  duty  of  the  Senate  to  refuse  its  advice 

67 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

and  consent  to  proposed  removals  of  officers 
when  papers  and  documents  in  reference  to 
their  alleged  misconduct  were  withheld,  was 
adopted  by  a  majority  of  only  a  single  vote; 
and  the  proclamation  contained  in  the  third 
resolution,  setting  forth  the  obligations  of  the 
Government  and  its  people  to  the  veterans  of 
the  civil  war,  was  unanimously  approved,  ex- 
cept for  one  dissenting  voice. 

The  controversy  thus  closed  arose  from  the 
professed  anxiety  of  the  majority  in  the  Senate 
to  guard  the  interests  of  an  official  who  was  sus- 
pended from  office  in  July,  1885,  and  who  was 
still  claimed  to  be  in  a  condition  of  suspension. 
In  point  of  fact,  however,  that  official's  term  of 
office  expired  by  limitation  on  the  20th  of  De- 
cember, 1885— before  the  demand  for  papers 
and  documents  relating  to  his  conduct  in  office 
was  made,  before  the  resolutions  and  reports 
of  the  Committee  on  the  Judiciary  were  pre- 
sented, and  before  the  commencement  of  the 
long  discussion  in  defense  of  the  right  of  a  sus- 
pended incumbent.  This  situation  escaped  no- 
tice in  Executive  quarters,  because  the  ap- 
pointee to  succeed  the  suspended  officer  having 
been  actually  installed  and  in  the  discharge  of 
the  duties  of  the  position  for  more  than  six 
months,  and  his  nomination  having  been  sent 

68 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

to  the  Senate  very  soon  after  the  beginning  of 
its  session,  the  situation  or  duration  of  the 
former  incumbent 's  term  was  not  kept  in  mind. 
The  expiration  of  his  term  was,  however,  dis- 
tinctly alleged  in  the  Senate  on  the  second  day 
of  the  discussion,  and  by  the  first  speaker  in 
opposition  to  the  majority  report.  The  ques- 
tion of  suspension  or  removal  was  therefore 
eliminated  from  the  case  and  the  discussion  as 
related  to  the  person  suspended  continued  as  a 
sort  of  post-mortem  proceeding.  Shortly  after 
the  resolutions  of  the  committee  were  passed, 
the  same  person  who  superseded  the  suspended 
and  defunct  officer  was  again  nominated  to  suc- 
ceed him  by  reason  of  the  expiration  of  his 
term;  and  this  nomination  was  confirmed. 

At  last,  after  stormy  weather,  Duskin,  the 
suspended,  and  Burnett,  his  successor,  were  at 
rest.  The  earnest  contention  that  beat  about 
their  names  ceased,  and  no  shout  of  triumph 
disturbed  the  supervening  quiet. 


69 


I  have  thus  attempted,  after  fourteen  years  of 
absolute  calm,  to  recount  the  prominent  details 
of  the  strife;  and  I  hope  that  interest  in  the 
subject  is  still  sufficient  to  justify  me  in  a  fur- 
ther brief  reference  to  some  features  of  the 
dispute  and  certain  incidents  that  followed  it, 
which  may  aid  to  a  better  appreciation  of  its 
true  character  and  motive. 

Of  the  elaborate  speeches  made  in  support 
of  the  resolutions  and  the  committee's  majority 
report,  seven  dealt  more  or  less  prominently 
with  the  President's  Civil  Service  reform  pro- 
fessions and  his  pledges  against  the  removal  of 
officials  on  purely  partizan  grounds.  It  seems 
to  have  been  assumed  that  these  pledges  had 
been  violated.  At  any  rate,  without  any  evi- 
dence worthy  of  the  name,  charges  of  such  vio- 
lation ranged  all  the  way  from  genteel  insinua- 
tion to  savage  accusation.  Senators  who  would 
have  stoutly  refused  to  vote  for  the  spoils  sys- 
tem broadly  intimated  or  openly  declared  that 
if  suspensions  had  been  made  confessedly  on 

70 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

partizan  grounds  they  would  have  interposed 
no  opposition.  The  majority  seem  to  have  es- 
pecially admired  and  applauded  the  antics  of 
one  of  their  number,  who,  in  intervals  of  lurid 
and  indiscriminate  vituperation,  gleefully  min- 
gled ridicule  for  Civil  Service  reform  with 
praise  of  the  forbidding  genius  of  partizan 
spoils.  In  view  of  these  deliverances  and  as 
bearing  upon  their  relevancy,  as  well  as  indi- 
cating their  purpose,  let  me  again  suggest  that 
the  issue  involved  in  the  discussion  as  selected 
by  the  majority  of  the  Committee  on  the  Ju- 
diciary, and  distinctly  declared  in  their  report, 
was  whether,  as  a  matter  of  right,  or,  as  the 
report  expresses  it,  as  within  "constitutional 
competence,"  either  House  of  Congress  should 
"have  access  to  the  official  papers  and  docu- 
ments in  the  various  public  offices  of  the  United 
States,  created  by  laws  enacted  by  themselves. ' ' 
It  will  be  readily  seen  that  if  the  question  was 
one  of  senatorial  right,  the  President's  Civil 
Service  reform  pledges  had  no  honest  or  legiti- 
mate place  in  the  discussion. 

The  debate  and  the  adoption  of  the  resolu- 
tions reported  by  the  committee  caused  no  sur- 
render of  the  Executive  position.  Neverthe- 
less, confirmations  of  those  nominated  in  place 
of  suspended  officers  soon  began,  and  I  cannot 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

recall  any  further  embarrassment  or  difficulty 
on  that  score.  I  ought  to  add,  however,  that  in 
many  cases,  at  least,  these  confirmations  were 
accompanied  by  reports  from  the  committee  to 
which  they  had  been  referred,  stating  that  the 
late  incumbent  had  been  suspended  for  "po- 
litical reasons,"  or  on  account  of  "offensive 
partizanship, "  or  for  a  like  reason,  differently 
expressed,  and  that  nothing  was  alleged  against 
them  affecting  their  personal  character.  If  the 
terms  thus  used  by  the  committee  in  designating 
causes  for  suspension  mean  that  the  persons 
suspended  were  guilty  of  offensive  partizan- 
ship or  political  offenses,  as  distinguished  from 
personal  offenses  and  moral  or  official  delin- 
quencies, I  am  satisfied  with  the  statement. 
And  here  it  occurs  to  me  to  suggest  that  if  of- 
fenses and  moral  or  official  delinquencies,  not 
partizan  in  their  nature,  had  existed,  they 
would  have  been  subjects  for  official  inspection 
and  report,  and  such  reports,  being  official  doc- 
uments, would  have  been  submitted  to  the  com- 
mittee or  to  the  Senate,  according  to  custom, 
and  would  have  told  their  own  story  and  ex- 
cluded committee  comment. 

It  is  worth  recalling,  when  referring  to  com- 
mittee reports  on  nomination,  that  they  belong 
to  the  executive  business  of  the  Senate,  and  are, 

72 


Tbe  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

therefore,  among  the  secrets  of  that  body. 
Those  I  have  mentioned,  nevertheless,  were  by 
special  order  made  public,  and  published  in  the 
proceedings  of  the  Senate  in  open  session. 
This  extraordinary,  if  not  unprecedented,  ac- 
tion, following  long  after  the  conclusion  of  the 
dispute,  easily  interprets  its  own  intent,  and  re- 
moves all  covering  from  a  design  to  accomplish 
partizan  advantage.  The  declaration  of  the 
resolutions  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  Senate 
"to  refuse  its  advice  and  consent  to  the  pro- 
posed removal  of  officers ' '  when  the  papers  and 
documents  relating  to  their  supposed  miscon- 
duct were  withheld,  was  abandoned,  and  the  ir- 
revocable removal  of  such  officers  by  confirma- 
tion of  their  successors  was  entered  upon,  with 
or  without  the  much-desired  papers  and  docu- 
ments, and  was  supplemented  by  the  publi- 
cation of  committee  reports,  from  which  the 
secrecy  of  the  executive  session  had  been  re- 
moved, to  the  end  that,  pursuant  to  a  fixed 
determination,  an  unfavorable  senatorial  inter- 
pretation might  be  publicly  given  to  the  Presi- 
dent's action  in  making  suspensions. 

I  desire  to  call  attention  to  one  other  inci- 
dent connected  with  the  occurrences  already 
narrated.  On  the  14th  of  December,  1885,— 
prior  to  the  first  request  or  demand  upon  any 

73 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

executive  department  relating  to  suspensions, 
and  of  course  before  any  controversy  upon  the 
subject  arose,— a  bill  was  introduced  in  the 
Senate  by  one  of  the  most  distinguished  and 
able  members  of  the  majority  in  that  body,  and 
also  a  member  of  its  Committee  on  the  Ju- 
diciary, for  the  total  and  complete  repeal  of  the 
law  of  1869,  which,  it  will  be  remembered,  fur- 
nished the  basis  for  the  contention  we  have  con- 
sidered. This  repealing  bill  was  referred  to  the 
Senate  Committee  on  the  Judiciary,  where  it 
slumbered  until  the  21st  of  June,  1886,— nearly 
three  months  after  the  close  of  the  contention, 
—when  it  was  returned  to  the  Senate  with  a 
favorable  report,  the  chairman  of  the  commit- 
tee alone  dissenting.  When  the  bill  was  pre- 
sented for  discussion,  the  Senator  who  intro- 
duced it  explained  its  object  as  follows : 

This  bill  repeals  what  is  left  of  what  is  called  the 
Tenure  of  Office  act,  passed  under  the  administra- 
tion of  Andrew  Johnson,  and  as  a  part  of  the  contest 
with  that  President.  It  leaves  the  law  as  it  was  from 
the  beginning  of  the  Government  until  that  time, 
and  it  repeals  the  provision  which  authorizes  the 
suspension  of  civil  officers  and  requires  the  submis- 
sion of  that  suspension  to  the  Senate. 

On  a  later  day,  in  discussing  the  bill,  he  said, 
after  referring  to  the  early  date  of  its  introduc- 
tion: 

74 


The  Independence  of  tbe  Executive 

It  did  not  seem  to  me  to  be  quite  becoming  to  ask 
the  Senate  to  deal  with  this  general  question  while 
the  question  which  arose  between  the  President  and 
the  Senate  as  to  the  interpretation  and  administra- 
tion of  the  existing  law  was  pending.  I  thought  as  a 
party  man  that  I  had  hardly  the  right  to  interfere 
with  the  matter  which  was  under  the  special  charge 
of  my  honorable  friend  from  Vermont,  by  challeng- 
ing a  debate  upon  the  general  subject  from  a  differ- 
ent point  of  view.  This  question  has  subsided  and  is 
past,  and  it  seems  to  me  now  proper  to  ask  the  Senate 
to  vote  upon  the  question  whether  it  will  return  to 
the  ancient  policy  of  the  Government,  to  the  rule  of 
public  conduct  which  existed  from  1789  until  1867, 
and  which  has  practically  existed,  notwithstanding 
the  condition  of  the  statute-book,  since  the  accession 
to  power  of  General  Grant  on  the  4th  of  March,  1869. 

The  personnel  of  the  committee  which  re- 
ported favorably  upon  this  repealing  bill  had 
not  been  changed  since  all  the  members  of  it 
politically  affiliating  with  the  majority  in  the 
Senate  joined  in  recommending  the  accusatory 
report  and  resolutions,  which,  when  adopted, 
after  sharp  and  irritating  discussion,  caused 
the  question  between  the  President  and  the 
Senate,  in  the  language  of  the  introducer  of 
the  repealing  bill,  to  ' '  subside. ' ' 

This  repealing  act  passed  the  Senate  on  the 
17th  of  December,  1886,  by  thirty  affirmative 
votes  against  twenty-two  in  the  negative.  A 
short  time  afterward  it  passed  in  the  House  of 

75 


The  Independence  of  the  Executive 

Representatives  by  a  majority  of  one  hundred 
and  five. 

Thus  was  an  unpleasant  controversy  happily 
followed  by  an  expurgation  of  the  last  pretense 
of  statutory  sanction  to  an  encroachment  upon 
constitutional  Executive  prerogatives,  and  thus 
was  a  time-honored  interpretation  of  the  Con- 
stitution restored  to  us.  The  President,  freed 
from  the  Senate's  claim  of  tutelage,  became 
again  the  independent  agent  of  the  people,  rep- 
resenting a  coordinate  branch  of  their  Govern- 
ment, charged  with  responsibilities  which,  un- 
der his  oath,  he  ought  not  to  avoid  or  divide 
with  others,  and  invested  with  powers,  not  to 
be  surrendered,  but  to  be  used,  under  the  guid- 
ance of  patriotic  intention  and  an  unclouded 
conscience. 


76 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE 
CHICAGO  STRIKE  OF  1894 


THE  GOVERNMENT  IN  THE 
CHICAGO  STRIKE  OF  1894 


THE  President  inaugurated  on  the  fourth 
day  of  March,  1893,  and  those  associated 
with  him  as  Cabinet  officials,  encountered,  dur- 
ing their  term  of  executive  duty,  unusual  and 
especially  perplexing  difficulties.  The  members 
of  that  administration  who  still  survive,  in 
recalling  the  events  of  this  laborious  service, 
cannot  fail  to  fix  upon  the  years  1894  and  1895 
as  the  most  troublous  and  anxious  of  their  in- 
cumbency. During  those  years  unhappy  cur- 
rency complications  compelled  executive  resort 
to  heroic  treatment  for  the  preservation  of  our 
nation's  financial  integrity,  and  forced  upon 
the  administration  a  constant,  unrelenting 
struggle  for  sound  money;  a  long  and  persis- 
tent executive  effort  to  accomplish  beneficent 
and  satisfactory  tariff  reform  so  nearly  mis- 
carried as  to  bring  depression  and  disappoint- 

79 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

merit  to  the  verge  of  discouragement ;  and  it  was 
at  the  close  of  the  year  1895  that  executive  in- 
sistence upon  the  Monroe  Doctrine  culminated 
in  a  situation  that  gave  birth  to  solemn  thoughts 
of  war.  Without  attempting  to  complete  the 
list  of  troubles  and  embarrassments  that  beset 
the  administration  during  these  luckless  years, 
I  have  reserved  for  separate  and  more  detailed 
treatment  one  of  its  incidents  not  yet  mentioned, 
which  immensely  increased  executive  anxiety 
and  foreboded  the  most  calamitous  and  far- 
reaching  consequences. 

In  the  last  days  of  June,  1894,  a  very  deter- 
mined and  ugly  labor  disturbance  broke  out  in 
the  city  of  Chicago.  Almost  in  a  night  it  grew 
to  full  proportions  of  malevolence  and  danger. 
Rioting  and  violence  were  its  early  accompani- 
ments; and  it  spread  so  swiftly  that  within  a 
few  days  it  had  reached  nearly  the  entire  West- 
ern and  Southwestern  sections  of  our  country. 
Railroad  transportation  was  especially  in- 
volved in  its  attacks.  The  carriage  of  United 
States  mails  was  interrupted,  interstate  com- 
merce was  obstructed,  and  railroad  property 
was  riotously  destroyed. 

This  disturbance  is  often  called  "The  Chi- 
cago Strike. "  It  is  true  that  its  beginning  was 
in  that  city ;  and  the  headquarters  of  those  who 

80 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

inaugurated  it  and  directed  its  operations  were 
located  there ;  but  the  name  thus  given  to  it  is 
an  entire  misnomer  so  far  as  it  applies  to 
the  scope  and  reach  of  the  trouble.  Eailroad 
operations  were  more  or  less  affected  in 
twenty-seven  States  and  Territories;  and  in 
all  these  the  interposition  of  the  general 
Government  was  to  a  greater  or  less  extent 
invoked.  •  I 

This  wide-spread  trouble  had  its  inception  in 
a  strike  by  the  employees  of  the  Pullman  Pal- 
ace Car  Company,  a  corporation  located  and 
doing  business  at  the  town  of  Pullman,  which 
is  within  the  limits  of  the  city  of  Chicago. 
This  company  was  a  manufacturing  corpora- 
tion—or at  least  it  was  not  a  railroad  corpora- 
tion. Its  main  object  was  the  operation  and 
running  of  sleeping-  and  parlor-cars  upon  rail- 
roads under  written  contracts;  but  its  charter 
contemplated  the  manufacture  of  cars  as 
well;  and  soon  after  its  incorporation  it  be- 
gan the  manufacture  of  its  own  cars  and,  sub- 
sequently, the  manufacture  of  cars  for  the  gen- 
eral market. 

The  strike  on  the  part  of  the  employees  of 
this  company  began  on  the  eleventh  day  of  May, 
1894,  and  was  provoked  by  a  reduction  of 
wages. 

6  fir 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

The  American  Railway  Union  was  organized 
in  the  summer  of  1893.  It  was  professedly  an 
association  of  all  the  different  classes  of  rail- 
way employees.  In  its  scope  and  intent  it  was 
the  most  compact  and  effective  organization  of 
the  kind  ever  attempted.  Its  purpose  was  a 
thorough  unification  of  defensive  and  offensive 
effort  among  railway  employees  under  one  cen- 
tral direction,  and  the  creation  of  a  combina- 
tion embracing  all  such  employees,  which 
should  make  the  grievances  of  any  section  of  its 
membership  a  common  cause.  Those  prominent 
in  this  project  estimated  that  various  other  or- 
ganizations of  railroad  employees  then  existing 
had  a  membership  of  102,000  in  the  United 
States  and  neighboring  countries;  and  they 
claimed  that  these  brotherhoods,  because  of  di- 
vided councils  and  for  other  reasons,  were  in- 
effective, and  that  nearly  1,000,000  railroad  em- 
ployees still  remained  unorganized. 

The  wonderful  growth  of  this  new  combina- 
tion is  made  apparent  by  the  fact  that  between 
the  month  of  August,  1893,  and  the  time  it 
became  involved  in  the  Pullman  strike,  in 
June,  1894,  it  had  enrolled  nearly  150,000 
members. 

The  employees  of  the  Pullman  Palace  Car 
Company  could  not  on  any  reasonable  and 

82 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

consistent  theory  be  regarded  as  eligible  to 
membership  in  an  organization  devoted  to  the 
interests  of  railway  employees;  and  yet,  dur- 
ing the  months  of  March,  April,  and  May, 
1894,  it  appears  that  nearly  4000  of  these  em- 
ployees were  enrolled  in  the  American  Railway 
Union. 

This,  to  say  the  least  of  it,  was  an  exceedingly 
unfortunate  proceeding,  since  it  created  a  sit- 
uation which  implicated  in  a  comparatively  in- 
significant quarrel  between  the  managers  of  an 
industrial  establishment  and  their  workmen  the 
large  army  of  the  Railway  Union.  It  was  the 
membership  of  these  workmen  in  the  Railway 
Union,  and  the  union's  consequent  assumption 
of  their  quarrel,  that  gave  it  the  proportions  of 
a  tremendous  disturbance,  paralyzing  the  most 
important  business  interests,  obstructing  the 
functions  of  the  Government,  and  disturbing 
social  peace  and  order. .  H,  v  ; 

No  injury  to  the  property  of  the  Pullman 
Palace  Car  Company  was  done  or  attempted 
while  the  strike  was  confined  to  its  employees; 
and  during  that  time  very  little  disorder  of  any 
kind  occurred. 

It  so  happened,  however,  that  in  June,  1894, 
after  the  strike  at  Pullman  had  continued  for 
about  one  month,  a  regular  stated  convention 

83 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

of  the  American  Railway  Union  was  held  in  the 
city  of  Chicago,  which  was  attended  by  dele- 
gates from  local  branches  of  the  organization 
in  different  States,  as  well  as  by  representatives 
of  its  members  among  the  employees  of  the 
Pullman  Palace  Car  Company.  At  this  con- 
vention the  trouble  at  Pullman  was  considered, 
and  after  earnest  efforts  on  the  part  of  the 
Railway  Union  to  bring  about  a  settlement,  a 
resolution  was,  on  the  twenty-second  day  of 
June,  passed  by  the  convention,  declaring  that 
unless  the  Pullman  Palace  Car  Company  should 
adjust  the  grievances  of  its  employees  before 
noon  of  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  June,  the  mem- 
bers of  the  American  Railway  Union  would, 
after  that  date,  refuse  to  handle  Pullman  cars 
and  equipment. 

The  twenty-sixth  day  of  June  arrived  with- 
out any  change  in  the  attitude  of  the  parties 
to  the  Pullman  controversy ;  and  thereupon  the 
order  made  by  the  American  Railway  Union 
forbidding  the  handling  of  Pullman  cars,  be- 
came operative  throughout  its  entire  member- 
ship. 

At  this  time  the  Pullman  Palace  Car  Com- 
pany was  furnishing  drawing-room  and  sleep- 
ing-car accommodations  to  the  traveling  public 
under  contracts  with  numerous  railway  com- 

84 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

panies,  and  was  covering  by  this  service  about 
one  hundred  and  twenty-five  thousand  miles  of 
railway,  or  approximately  three  fourths  of  all 
the  railroad  mileage  of  the  country.  The  same 
railroad  companies  which  had  contracted  to  use 
these  Pullman  cars  upon  their  lines  had  con- 
tracts with  the  United  States  Government  for 
the  carriage  of  mails,  and  were,  of  course,  also 
largely  engaged  in  interstate  commerce.  It 
need  hardly  be  said  that,  of  necessity,  the 
trains  on  which  the  mails  were  carried  and 
which  served  the  purpose  of  interstate  com- 
merce were,  very  generally,  those  to  which  the 
Pullman  cars  were  also  attached. 

The  president  of  the  Railway  Union  was  one 
Eugene  V.  Debs.  In  a  sworn  statement  after- 
ward made  he  gave  the  following  description 
of  the  results  of  the  interference  of  the  union 
in  the  Pullman  dispute: 

The  employees,  obedient  to  the  order  of  the  con- 
vention, at  once,  on  the  26th,  refused  to  haul  Pull- 
man cars.  The  switchmen,  in  the  first  place,  refused 
to  attach  a  Pullman  car  to  a  train,  and  that  is  where 
the  trouble  began;  and  then,  when  a  switchman 
would  be  discharged  for  that,  they  would  all  simul- 
taneously quit,  as  they  had  agreed  to  do.  One  de- 
partment after  another  was  involved  until  the  Illi- 
nois Central  was  practically  paralyzed,  and  the  Rock 
Island  and  other  roads  in  their  turn.  Up  to  the  first 

85 


The  Govern  nun  t  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

day  of  July,  or  after  the  strike  had  been  in  progress 
five  days,  the  railway  managers,  as  we  believe,  were 
completely  defeated.  Their  immediate  resources 
were  exhausted,  their  properties  were  paralyzed,  and 
they  were  unable  to  operate  their  trains.  Our  men 
were  intact  at  every  point,  firm,  quiet,  and  yet  de- 
termined, and  no  sign  of  violence  or  disorder  any- 
where. That  was  the  condition  on  the  thirtieth  day 
of  June  and  the  first  day  of  July. 

The  officers  of  the  Railway  Union  from  their 
headquarters  in  the  city  of  Chicago  gave  direc- 
tions for  the  maintenance  and  management  of 
the  strike,  which  were  quickly  transmitted  to 
distant  railroad  points  and  were  there  promptly 
executed.  As  early  as  the  28th  of  June,  two 
days  after  the  beginning  of  the  strike  ordered 
by  the  Railway  Union  at  Chicago,  information 
was  received  at  Washington  from  the  Post-Of- 
fice Department  that  on  the  Southern  Pacific 
System,  between  Portland  and  San  Francisco, 
Ogden  and  San  Francisco,  and  Los  Angeles 
and  San  Francisco,  the  mails  were  completely 
obstructed,  and  that  the  strikers  refused  to 
permit  trains  to  which  Pullman  cars  were  at- 
tached to  run  over  the  lines  mentioned.  There- 
upon Attorney-General  Olney  immediately  sent 
the  following  telegraphic  despatch  to  the  United 
States  district  attorneys  in  the  State  of  Cali- 
fornia: 

86 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  June  28,  1894. 
See  that  the  passage  of  regular  trains,  carrying 
United  States  mails  in  the  usual  and  ordinary  way, 
as  contemplated  by  the  act  of  Congress  and  directed 
by  the  Postmaster-General,  is  not  obstructed.  Pro- 
cure warrants  or  any  other  available  process  from 
United  States  courts  against  any  and  all  persons  en- 
gaged in  such  obstructions,  and  direct  the  marshal 
to  execute  the  same  by  such  number  of  deputies  or 
such  posse  as  may  be  necessary. 

On  the  same  day,  and  during  a  number  of 
days  immediately  following,  complaints  of  a 
similar  character,  sometimes  accompanied  by 
charges  of  forcible  seizure  of  trains  and  other 
violent  disorders,  poured  in  upon  the  Attor- 
ney-General from  all  parts  of  the  West  and 
Southwest.  These  complaints  came  from  post- 
office  officials,  from  United  States  marshals  and 
district  attorneys,  from  railroad  managers,  and 
from  other  officials  and  private  citizens.  In 
all  cases  of  substantial  representation  of  inter- 
ference with  the  carriage  of  mails,  a  despatch 
identical  with  that  already  quoted  was  sent 
by  the  Attorney-General  to  the  United  States 
district  attorneys  in  the  disturbed  localities; 
and  this  was  supplemented,  whenever  neces- 
sary, by  such  other  prompt  action  as  the  dif- 
ferent emergencies  required. 

I  shall  not  enter  upon  an  enumeration  of  all 
8? 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

the  disorders  and  violence,  the  defiance  of  law 
and  authority,  and  the  obstructions  of  national 
functions  and  duties,  which  occurred  in  many 
localities  as  a  consequence  of  this  labor  con- 
tention, thus  tremendously  reinforced  and  com- 
pletely under  way.  It  is  my  especial  purpose  to 
review  the  action  taken  by  the  Government  for 
the  maintenance  of  its  own  authority  and  the 
protection  of  the  interests  intrusted  to  its  keep- 
ing, so  far  as  they  were  endangered  by  this  dis- 
turbance; and  I  do  not  intend  to  specifically 
deal  with  the  incidents  of  the  strike  except  in  so 
far  as  a  reference  to  them  may  be  necessary  to 
show  conditions  which  not  only  justified  but 
actually  obliged  the  Government  to  resort  to 
stern  and  unusual  measures  in  the  assertion  of 
its  prerogatives. 

Inasmuch,  therefore,  as  the  city  of  Chicago 
was  the  birthplace  of  the  disturbance  and  the 
home  of  its  activities,  and  because  it  was  the 
field  of  its  most  pronounced  and  malign  mani- 
festations, as  well  as  the  place  of  its  final  ex- 
tinction, I  shall  meet  the  needs  of  my  subject 
if  I  supplement  what  has  been  already  said  by 
a  recital  of  events  occurring  at  this  central 
point.  In  doing  this,  I  shall  liberally  embody 
documents,  orders,  instructions,  and  reports 
which  I  hope  will  not  prove  tiresome,  since  they 

88 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

supply  the  facts  I  desire  to  present,  at  first 
hand  and  more  impressively  than  they  could 
be  presented  by  any  words  of  mine. 

Owing  to  the  enforced  relationship  of  Chi- 
cago to  the  strike  which  started  within  its  bor- 
ders, and  because  of  its  importance  as  a  center 
of  railway  traffic,  Government  officials  at  Wash- 
ington were  not  surprised  by  the  early  and  per- 
sistent complaints  of  mail  and  interstate  com- 
merce obstructions  which  reached  them  from 
that  city.  It  was  from  the  first  anticipated  that 
this  would  be  the  seat  of  the  most  serious  com- 
plications, and  the  place  where  the  strong  arm 
of  the  law  would  be  most  needed.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances it  would  have  been  a  criminal 
neglect  of  duty  if  those  charged  with  the  protec- 
tion of  governmental  agencies  and  the  enforce- 
ment of  orderly  obedience  and  submission  to 
Federal  authority,  had  been  remiss  in  prepara- 
tions for  any  emergency  in  that  quarter. 

On  the  thirtieth  day  of  June  the  district  at- 
torney at  Chicago  reported  by  telegraph  that 
mail  trains  in  the  suburbs  of  Chicago  were,  on 
the  previous  night,  stopped  by  strikers,  that  an 
engine  had  been  cut  off  and  disabled,  and  that 
conditions  were  growing  more  and  more  likely 
to  culminate  in  the  stoppage  of  all  trains ;  and 
he  recommended  that  the  marshal  be  authorized 

89 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

to  employ  a  force  of  special  deputies  who  should 
be  placed  on  trains  to  protect  mails  and  detect 
the  parties  guilty  of  such  interference.  In  re- 
ply to  this  despatch  Attorney-General  Olney  on 
the  same  day  authorized  the  marshal  to  employ 
additional  deputies  as  suggested,  and  desig- 
nated Edwin  Walker,  an  able  and  prominent 
attorney  in  Chicago,  as  special  counsel  for  the 
Government,  to  assist  the  district  attorney  in 
any  legal  proceedings  that  might  be  instituted. 
He  also  notified  the  district  attorney  of  the  steps 
thus  taken,  and  enjoined  upon  him  that  "action 
ought  to  be  prompt  and  vigorous, ' '  and  also  di- 
rected him  to  confer  with  the  special  counsel 
who  had  been  employed.  In  a  letter  of  the  same 
date  addressed  to  this  special  counsel,  the  At- 
torney-General, in  making  suggestions  concern- 
ing legal  proceedings,  wrote : '  *  It  has  seemed  to 
me  that  if  the  rights  of  the  United  States  were 
vigorously  asserted  in  Chicago,  the  origin  and 
center  of  the  demonstration,  the  result  would 
be  to  make  it  a  failure  everywhere  else,  and  to 
prevent  its  spread  over  the  entire  country"; 
and  in  that  connection  he  indicated  that  it  might 
be  advisable,  instead  of  relying  entirely  upon 
warrants  issued  under  criminal  statutes  against 
persons  actually  guilty  of  the  offense  of  ob- 

90 


The  Government  in  Cbicago  Strike  0/1894 

structing  United  States  mails,  to  apply  to  the 
courts  for  injunctions  which  would  restrain 
and  prevent  any  attempt  to  commit  such  of- 
fense. This  suggestion  contemplated  the  in- 
auguration of  legal  proceedings  in  a  regular 
and  usual  way  to  restrain  those  prominently 
concerned  in  the  interference  with  the  mails 
and  the  obstruction  of  interstate  commerce, 
basing  such  proceedings  on  the  proposition 
that,  under  the  Constitution  and  laws,  these 
subjects  were  in  the  exclusive  care  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  and  that  for  their 
protection  the  Federal  courts  were  competent 
under  general  principles  of  law  to  intervene 
by  injunction ;  and  on  the  further  ground  that 
under  an  act  of  Congress,  passed  July  2,  1890, 
conspiracies  in  restraint  of  trade  or  commerce 
among  the  several  States  were  declared  to  be  il- 
legal, and  the  circuit  courts  of  the  United 
States  were  therein  expressly  given  jurisdiction 
to  prevent  and  restrain  such  conspiracies. 

On  the  first  day  of  July  the  district  attorney 
reported  to  the  Attorney-General  that  he  was 
preparing  a  bill  of  complaint  to  be  presented  to 
the  court  the  next  day,  on  an  application  for  an 
injunction.  He  further  reported  that  very  little 
mail  and  no  freight  was  moving,  that  the  mar- 

9' 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

shal  was  using  all  his  force  to  prevent  riots 
and  the  obstruction  of  tracks,  and  that  this  force 
was  clearly  inadequate.  On  the  same  day  the 
marshal  reported  that  the  situation  was  des- 
perate, that  he  had  sworn  in  over  four  hundred 
deputies,  that  many  more  would  be  required  to 
protect  mail  trains,  and  that  he  expected  great 
trouble  the  next  day.  He  further  expressed 
the  opinion  that  one  hundred  riot  guns  were 
needed. 

Upon  the  receipt  of  these  reports,  and  antici- 
pating an  attempt  to  serve  injunctions  on  the 
following  day,  the  Attorney-General  immedi- 
ately sent  a  despatch  to  the  district  attorney 
directing  him  to  report  at  once  if  the  process 
of  the  court  should  be  resisted  by  such  force  as 
the  marshal  could  not  overcome,  and  suggest- 
ing that  the  United  States  judge  should  join 
in  such  report.  He  at  the  same  time  sent  a 
despatch  to  the  special  counsel  requesting  him 
to  report  his  view  of  the  situation  as  early  as 
the  forenoon  of  the  next  day. 

In  explanation  of  these  two  despatches  it 
should  here  be  said  that  the  desperate  character 
of  this  disturbance  was  not  in  the  least  under- 
estimated by  executive  officials  at  Washington  ; 
and  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  while  menac- 
ing conditions  were  moving  swiftly  and  accu- 

92 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

nmlating  at  Chicago,  like  conditions,  inspired 
and  supported  from  that  central  point,  existed 
in  many  other  places  within  the  area  of  the 
strike's  contagion. 

Of  course  it  was  hoped  by  those  charged  with 
the  responsibility  of  dealing  with  the  situation, 
that  a  direct  assertion  of  authority  by  the  mar- 
shal and  a  resort  to  the  restraining  power  of 
the  courts  would  prove  sufficient  for  the  emer- 
gency. Notwithstanding,  however,  an  anxious 
desire  to  avoid  measures  more  radical,  the  fact 
had  not  been  overlooked  that  a  contingency 
might  occur  which  would  compel  a  resort  to 
military  force.  The  key  to  these  despatches  of 
the  Attorney-General  is  found  in  the  determina- 
tion of  the  Federal  authorities  to  overcome  by 
any  lawful  and  constitutional  means  all  resist- 
ance to  governmental  functions  as  related  to  the 
transportation  of  mails,  the  operation  of  inter- 
state commerce,  and  the  preservation  of  the 
property  of  the  United  States. 

The  Constitution  requires  that  the  United 
States  shall  protect  each  of  the  States  against 
invasion, ' '  and  on  application  of  the  legislature, 
or  of  the  executive  (when  the  legislature  can- 
not be  convened),  against  domestic  violence." 
There  was  plenty  of  domestic  violence  in  the 
city  of  Chicago  and  in  the  State  of  Illinois  dur- 

93 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

ing  the  early  days  of  July,  1894 ;  but  no  appli- 
cation was  made  to  the  Federal  Government  for 
assistance.  It  was  probably  a  very  fortunate 
circumstance  that  the  presence  of  United  States 
soldiers  in  Chicago  at  that  time  did  not  depend 
upon  the  request  or  desire  of  Governor  Altgeld. 
Section  5298  of  the  Revised  Statutes  of  the 
United  States  provides:  " Whenever,  by  rea- 
son of  unlawful  obstructions,  combinations  or 
assemblages  of  persons,  or  rebellion  against 
the  authority  of  the  United  States,  it  shall  be- 
come impracticable  in  the  judgment  of  the 
President  to  enforce,  by  the  ordinary  course  of 
judicial  proceedings,  the  laws  of  the  United 
States  within  any  State  or  Territory,  it  shall  be 
lawful  for  the  President  to  call  forth  the  militia 
of  any  or  all  of  the  States,  and  to  employ  such 
parts  of  the  land  or  naval  forces  of  the  United 
States  as  he  may  deem  necessary  to  enforce  the 
faithful  execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United 
States,  or  to  suppress  such  rebellion,  in  what- 
ever State  or  Territory  thereof  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  may  be  forcibly  opposed,  or 
the  execution  thereof  be  forcibly  obstructed"; 
and  Section  5299  provides :  ' '  Whenever  any  in- 
surrection, domestic  violence,  unlawful  com- 
binations or  conspiracies  in  any  State  .  .  . 
opposes  or  obstructs  the  laws  of  the  United 

94 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

States,  or  the  due  execution  thereof,  or  impedes 
or  obstructs  the  due  course  of  justice  under  the 
same,  it  shall  be  lawful  for  the  President,  and  it 
shall  be  his  duty,  to  take  such  measures,  by  the 
employment  of  the  militia,  or  the  land  and  naval 
forces  of  the  United  States,  or  of  either,  or  by 
other  means  as  he  may  deem  necessary,  for  the 
suppression  of  such  insurrection,  domestic  vio- 
lence or  combinations. ' ' 


II 


It  was  the  intention  of  the  Attorney-General 
to  suggest  in  these  despatches  that  immediate 
and  authoritative  information  should  be  given 
to  the  Washington  authorities  if  a  time  should 
arrive  when,  under  the  sanction  of  general  ex- 
ecutive authority,  or  the  constitutional  and  stat- 
utory provisions  above  quoted,  a  military  force 
would  be  necessary  at  the  scene  of  disturbance. 

On  the  2d  of  July,  the  day  after  these  de- 
spatches were  sent,  information  was  received 
from  the  district  attorney  and  special  counsel 
that  a  sweeping  injunction  had  been  granted 
against  Eugene  V.  Debs,  president  of  the  Amer- 
ican Railway  Union,  and  other  officials  of  that 
organization,  together  with  parties  whose 
names  were  unknown,  and  that  the  writs  would 
be  served  that  afternoon.  The  special  counsel 
also  expressed  the  opinion  that  it  would  require 
Government  troops  to  enforce  the  orders  of  the 
court  and  protect  the  transportation  of  mails. 

Major-General  Schofield  was  then  in  com- 
mand of  the  army;  and,  after  a  consultation 

96 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

with  him,  in  which  the  Attorney-General  and 
the  Secretary  of  War  took  part,  I  directed  the 
issuance  of  the  following  order  by  telegraph  to 
General  Nelson  A.  Miles,  in  command  of  the 
Military  Department  of  Missouri,  with  head- 
quarters at  Chicago : 

HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY. 

WASHINGTON,  July  2,  1894. 
To  the  Commanding-General, 
Department  of  Missouri, 

Chicago,  III. 

You  will  please  make  all  necessary  arrangements 
confidentially  for  the  transportation  of  the  entire 
garrison  at  Fort  Sheridan — infantry,  cavalry,  and 
artillery — to  the  lake  front  in  the  city  of  Chicago. 
To  avoid  possible  interruption  of  the  movement  by 
rail  and  by  marching  through  a  part  of  the  city,  it 
may  be  advisable  to  bring  them  by  steam-boat. 
Please  consider  this  matter  and  have  the  arrange- 
ments perfected  without  delay.  You  may  expect 
orders  at  any  tune  for  the  movement.  Acknowledge 
receipt  and  report  in  what  manner  movement  is  to 
be  made.  J.  M.  SCHOFIELD, 

Major-General  Commanding. 

It  should  by  no  means  be  inferred  from  this 
despatch  that  it  had  been  definitely  determined 
that  the  use  of  a  military,  force  was  inevitable. 
It  was  still  hoped  that  the  effect  of  the  injunc- 
tion would  be  such  that  this  alternative  might 
be  avoided.  A  painful  emergency  is  created 
7  97 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

when  public  duty  forces  the  necessity  of  plac- 
ing trained  soldiers  face  to  face  with  riotous 
opposition  to  the  general  Government,  and  an 
acute  and  determined  defiance  to  law  and  order. 
This  course,  once  entered  upon,  admits  of  no 
backward  step ;  and  an  appreciation  of  the  con- 
sequences that  may  ensue  cannot  fail  to  oppress 
those  responsible  for  its  adoption  with  sadly 
disturbing  reflections.  Nevertheless,  it  was 
perfectly  plain  that,  whatever  the  outcome 
might  be,  the  situation  positively  demanded 
such  precaution  and  preparation  as  would  in- 
sure readiness  and  promptness  in  case  the  pres- 
ence of  a  military  force  should  finally  be  found 
necessary. 

On  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  July  3, 
the  Attorney-General  received  a  letter  from  Mr. 
Walker,  the  special  counsel,  in  which,  after  re- 
ferring to  the  issuance  of  the  injunctions  and 
setting  forth  that  the  marshal  was  engaged  in 
serving  them,  he  wrote : 

I  do  not  believe  that  the  marshal  and  his  deputies 
can  protect  the  railroad  companies  in  moving  their 
trains,  either  freight  or  passenger,  including,  of 
course,  the  trains  carrying  United  States  mails. 
Possibly,  however,  the  service  of  the  writ  of  injunc- 
tion will  have  a  restraining  influence  upon  Debs  and 
other  officers  of  the  association.  If  it  does  not,  from 

98 


Tbe  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

present  appearances,  I  think  it  is  the  opinion  of  all 
that  the  orders  of  the  court  cannot  be  enforced  except 
by  the  aid  of  the  regular  army. 

Thereupon  the  Attorney-General  immediately 
sent  this  despatch  to  the  district  attorney: 

I  trust  use  of  United  States  troops  will  not  be 
necessary.  If  it  becomes  necessary,  they  will  be  used 
promptly  and  decisively  upon  the  justifying  facts 
being  certified  to  me.  In  such  case,  if  practicable,  let 
Walker  and  the  marshal  and  United  States  judge 
join  in  statement  as  to  the  exigency. 

A  few  hours  afterward  the  following  urgent 
and  decisive  despatch  from  the  marshal,  en- 
dorsed by  a  judge  of  the  United  States  court 
and  the  district  attorney  and  special  counsel, 
was  received  by  the  Attorney-General. 

CHICAGO,  111.,  July  3,  1894. 
Hon.  RICHARD  OLNEY,  Attorney-General, 

Washington,  D.  C. : 

When  the  injunction  was  granted  yesterday,  a 
mob  of  from  two  to  three  thousand  held  possession 
of  a  point  in  the  city  near  the  crossing  of  the  Rock 
Island  by  other  roads,  where  they  had  already 
ditched  a  mail-train,  and  prevented  the  passing  of 
any  trains,  whether  mail  or  otherwise.  I  read  the 
injunction  writ  to  this  mob  and  commanded  them  to 
disperse.  The  reading  of  the  writ  met  with  no  re- 
sponse except  jeers  and  hoots.  Shortly  after,  the 
mob  threw  a  number  of  baggage-cars  across  the 
track,  since  when  no  mail-train  has  been  able  to  move. 

99 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

I  am  unable  to  disperse  the  mob,  clear  the  tracks,  or 
arrest  the  men  who  were  engaged  in  the  acts  named, 
and  believe  that  no  force  less  than  the  regular  troops 
of  the  United  States  can  procure  the  passage  of  the 
mail-trains,  or  enforce  the  orders  of  the  courts.  I 
believe  people  engaged  in  trades  are  quitting  em- 
ployment to-day,  and  in  my  opinion  will  be  joining 
the  mob  to-night  and  especially  to-morrow ;  and  it  is 
my  judgment  that  the  troops  should  be  here  at  the 
earliest  moment.  An  emergency  has  arisen  for  their 
presence  in  this  city.  J.  W.  ARNOLD, 

United  States  Marshal. 

We  have  read  the  foregoing,  and  from  that  infor- 
mation, and  other  information  that  has  come  to  us, 
believe  that  an  emergency  exists  for  the  immediate 
presence  of  United  States  troops. 

P.  S.  GROSSCUP,  Judge. 
EDWIN  WALKER,  ^ 

THOMAS  E.  MILCHIST,  \  AttySf 

In  the  afternoon  of  the  same  day  the  follow- 
ing order  was  telegraphed  from  army  head- 
quarters in  the  city  of  Washington: 

WAR  DEPARTMENT, 
HEADQUARTERS  OF  THE  ARMY. 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  3,  1894, 

4  o'clock  P.M. 
To  MARTIN,  Adjutant-General, 

Headquarters  Department  of  Missouri, 

Chicago,  111. 

It  having  become  impracticable  in  the  judgment 
of  the  President  to  enforce  by  the  ordinary  course  of 

IOO 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

judicial  proceedings  the  laws  of  the  United  States, 
you  will  direct  Colonel  Crofton  to  move  his  entire 
command  at  once  to  the  city  of  Chicago  (leaving  the 
necessary  guard  at  Fort  Sheridan) ,  there  to  execute 
the  orders  and  processes  of  the  United  States  court, 
to  prevent  the  obstruction  of  the  United  States  mails, 
and  generally  to  enforce  the  faithful  execution  of 
the  laws  of  the  United  States.  He  will  confer  with 
the  United  States  marshal,  the  United  States  dis- 
trict attorney,  and  Edwin  Walker,  special  counsel. 
Acknowledge  receipt  and  report  action  promptly. 
By  order  of  the  President. 

J.  M.  SCHOFIELD,  Major-General. 

Immediately  after  this  order  was  issued,  the 
following  despatch  was  sent  to  the  district  at- 
torney by  the  Attorney-General : 

Colonel  Crof ton's  command  ordered  to  Chicago  by 
the  President.  As  to  disposition  and  movement  of 
troops,  yourself,  Walker,  and  marshal  should  confer 
with  Colonel  Crofton  and  with  Colonel  Martin,  ad- 
jutant-general at  Chicago.  While  action  should  be 
prompt  and  decisive,  it  should  of  course  be  kept 
within  the  limits  provided  by  the  Constitution  and 
laws.  Rely  upon  yourself  and  Walker  to  see  that 
this  is  done. 

Colonel  Martin,  adjutant-general  at  Chi- 
cago, reported,  the  same  night  at  half-past  nine 
o'clock,  that  the  order  for  the  movement  of 
troops  was,  immediately  on  its  receipt  by  him, 
transmitted  to  Fort  Sheridan,  and  that  Colonel 

101 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

Crof ton 's  command  started  for  Chicago  at  nine 
o  'clock. 

During  the  forenoon  of  the  next  day,  July 
4,  Colonel  Martin  advised  the  War  Depart- 
ment that  Colonel  Crofton  reported  his  com- 
mand in  the  city  of  Chicago  at  10 :15  that  morn- 
ing. After  referring  to  the  manner  in  which 
the  troops  had  been  distributed,  this  officer 
added : ' '  People  seem  to  feel  easier  since  arrival 
of  troops." 

General  Miles,  commanding  the  department, 
arrived  in  Chicago  the  same  morning,  and  at 
once  assumed  direction  of  military  movements. 
In  the  afternoon  of  that  day  he  sent  a  report  to 
the  War  Department  at  Washington,  giving  an 
account  of  the  disposition  of  troops,  recounting 
an  unfavorable  condition  of  affairs,  and  rec- 
ommending an  increase  of  the  garrison  at  Fort 
Sheridan  sufficient  to  meet  any  emergency. 

In  response  to  this  despatch  General  Miles 
was  immediately  authorized  to  order  six  com- 
panies of  infantry  from  Fort  Leavenworth,  in 
Kansas,  and  two  companies  from  Fort  Brady, 
in  Michigan,  to  Fort  Sheridan. 

On  the  fifth  day  of  July  he  reported  that  a 
mob  of  over  two  thousand  had  gathered  that 
morning  at  the  stock-yards,  crowded  among  the 
troops,  obstructed  the  movement  of  trains, 

102 


Tbe  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

knocked  down  a  railroad  official,  and  overturned 
about  twenty  freight-cars,  which  obstructed  all 
freight  and  passenger  traffic  in  the  vicinity  of 
the  stock-yards,  and  that  the  mob  had  also  de- 
railed a  passenger-train  on  the  Pittsburg,  Fort 
Wayne  and  Chicago  Railroad,  and  burned 
switches.  To  this  recital  of  violent  demonstra- 
tions he  added  the  following  statement : 

The  injunction  of  the  United  States  court  is  openly 
defied,  and  unless  the  mobs  are  dispersed  by  the  ac- 
tion of  the  police  or  they  are  fired  upon  by  United 
States  troops,  more  serious  trouble  may  be  expected, 
as  the  mob  is  increasing  and  becoming  more  defiant. 

In  view  of  the  situation  as  reported  by  Gen- 
eral Miles,  a  despatch  was  sent  to  him  by  Gen- 
eral Schofield  directing  him  to  concentrate  his 
troops  in  order  that  they  might  act  more  effec- 
tively in  the  execution  of  orders  theretofore 
given,  and  in  the  protection  of  United  States 
property.  This  despatch  concluded  as  follows : 

The  mere  preservation  of  peace  and  good  order  in 
the  city  is,  of  course,  the  province  of  the  city  and 
state  authorities. 

The  situation  on  the  sixth  day  of  July  was 
thus  described  in  a  despatch  sent  in  the  after- 

103 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

noon  of  that  day  by  General  Miles  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  War: 

In  answer  to  your  telegram,  I  report  the  follow- 
ing :  Mayor  Hopkins  last  night  issued  a  proclamation 
prohibiting  riotous  assemblies  and  directing  the 
police  to  stop  people  from  molesting  railway  com- 
munication. Governor  Altgeld  has  ordered  General 
Wheeler's  brigade  on  duty  in  Chicago  to  support 
the  Mayor's  authority.  So  far,  there  have  been  no 
large  mobs  like  the  one  of  yesterday,  which  moved 
from  51st  Street  to  18th  Street  before  it  dispersed. 
The  lawlessness  has  been  along  the  line  of  the  rail- 
ways, destroying  and  burning  more  than  one  hun- 
dred cars  and  railway  buildings,  and  obstructing 
transportation  in  various  ways,  even  to  the  extent 
of  cutting  telegraph  lines.  United  States  troops 
have  dispersed  mobs  at  51st  Street,  Kensington,  and 
a  company  of  infantry  is  moving  along  the  Rock 
Island  to  support  a  body  of  United  States  marshals 
in  making  arrests  for  violating  the  injunction  of  the 
United  States  court.  Of  the  twenty-three  roads 
centering  in  Chicago,  only  six  are  unobstructed  in 
freight,  passenger,  and  mail  transportation.  Thirteen 
are  at  present  entirely  obstructed,  and  ten  are  run- 
ning only  mail-  and  passenger-trains.  Large  num- 
bers of  trains  moving  in  and  out  of  the  city  have 
been  stoned  and  fired  upon  by  mobs,  and  one  en- 
gineer killed.  There  was  a  secret  meeting  to-day  of 
Debs  and  the  representatives  of  labor  unions  consid- 
ering the  advisability  of  a  general  strike  of  all  labor 
unions.  About  one  hundred  men  were  present  at 
that  meeting.  The  result  is  not  yet  known.  United 
States  troops  are  at  the  stock-yards,  Kensington, 

104 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

Blue  Island,  crossing  of  51st  Street,  and  have  been 
moving  along  some  of  the  lines:  the  balance,  eight 
companies  of  infantry,  battery  of  artillery,  and  one 
troop  of  cavalry,  are  camped  on  Lake  Front  Park, 
ready  for  any  emergency  and  to  protect  Government 
buildings  and  property.  It  is  learned  from  the  Fire 
Department,  City  Hall,  that  a  party  of  strikers  has 
been  going  through  the  vicinity  from  14th  to  41st 
streets  and  Stewart  Avenue  freight-yards,  throwing 
gasoline  on  freight-cars  all  through  that  section. 
Captain  Ford,  of  the  Fire  Department,  was  badly 
stoned  this  morning.  Troops  have  just  dispersed  a 
mob  of  incendiaries  on  Fort  Wayne  tracks,  near 
51st  Street,  and  fires  that  were  started  have  been 
suppressed.  Mob  just  captured  mail-train  at  47th 
Street,  and  troops  sent  to  disperse  them. 

On  the  eighth  day  of  July,  in  view  of  the  ap- 
parently near  approach  of  a  crisis  which  the 
Government  had  attempted  to  avoid,  the  follow- 
ing Executive  Proclamation  was  issued  and  at 
once  extensively  published  in  the  city  of  Chi- 
cago: 

Whereas,  by  reason  of  unlawful  obstruction,  com- 
binations and  assemblages  of  persons,  it  has  become 
impracticable,  in  the  judgment  of  the  President,  to 
enforce,  by  the  ordinary  course  of  judicial  proceed- 
ings, the  laws  of  the  United  States  within  the  State 
of  Illinois,  and  especially  in  the  city  of  Chicago 
within  said  State ;  and 

Whereas,  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  the  faith- 
ful execution  of  the  laws  of  the  United  States  and 

105 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

protecting  its  property  and  removing  obstructions 
to  the  United  States  mails  in  the  State  and  city  afore- 
said, the  President  has  employed  a  part  of  the  mili- 
tary forces  of  the  United  States  :— 

Now,  therefore,  I,  Grover  Cleveland,  President  of 
the  United  States,  do  hereby  admonish  all  good  citi- 
zens, and  all  persons  who  may  be  or  may  come  within 
the  City  and  State  aforesaid,  against  aiding,  counte- 
nancing, encouraging,  or  taking  any  part  in  such  un- 
lawful obstructions,  combinations,  and  assemblages; 
and  I  hereby  warn  all  persons  engaged  in  or  in  any 
way  connected  with  such  unlawful  obstructions,  com- 
binations, and  assemblages  to  disperse  and  retire 
peaceably  to  their  respective  abodes  on  or  before 
twelve  o'clock  noon  of  the  9th  day  of  July  instant. 

Those  who  disregard  this  warning  and  persist  in 
taking  part  with  a  riotous  mob  in  forcibly  resisting 
and  obstructing  the  execution  of  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  or  interfering  with  the  functions  of 
the  Government,  or  destroying  or  attempting  to  de- 
stroy the  property  belonging  to  the  United  States  or 
under  its  protection,  cannot  be  regarded  otherwise 
than  as  public  enemies. 

Troops  employed  against  such  a  riotous  mob  will 
act  with  all  the  moderation  and  forbearance  consis- 
tent with  the  accomplishment  of  the  desired  end ;  but 
the  stern  necessities  that  confront  them  will  not  with 
certainty  permit  discrimination  between  guilty  par- 
ticipants and  those  who  are  mingling  with  them  from 
curiosity  and  without  criminal  intent.  The  only  safe 
course,  therefore,  for  those  not  actually  participat- 
ing, is  to  abide  at  their  homes,  or  at  least  not  to  be 
found  in  the  neighborhood  of  riotous  assemblages. 

While  there  will  be  no  vacillation  in  the  decisive 
106 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

treatment  of  the  guilty,  this  warning  is  especially 
intended  to  protect  and  save  the  innocent. 


On  the  10th  of  July,  Eugene  V.  Debs,  the 
president  of  the  American  Railway  Union,  to- 
gether with  its  vice-president,  general  secre- 
tary, and  one  other  who  was  an  active  director, 
were  arrested  upon  indictments  found  against 
them  for  complicity  in  the  obstruction  of  mails 
and  interstate  commerce.  Three  days  after- 
ward our  special  counsel  expressed  the  opin- 
ion that  the  strike  was  practically  broken.  This 
must  not  be  taken  to  mean,  however,  that  peace 
and  quiet  had  been  completely  restored  or  that 
the  transportation  of  mails  and  the  activities 
of  interstate  commerce  were  entirely  free  from 
interruption.  It  was  only  the  expression  of 
a  well-sustained  and  deliberate  expectation  that 
the  combination  of  measures  already  inaugu- 
rated, and  others  contemplated  in  the  near 
future,  would  speedily  bring  about  a  termina- 
tion of  the  difficulty. 

On  the  seventeenth  day  of  July  an  informa- 
tion was  filed  in  the  United  States  Circuit  Court 
at  Chicago  against  Debs  and  the  three  other  of- 
ficials of  the  Railway  Union  who  had  been  ar- 
rested on  indictment  a  few  days  before,  but  were 
then  at  large  on  bail.  This  information  alleged 

107 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

that  these  parties  had  been  guilty  of  open,  con- 
tinued, and  defiant  disobedience  of  the  injunc- 
tion which  was  served  on  them  July  3,  forbid- 
ding them  to  do  certain  specified  acts  tending 
to  incite  and  aid  the  obstruction  of  the  carriage 
of  mails  and  the  operation  of  interstate  com- 
merce. On  the  footing  of  this  information  these 
parties  were  brought  before  the  court  to  show 
cause  why  they  should  not  be  punished  for  con- 
tempt in  disobeying  the  injunction.  Instead  of 
giving  bail  for  their  freedom  pending  the  inves- 
tigation of  this  charge  against  them,  as  they 
were  invited  to  do,  they  preferred  to  be  com- 
mitted to  custody— perhaps  intending  by  such 
an  act  of  martyrdom  either  to  revive  a  waning 
cause,  or  to  gain  a  plausible  and  justifying 
excuse  for  the  collapse  of  their  already  fore- 
doomed movement.  Debs  himself,  in  speaking 
of  this  event  afterward,  said:  ''As  soon  as  the 
employees  found  that  we  were  arrested  and 
taken  from  the  scene  of  action  they  became  de- 
moralized, and  that  ended  the  strike." 

That  the  strike  ended  about  the  time  of  this 
second  arrest  is  undoubtedly  true;  for,  during 
the  few  days  immediately  preceding  and  follow- 
ing the  seventeenth  day  of  July,  reports  came 
from  nearly  all  the  localities  to  which  the  strike 
had  spread,  indicating  its  defeat  and  the  ac- 

108 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

complishment  of  all  the  purposes  of  the  Govern- 
ment's  interference.  The  successful  assertion 
of  national  authority  was  conclusively  indi- 
cated when  on  the  twentieth  day  of  July  the 
last  of  the  soldiers  of  the  United  States  who  had 
been  ordered  for  duty  at  the  very  center  of  op- 
position and  disturbance,  were  withdrawn  from 
Chicago  and  returned  to  the  military  posts  to 
which  they  were  attached. 

I  hope  I  have  been  successful  thus  far  in  my 
effort  satisfactorily  to  exhibit  the  extensive 
reach  and  perilous  tendency  of  the  convulsion 
under  consideration,  the  careful  promptness 
which  characterized  the  interference  of  the  Gov- 
ernment, the  constant  desire  of  the  national  ad- 
ministration to  avoid  extreme  measures,  the 
scrupulous  limitation  of  its  interference  to  pur- 
poses which  were  clearly  within  its  constitu- 
tional competency  and  duty,  and  the  gratifying 
and  important  results  of  its  conservative  but 
stern  activity. 

I  must  not  fail  to  mention  here  as  part  of  the 
history  of  this  perplexing  affair,  a  contribu- 
tion made  by  the  governor  of  Illinois  to  its  an- 
noyances. This  official  not  only  refused  to  re- 
gard the  riotous  disturbances  within  the  borders 
of  his  State  as  a  sufficient  cause  for  an  applica- 
tion to  the  Federal  Government  for  its  protec- 

109 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

tion  "against  domestic  violence"  under  the 
mandate  of  the  Constitution,  but  he  actually 
protested  against  the  presence  of  Federal 
troops  sent  into  the  State  upon  the  general 
Government's  own  initiative  and  for  the  pur- 
pose of  defending  itself  in  the  exercise  of  its 
well-defined  legitimate  functions. 

On  the  fifth  day  of  July,  twenty-four  hours 
after  our  soldiers  had  been  brought  to  the  city 
of  Chicago,  pursuant  to  the  order  of  July  3d, 
I  received  a  long  despatch  from  Governor  Alt- 
geld,  beginning  as  follows: 

I  am  advised  that  you  have  ordered  Federal  troops 
to  go  into  service  in  the  State  of  Illinois.  Surely  the 
facts  have  not  been  correctly  presented  to  you  in 
this  case  or  you  would  not  have  taken  the  step ;  for 
it  is  entirely  unnecessary  and,  as  it  seems  to  me,  un- 
justifiable. Waiving  all  question  of  courtesy,  I 
will  say  that  the  State  of  Illinois  is  not  only  able  to 
take  care  of  itself,  but  it  stands  ready  to-day  to 
furnish  the  Federal  Government  any  assistance  it 
may  need  elsewhere. 

This  opening  sentence  was  followed  by  a 
lengthy  statement  which  so  far  missed  actual 
conditions  as  to  appear  irrelevant  and,  in  some 
parts,  absolutely  frivolous. 

This  remarkable  despatch  closed  with  the  fol- 
lowing words : 

no 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

As  Governor  of  the  State  of  Illinois,  I  protest 
against  this  and  ask  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
Federal  troops  from  active  duty  in  this  State. 
Should  the  situation  at  any  time  get  so  serious  that 
we  cannot  control  it  with  the  State  forces,  we  will 
promptly  and  freely  ask  for  Federal  assistance ;  but 
until  such  time  I  protest  with  all  due  deference 
against  this  uncalled-for  reflection  upon  our  people, 
and  again  ask  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of  these 
troops. 

Immediately  upon  the  receipt  of  this  commu- 
nication, I  sent  to  Governor  Altgeld  the  follow- 
ing reply : 

Federal  troops  were  sent  to  Chicago  in  strict  ac- 
cordance with  the  Constitution  and  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  upon  the  demand  of  the  Post-Office 
Department  that  obstructions  of  the  mails  should  be 
removed,  and  upon  the  representation  of  the  judi- 
cial officers  of  the  United  States  that  process  of  the 
Federal  courts  could  not  be  executed  through  the 
ordinary  means,  and  upon  abundant  proof  that  con- 
spiracies existed  against  commerce  between  the 
States.  To  meet  these  conditions,  which  are  clearly 
within  the  province  of  Federal  authority,  the  pres- 
ence of  Federal  troops  in  the  city  of  Chicago  was 
deemed  not  only  proper  but  necessary;  and  there 
has  been  no  intention  of  thereby  interfering  with  the 
plain  duty  of  the  local  authorities  to  preserve  the 
peace  of  the  city. 


in 


in 


In  response  to  this  the  governor,  evidently  un- 
willing to  allow  the  matter  at  issue  between 
us  to  rest  without  a  renewal  of  argument  and 
protest,  at  once  addressed  to  me  another  long 
telegraphic  communication,  evidently  intended 
to  be  more  severely  accusatory  and  insistent 
than  its  predecessor.  Its  general  tenor  may  be 
inferred  from  the  opening  words : 

Your  answer  to  my  protest  involves  some  startling 
conclusions,  and  ignores  and  evades  the  question  at 
issue— that  is,  that  the  principle  of  local  self-gov- 
ernment is  just  as  fundamental  in  our  institutions 
as  is  that  of  Federal  supremacy.  You  calmly  as- 
sume that  the  Executive  has  the  legal  right  to  order 
Federal  troops  into  any  community  of  the  United 
States  in  the  first  instance,  whenever  there  is  the 
slightest  disturbance,  and  that  he  can  do  this  with- 
out any  regard  to  the  question  as  to  whether  the 
community  is  able  to  and  ready  to  enforce  the  law 
itself. 

After  a  rather  dreary  discussion  of  the  im- 
portance of  preserving  the  rights  of  the  States 
and  a  presentation  of  the  dangers  to  constitu- 

1 12 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

ional  government  that  lurked  in  the  course  that 
had  been  pursued  by  the  general  Government, 
this  communication  closed  as  follows : 

Inasmuch  as  the  Federal  troops  can  do  nothing 
hut  what  the  State  troops  can  do  there,  and  believing 
that  the  State  is  amply  able  to  take  care  of  the  situa- 
tion and  to  enforce  the  law,  and  believing  that  the 
ordering  out  of  the  Federal  troops  was  unwarranted, 
1  again  ask  their  withdrawal. 

I  confess  that  my  patience  was  somewhat 
strained  when  I  quickly  sent  the  following  de- 
spatch in  reply  to  this  communication : 

EXECUTIVE  MANSION. 
WASHINGTON,  D.  C.,  July  6,  1894. 
While  I  am  still  persuaded  that  I  have  neither 
transcended  my  authority  nor  duty  in  the  emergency 
that  confronts  us,  it  seems  to  me  that  in  this  hour  of 
danger  and  public  distress,  discussion  may  well  give 
way  to  active  efforts  on  the  part  of  all  in  authority 
to  restore  obedience  to  law  and  to  protect  life  and 
property.  GROVER  CLEVELAND. 

Hon.  JOHN  P.  ALTGELD, 
Governor  of  Illinois. 

This  closed  a  discussion  which  in  its  net  re- 
sults demonstrated  how  far  one's  disposition 
and  inclination  will  lead  him  astray  in  the  field 
of  argument. 

I  shall  conclude  the  treatment  of  my  subject 

8  113 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

by  a  brief  reference  to  the  legal  proceedings 
which  grew  out  of  this  disturbance,  and  finally 
led  to  an  adjudication  by  the  highest  court  in 
our  land,  establishing  in  an  absolutely  authori- 
tative manner  and  for  all  time  the  power  of  the 
national  Government  to  protect  itself  in  the 
exercise  of  its  functions. 

It  will  be  recalled  that  in  the  course  of  our 
narrative  we  left  Mr.  Debs,  the  president  of  the 
Eailway  Union,  and  his  three  associates  in  cus- 
tody of  the  law,  on  the  seventeenth  day  of  July, 
awaiting  an  investigation  of  the  charge  of  con- 
tempt of  court  made  against  them,  based  upon 
their  disobedience  of  the  writs  of  injunction 
forbidding  them  to  do  certain  things  in  aid  or 
encouragement  of  interference  with  mail  trans- 
portation or  interstate  commerce. 

This  investigation  was  so  long  delayed  that 
the  decision  of  the  Circuit  Court  before  which 
the  proceedings  were  pending  was  not  rendered 
until  the  fourteenth  day  of  December,  1894. 
On  that  date  the  court  delivered  an  able  and 
carefully  considered  decision  finding  Debs  and 
his  associates  guilty  of  contempt  of  court,  bas- 
ing its  decision  upon  the  provisions  of  the  law 
of  Congress,  passed  in  1890,  entitled:  "An  act 
to  protect  trade  and  commerce  against  unlawful 
restraint  and  monopolies";  sometimes  called 

114 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  of  1894 

the  Sherman  Anti-Trust  Law.  Thereupon  the 
parties  were  sentenced  on  said  conviction  to 
confinement  in  the  county  jail  for  terms  varying 
from  three  to  six  months. 

Afterward,  and  on  the  14th  day  of  January, 
1895,  the  prisoners  applied  to  the  Supreme 
Court  of  the  United  States  for  a  writ  of  habeas 
corpus  to  relieve  them  from  imprisonment,  on 
the  ground  that  the  facts  found  against  them 
by  the  Circuit  Court  did  not  constitute  diso- 
bedience of  the  writs  of  injunction  and  that 
their  commitment  in  the  manner  and  for  the 
reasons  alleged  was  without  justification  and 
not  within  the  constitutional  power  and  juris- 
diction of  that  tribunal. 

On  this  application,  the  case  was  elaborately 
argued  before  the  Supreme  Court  in  March, 
1895;  and  on  the  twenty-seventh  day  of  May, 
1895,  the  court  rendered  its  decision,  upholding 
on  the  broadest  grounds  the  proceedings  of  the 
Circuit  Court  and  confirming  its  adjudication 
and  the  commitment  to  jail  of  the  petitioners 
thereupon. 

Justice  Brewer,  in  delivering  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  the  Supreme  Court,  stated  the  case 
as  follows : 

The  United  States,  finding  that  the  interstate 
transportation  of  persons  and  property,  as  well  as 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

the  carriage  of  mails,  is  forcibly  obstructed,  and  that 
a  combination  and  conspiracy  exists  to  subject  the 
control  of  such  transportation  to  the  will  of  the 
conspirators,  applied  to  one  of  their  courts  sitting 
as  a  court  of  equity,  for  an  injunction  to  restrain 
such  obstructions  and  prevent  carrying  into  effect 
such  conspiracy.  Two  questions  of  importance  are 
presented :  First,  are  the  relations  of  the  general 
Government  to  interstate  commerce  and  the  trans- 
portation of  the  mails  such  as  to  authorize  a  direct 
interference  to  prevent  a  forcible  obstruction 
thereof?  Second,  if  authority  exists,— as  authority 
in  governmental  affairs  implies  both  power  and  duty, 
—has  a  court  of  equity  jurisdiction  to  issue  an  in- 
junction in  aid  of  the  performance  of  such  duty  ? 

Both  of  these  questions  were  answered  by 
the  court  in  the  affirmative ;  and  in  the  opinion 
read  by  the  learned  justice,  the  inherent  power 
of  the  Government  to  execute  the  powers  and 
functions  belonging  to  it  by  means  of  physical 
force  through  its  official  agents,  and  on  every 
foot  of  American  soil,  was  amply  vindicated  by 
a  process  of  reasoning  simple,  logical,  unham- 
pered by  fanciful  distinctions,  and  absolutely 
conclusive;  and  the  Government's  peaceful  re- 
sort to  the  court,  the  injunction  issued  in  its  aid, 
and  all  the  proceedings  thereon,  including  the 
imprisonment  of  Debs  and  his  associates,  were 
fully  approved. 

Thus  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States 
1 16 


The  Government  in  Chicago  Strike  0/1894 

has  written  the  closing  words  of  this  history, 
tragical  in  many  of  its  details,  and  in  every  line 
provoking  sober  reflection.  As  we  gratefully 
turn  its  concluding  page,  those  who  were  most 
nearly  related  by  executive  responsibility  to  the 
troublous  days  whose  story  is  told  may  well 
especially  congratulate  themselves  on  the  part 
which  fell  to  them  in  marking  out  the  way  and 
clearing  the  path,  now  unchangeably  estab- 
lished, which  shall  hereafter  guide  our  nation 
safely  and  surely  in  the  exercise  of  the  im- 
portant functions  which  represent  the  people's 
trust. 


117 


THE  BOND  ISSUES 


THE  BOND  ISSUES 


THE  sales  of  United  States  bonds  in  the 
years  1894, 1895,  and  1896  for  the  purpose 
of  replenishing  the  stock  of  gold  in  the  public 
Treasury  have  been  greatly  misunderstood  by 
many  honest  people,  and  often  deliberately  mis- 
represented. 

My  conviction  that  a  love  of  fairness  still 
abides  with  the  masses  of  our  people  has  en- 
couraged me  to  give  a  history  of  these  transac- 
tions for  the  benefit  of  those  who  are  unin- 
formed or  have  been  misled  concerning  them. 
In  undertaking  this  task  I  shall  attempt  to  avoid 
unprofitable  and  tiresome  explanation;  but  I 
shall,  nevertheless,  indulge  in  the  recital  of 
details  to  such  an  extent  as  may  appear  neces- 
sary to  an  easy  understanding  of  the  matter 
in  hand.  I  desire,  above  all  things,  to  treat  the 
subject  in  such  a  way  that  none  who  read  my 

121 


The  Bond  Issues 

narrative  will  be  confused  by  the  use  of  obscure 
or  technical  language. 

The  Government's  gold  reserve,  as  it  is  usu- 
ally known,  originated  under  the  provision  of 
an  act  of  Congress  passed  January  14, 1875,  en- 
titled, "An  Act  to  provide  for  the  resumption  of 
specie  payments."  This  law  contemplated  the 
redemption  in  gold  and  the  retirement  of  the 
currency  obligations  legally  known  as  United 
States  notes,  but  commonly  called  greenbacks; 
and  it  provided  that  such  notes  in  excess  of 
$300,000,000  should  be  redeemed  and  retired 
prior  to  January  1,  1879,  and  that  after  that 
date  all  the  remainder  of  such  notes  should  be 
likewise  redeemed  and  canceled.  This  law  fur- 
ther provided  that  "to  enable  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  to  prepare  and  provide  for  such 
redemption"  he  should  have  the  authority  "to 
issue,  sell  and  dispose  of"  bonds  of  the  United 
States  which  were  therein  particularly  specified. 
Of  course  this  authority  was  given  to  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  in  order  that,  by  the  sale 
of  Government  bonds,  he  could  accumulate  a 
sufficient  gold  fund  or  reserve  to  meet  the  de- 
mands of  the  gold  redemption  provided  for, 
and  accomplish  the  ultimate  retirement  of  all 
the  United  States  notes  in  circulation. 

In  compliance  with  this  act,  the  sum  of  about 
122 


$92,000,000  in  gold  was  realized  by  the  sale  of 
bonds,  and  about  $41,000,000,  in  addition,  was 
obtained  from  surplus  revenue;  and  thereupon 
the  contemplated  redemption  was  entered  upon. 
But  after  the  retirement  and  cancelation  of 
only  about  $30,000,000  of  these  notes,  and  on  the 
thirty-first  day  of  May,  1878,  this  process  was 
interrupted  by  the  passage  of  an  act  forbid- 
ding their  further  retirement  or  cancelation, 
and  providing  that  any  such  notes  thereafter 
redeemed  should  not  be  canceled  or  destroyed, 
but  should  be  ' '  reissued  and  paid  out  again  and 
kept  in  circulation."  At  the  time  this  act  was 
passed  the  United  States  notes  uncanceled  and 
still  outstanding  amounted  to  $346,681,016.  It 
will  be  observed  that  though  the  actual  retire- 
ment of  these  notes  was  prohibited,  their  re- 
demption in  gold  was  still  continued,  coupled 
with  the  condition  that,  though  thus  redeemed, 
they  should  be  still  kept  on  foot  and  again  put 
in  circulation  as  a  continuing  and  never-ending 
obligation  of  the  Government,  calling  for  pay- 
ment in  gold— not  once  alone,  but  as  often  as 
their  reissue  permitted,  and  without  the  least 
regard  to  prior  so-called  redemptions.  It  will 
be  also  observed  that  this  prohibition  of  can- 
celation intervened  seven  months  prior  to  Jan- 
uary 1, 1879,  the  date  when  the  general  and  un- 

123 


The  Bond  Issues 

restricted  redemption  and  retirement  of  all 
these  outstanding  notes  was,  under  the  terms  of 
the  act  of  1875,  to  commence.  At  the  time  when 
their  further  cancelation  was  thus  terminated 
there  remained  of  the  gold  which  had  been  pro- 
vided as  a  reserve  for  their  redemption  about 
$103,000,000.  This  is  the  fund  which  has  since 
then  been  called  the  "gold  reserve.'* 

In  point  of  fact,  this  reserve  was  thereafter 
made  up  of  all  the  net  gold  held  by  the  Govern- 
ment; and  its  amount  at  any  particular  date 
was  ascertained  by  deducting  from  the  entire 
stock  of  gold  in  the  Treasury  the  amounts  cov- 
ered by  outstanding  gold  certificates,  which  in- 
struments resemble  a  bank's  certificate  of  de- 
posit, and  are  issued  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  to  those  making  with  the  Govern- 
ment specific  deposits  of  gold,  to  be  returned 
to  the  holders  of  the  certificates  on  demand. 
Of  course  the  gold  thus  held  for  certificate- 
holders  is  not  available  for  the  redemption  of 
United  States  notes. 

In  the  year  1882  a  law  was  passed  by  Con- 
gress which  provided  that  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  should  suspend  the  issue  of  these  gold 
certificates  "whenever  the  amount  of  gold  coin 
and  gold  bullion  in  the  Treasury,  reserved  for 
the  redemption  of  United  States  notes,  falls  be- 

124 


The  Bond  Issues 

low  $100,000,000."  Whatever  may  have  been 
the  actual  relationship  between  gold  certificates 
representing  gold  deposited  for  their  redemp- 
tion, and  the  gold  kept  on  hand  for  the  redemp- 
tion of  United  States  notes,  the  provision  of 
law  just  quoted  seems  to  have  been  accepted  as 
a  statutory  recognition  of  the  fact  that  our  gold 
reserve  for  note  redemption  should  have  for  its 
lowest  limit  this  sum  of  $100,000,000.  It  is  a 
singular  circumstance  that  until  very  lately, 
when  this  reserve  was  increased  and  fixed  at 
$150,000,000,  no  Act  of  Congress  actually  pro- 
vided, or  in  any  way  expressly  stated,  what 
the  limits  of  this  gold  reserve  for  redemption 
purposes  should  be;  and  it  is  no  less  singular 
that  this  provision  in  the  law  of  1882  fixed  its 
lowest  safe  limit  as  perfectly  and  authorita- 
tively in  the  understanding  of  our  people  as 
it  could  have  been  done  by  a  distinct  legis- 
lative requirement.  At  the  time  this  reserve 
was  created,  as  well  as  when  the  actual  can- 
celation  of  United  States  notes  after  redemp- 
tion was  prohibited,  it  evidently  was  thought 
by  those  directing  our  nation's  financial  af- 
fairs that  the  sum  of  $100,000,000  in  net  gold 
actually  in  hand,  especially  with  such  addi- 
tions as  might  naturally  be  expected  to  reach 
the  fund  by  way  of  surplus  revenue  receipts, 

125 


The  Bond  Issues 

or  otherwise,  would  constitute  a  sufficient  gold 
reserve  to  redeem  such  of  these  notes  still 
left  outstanding  as  might  be  presented,  and  that 
the  assurance  of  their  gold  redemption  when 
presented  would  keep  them  largely  in  circula- 
tion. This  scheme  seemed  for  a  time  to  be 
abundantly  vindicated  by  the  people's  content- 
ment with  the  sufficiency  of  the  redemption 
reserve,  and  by  their  willingness  to  keep  in 
circulating  use  these  United  States  notes  as 
currency  more  convenient  than  gold  itself. 

Another  most  important  condition  of  mind 
among  the  people,  however,  grew  out  of,  or  at 
least  accompanied,  their  acceptance  of  the  re- 
demptive sufficiency  of  the  gold  reserve  as  con- 
stituted. The  popular  belief  became  deep-seated 
and  apparently  immovable  that  the  reduction 
of  this  gold  reserve  to  an  amount  less  than 
$100,000,000  would,  in  some  way,  cause  a  dis- 
astrous situation,  and  perhaps  justify  an  ap- 
prehension concerning  our  nation's  financial 
soundness.  Thus  a  gold  reserve  containing  at 
all  times  at  least  $100,000,000  came  to  be  re- 
garded by  the  people  with  a  sort  of  sentimental 
solicitude,  which,  whatever  else  may  be  said  of 
it,  was  certainly  something  to  be  reckoned  with 
in  making  our  national  financial  calculations. 

That  the  plans  thus  set  on  foot  for  the  so- 
126 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

called  redemption  of  the  United  States  notes 
outstanding  promised  to  be  adequate  and 
effective  is  seen  in  the  fact  that  the  gold  re- 
serve, starting  at  the  end  of  June,  1878,  with 
about  $103,500,000,  never  afterward  fell  as 
low  as  $100,000,000  until  April,  1893,  and 
that  sometimes  in  its  fluctuations  during  this 
interval  of  twenty-five  years  it  amounted  to 
upward  of  $200,000,000.  Under  conditions 
then  existing  popular  confidence  was  well  es- 
tablished, the  reserve  satisfactorily  endured 
the  strain  of  all  redemption  demands,  and 
United  States  notes  were  kept  well  in  circula- 
tion as  money. 

In  an  evil  hour,  however,  a  legislative  con- 
cession was  made  to  a  mischievous  and  persis- 
tent demand  for  the  free  and  unlimited  coinage 
of  silver.  This  concession  was  first  exhibited 
in  an  act  of  Congress  passed  in  1878,  directing 
the  expenditure  of  not  less  than  $2,000,000  nor 
more  than  $4,000,000  each  month  by  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  in  the  purchase  of  silver 
bullion,  and  the  coinage  of  such  bullion  into  sil- 
ver dollars.  Though  this  act  is  not  in  itself 
so  intimately  related  to  my  subject  as  to  require 
detailed  explanation,  it  was  the  forerunner  of 
another  law  of  Congress  which  had  much  to  do 
with  creating  the  financial  conditions  that  ne- 

127 


The  Bond  Issues 

cessitated  the  issuance  of  Government  bonds 
for  the  reinforcement  of  the  gold  reserve. 

This  law  was  passed  in  1890,  and  superseded 
the  provision  of  the  law  of  1878  directing  the 
purchase  and  coinage  of  silver.  In  lieu  of  these 
provisions  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was 
thereby  directed  to  purchase  silver  bullion  from 
time  to  time  in  each  month  to  the  aggregate 
amount  of  4,500,000  ounces,  or  as  much  as  might 
be  offered,  at  the  market  price,  not  to  exceed, 
however,  a  limit  therein  fixed.  It  was  further 
provided  that  there  should  be  issued,  in  pay- 
ment of  such  purchases  of  silver  bullion,  Treas- 
ury notes  of  the  United  States  in  denominations 
not  less  than  one  dollar  nor  more  than  $1000; 
that  such  notes  should  be  redeemable  in  coin, 
and  should  "be  a  legal  tender  in  payment  of  all 
debts,  public  and  private,  except  where  other- 
wise expressly  stipulated  in  the  contract,  and 
should  be  receivable  for  customs,  taxes  and  all 
public  dues";  and  that  when  they  were  re- 
deemed or  paid  into  the  Treasury  they  might  be 
reissued.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was 
directed  to  coin  into  silver  dollars  in  each  month 
until  the  first  day  of  July,  1891,  2,000,000 
ounces  of  the  silver  so  purchased,  and  there- 
after so  much  as  might  be  necessary  to  provide 
for  the  redemption  of  the  notes  issued  in  pay- 

128 


The  Bond  Issues 

merit  for  the  silver  from  time  to  time  purchased 
under  the  act. 

I  have  recited  these  provisions  by  way  of 
leading  up  to  the  proposition  that,  under  the 
law  of  1890,  the  burden  upon  the  gold  reserve 
was  tremendously  enlarged.  It  will  be  readily 
seen  that  it  forced  larger  monthly  purchases  of 
silver  than  were  required  under  the  prior  act, 
and  that,  instead  of  providing  for  silver  dol- 
lars, which  as  coins,  or  certificates  of  deposit 
representing  such  coins,  should  circulate  as 
silver  currency,  unredeemable  in  gold  as  was 
done  under  the  act  of  1878,  it  directed  that  in 
payment  of  such  purchases  a  new  obligation 
of  the  Government,  redeemable  in  coin,  should 
be  issued  and  added  to  our  circulating  medium. 

It  is,  however,  only  when  we  examine  the  spe- 
cific provision  for  the  redemption  of  these  notes 
that  we  discover  in  its  full  extent  the  harm- 
ful relationship  of  this  new  device  to  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  gold  reserve.  At  its  outset  the 
redemption  clause  of  the  act  courageously  and 
manfully  gave  to  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
the  authority  to  redeem  such  notes  in  gold  or 
silver  at  his  discretion;  but  in  its  ending  it  fell 
down  a  pitiful  victim  of  the  silver  craze.  The 
entire  clause  is  in  these  words:  "That  upon 
demand  of  the  holder  of  any  of  the  Treasury 

9  129 


notes  herein  provided  for,  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  shall,  under  such  regulations  as  he 
may  provide,  redeem  such  notes  in  gold  or  sil- 
ver coin  at  his  discretion,  it  being  the  estab- 
lished policy  of  the  United  States  to  maintain 
the  two  metals  at  a  parity  ivith  each  other  upon 
the  present  legal  ratio,  or  such  ratio  as  may  be 
provided  by  laiv." 

According  to  the  legal  ratio  then  existing, 
which  has  never  been  changed,  the  average  in- 
trinsic gold  value  of  a  silver  dollar  as  compared 
with  a  gold  dollar  was,  during  the  year  1891, 
about  seventy-six  cents,  during  1892  a  trifle 
more  than  sixty-seven  cents,  and  during  1893 
about  sixty  cents. 

It  is  hardly  necessary  to  say  that  the  asser- 
tion in  the  act  of  '  *  the  established  policy  of  the 
United  States  to  maintain  the  two  metals  at  a 
parity"  had  the  effect  of  transferring  the  dis- 
cretion of  determining  whether  these  Treasury 
notes  should  be  redeemed  in  gold  or  silver,  from 
the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  to  the  holder  of 
the  notes.  Manifestly,  in  the  face  of  this  as- 
sertion of  the  Government's  intention,  a  de- 
mand for  gold  redemption  on  the  part  of  the 
holders  of  such  notes  could  not  be  refused,  and 
the  acceptance  of  silver  dollars  insisted  upon, 
without  either  subjecting  to  doubt  the  good 

130 


The  Bond  Issues 

faith  and  honest  intention  of  the  Government 's 
professions,  or  creating  a  suspicion  of  our 
country's  solvency.  The  parity  between  the 
two  metals  could  not  be  maintained,  but,  on  the 
contrary,  would  be  distinctly  denied,  if  the  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury  persisted  in  redeeming 
these  notes,  against  the  will  of  the  holders,  in 
dollars  of  silver  instead  of  gold. 

Therefore  it  came  to  pass  that  the  Treasury 
notes  issued  for  the  purchase  of  silver  under 
the  law  of  1890  took  their  place  by  the  side  of 
the  United  States  notes,  commonly  called  green- 
backs, as  demands  against  our  very  moderate 
and  shifting  gold  reserve. 

It  should  have  been  plainly  apparent  to  all 
who  had  eyes  to  see  that  the  monetary  scheme, 
thus  additionally  burdened,  was  adequate  and 
safe  only  in  smooth  financial  weather,  and  was 
miserably  calculated  to  resist  any  disturbances 
in  public  confidence,  or  the  rough  waves  of  busi- 
ness emergencies.  The  proof  of  this  was 
quickly  forthcoming. 

The  new  Treasury  notes  made  their  first  ap- 
pearance as  part  of  our  money  circulation  in 
August,  1890 ;  and  at  the  close  of  that  month  the 
gold  reserve  amounted  to  $185,837,581.  Dur- 
ing the  next  month  it  fell  off  about  $38,000,000, 
reducing  the  amount  on  the  last  day  of  Septem- 

131 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

ber  to  nearly  $148,000,000;  and  with  a  few 
slight  spasmodic  rallies  it  continued  to  decrease 
until  the  sale  of  bonds  for  its  replenishment. 

In  the  latter  part  of  1892  and  the  first  months 
of  1893,  these  Treasury  notes  having,  in  the 
meantime,  very  greatly  multiplied,  the  with- 
drawals of  gold  from  the  Treasury  through  the 
redemption  of  these  as  well  as  the  United  States 
notes  strikingly  increased;  and  the  fact  that 
by  far  the  larger  part  of  the  gold  so  withdrawn 
was  shipped  abroad  plainly  showed  that  foreign 
investors  in  American  securities  had  grave  ap- 
prehensions as  to  our  ability  to  continue  to  re- 
deem all  these  notes  in  gold  and  thus  maintain 
the  integrity  and  soundness  of  our  financial  con- 
dition. 

I  succeeded  Mr.  Harrison  in  the  Presidency 
on  the  fourth  day  of  March,  1893 ;  and  on  the 
seventh  of  that  month  Mr.  Carlisle  became  Sec- 
retary of  the  Treasury.  The  gold  reserve  on 
that  day  amounted  to  $100,982,410— only  $982,- 
410  in  excess  of  the  sum  that  had  come  to  be 
generally  regarded  as  indicating  the  danger 
line.  The  retiring  Secretary  of  the  Treasury, 
appreciating  the  importance  of  preventing  the 
fall  of  the  reserve  below  this  limit,  had  just 
before  his  retirement  directed  the  preparation 
of  plates  for  the  engraving  of  bonds  so  that 

132 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

he  might  by  their  sale  obtain  gold  to  reinforce 
the  fund.  I  have  heard  him  say  within  the  last 
few  years  that  he  expected  before  the  close  of 
his  term  to  resort  to  bond  sales  for  the  purpose 
of  such  reinforcement,  unless  prevented  at  the 
last  moment  by  the  President's  disapproval. 
Of  course  it  is  but  natural  that  any  one  direct- 
ing the  affairs  of  the  Treasury  Department 
should  be  anxious  to  avoid  such  an  expedient; 
and  Secretary  Foster  avoided  it,  and  barely 
saved  the  reserve  from  falling  below  the  $100,- 
000,000  mark  during  his  term,  by  effecting  ar- 
rangements, in  January  and  February,  1893, 
with  certain  bankers  in  New  York,  by  which  he 
obtained  from  them  in  exchange  for  United 
States  notes,  or  on  other  considerations,  some- 
thing over  $8,000,000  in  gold,  which  enabled 
him  to  escape  the  sale  of  bonds  in  aid  of  the 
reserve. 

With  the  gold  reserve  lower  than  it  had  ever 
been  since  its  creation  in  1878,  and  showing  an 
excess  of  less  than  $1,000,000  above  the  sup- 
posed limit  of  disaster,  and  with  the  demand  for 
gold  redemption  of  Government  currency  ob- 
ligations giving  no  sign  of  abatement,  the  pros- 
pect that  greeted  the  new  administration  was 
certainly  not  reassuring.  In  our  effort  to  meet 
the  emergency  without  an  issue  of  bonds  Sec- 

133 


The  Bond  Issues 

retary  Carlisle  immediately  applied  to  banks 
in  different  localities  for  an  exchange  with  the 
Government  of  a  portion  of  their  holdings  of 
gold  coin  for  other  forms  of  currency.  This 
effort  was  so  far  successful  that  on  the  25th 
of  March  the  gold  reserve  amounted  to 
over  $107,000,000,  notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
considerable  withdrawals  had  been  made  in  the 
interval.  The  slight  betterment  thus  secured 
proved,  however,  to  be  only  temporary ;  for  un- 
der the  stress  of  continued  and  augmented  with- 
drawals, the  gold  reserve,  on  the  twenty-second 
day  of  April,  1893,  for  the  first  time  since  its 
establishment,  was  reduced  below  the  $100,000,- 
000  limit— amounting  on  that  day  to  about 
$97,000,000. 

Though  this  fall  below  the  minimum  thereto- 
fore always  maintained  was  not  followed  by 
any  sudden  and  distinctly  new  disaster,  it  had 
the  effect  of  accelerating  withdrawals  of  gold. 
It  became  apparent  that  there  had  intervened 
a  growing  apprehension  among  the  masses  of 
our  own  people  concerning  the  Government's 
competency  to  continue  gold  redemption,  with 
the  result  that  a  greatly  increased  proportion  of 
the  amount  withdrawn  from  the  gold  reserve, 
instead  of  going  abroad  to  satisfy  the  claims  of 
foreigners  or  as  a  basis  of  commercial  exchange, 

134 


was  hoarded  by  our  citizens  at  home  as  a  pre- 
caution against  possible  financial  distress.  In 
the  meantime,  nearly  the  entire  gold  receipts  in 
payment  of  customs  and  other  revenue  charges 
had  ceased.  To  meet  this  situation  strenuous 
efforts  were  made  by  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury  to  improve  the  condition  by  resorting 
again  to  the  plan  of  exchanging  for  gold  other 
forms  of  currency,  with  some  success,  while  in 
the  month  of  August,  1893,  gold  revenue  re- 
ceipts were  temporarily  considerably  stimu- 
lated. Thus  a  fleeting  gleam  of  hope  was  given 
to  the  dark  surroundings. 

In  these  troublous  times  those  charged  with 
the  administration  of  the  Government's  finan- 
cial affairs  could  not  fail  to  recognize  in  the 
law  of  1890,  directing  the  monthly  purchase 
of  silver  and  the  issuance  in  payment  therefor 
of  Treasury  notes  in  effect  redeemable  in  gold, 
a  prolific  cause  of  our  financial  trouble.  Ac- 
cordingly, a  special  session  of  Congress  was 
called  to  meet  on  the  seventh  day  of  August, 
1893,  to  repeal  this  law,  and  thus  terminate  the 
creation  of  further  demands  upon  our  already 
overburdened  and  feeble  gold  reserve.  The  re- 
pealing act  was  quite  promptly  passed  in  the 
House  of  Representatives  on  the  twenty-eighth 
day  of  August;  but,  on  account  of  vexatious 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

opposition  in  the  Senate,  the  repeal  was  not 
finally  effected  until  the  first  day  of  November, 
1893,  and  then  only  after  there  had  been  added 
to  the  act  an  inopportune  repetition  of  the 
statement  concerning  the  Government's  inten- 
tion to  maintain  the  parity  of  both  gold  and 
silver  coins. 


136 


II 


The  effect  of  this  repeal  in  its  immediate  re- 
sults failed  to  quiet  the  fear  of  impending  evil 
now  thoroughly  aroused;  nor  were  all  the  ef- 
forts thus  far  made  to  augment  the  gold  re- 
serve effective  as  against  the  constant  process 
of  its  depletion. 

On  the  seventeenth  day  of  January,  1894,  the 
Government  was  confronted  by  a  disquieting 
emergency.  The  gold  reserve  had  fallen  to  less 
than  $70,000,000,  notwithstanding  the  most  dil- 
igent efforts  to  maintain  it  in  sounder  condi- 
tion. Against  this  slender  fund  gold  demands 
amounting  to  not  less  than  $450,000,000  in 
United  States  notes  and  Treasury  notes  were 
in  actual  circulation,  and  others  amounting  to 
about  $50,000,000,  in  addition,  were  tempora- 
rily held  in  the  Treasury  subject  to  reissue— the 
entire  volume,  by  peremptory  requirement  of 
law,  remaining  uncanceled  even  after  repeated 
redemption;  nor  was  there  any  promise  of  a 
cessation  of  the  abnormal  and  exhausting  drain 
of  gold  then  fully  under  way.  Another  factor 


The  Bond  Issues 

in  the  situation,  most  perplexing  and  danger- 
ous, was  the  distrust,  which  was  growing  enor- 
mously, regarding  the  wisdom  and  stability  of 
our  scheme  of  finance.  As  a  result  of  these  con- 
ditions there  loomed  in  sight  the  menace  of  the 
destruction  of  our  gold  reserve,  the  repudiation 
of  our  gold  obligations,  the  humiliating  fall  of 
our  nation's  finances  to  a  silver  basis,  and  the 
degradation  of  our  Government's  high  standing 
in  the  respect  of  the  civilized  world. 

There  was  absolutely  but  one  way  to  avert 
national  calamity  and  our  country's  disgrace; 
and  this  way  was  adopted  when,  on  the  seven- 
teenth day  of  January,  1894,  the  Secretary  of 
the  Treasury  issued  a  notice  that  bids  in  gold 
would  be  received  until  the  first  day  of  Febru- 
ary following  for  $50,000,000  in  bonds  of  the 
United  States,  redeemable  in  coin  at  the  pleas- 
ure of  the  Government  after  ten  years  from  the 
date  of  their  issue,  and  bearing  interest  at  the 
rate  of  five  per  cent,  per  annum.  It  was  further 
stated  in  the  notice  that  no  bid  would  be  con- 
sidered that  did  not  offer  a  premium  on  said 
bonds  of  a  fraction  more  than  seventeen  per 
cent.,  which  would  secure  to  the  purchaser  an 
investment  yielding  three  per  cent,  per  annum. 

It  should  here  be  mentioned  that  the  only 
Government  bonds  which  could  be  sold  in  the 

138 


manner  and  for  the  purpose  contemplated  were 
such  as  were  authorized  and  described  in  a  law 
passed  in  1870,  and  which  were  designated  in 
the  law  of  1875  providing  for  the  redemption 
of  United  States  notes  as  the  kind  of  bonds 
which  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  was  per- 
mitted to  sell  to  enable  him  "to  prepare  and 
provide  for"  such  redemption.  The  issues  of 
bonds  thus  authorized  were  of  three  descrip- 
tions: one  payable  at  the  pleasure  of  the  Gov- 
ernment after  ten  years  from  their  date,  and 
bearing  interest  at  the  rate  of  five  per  cent.; 
one  so  made  payable  after  fifteen  years  from 
their  date,  bearing  four  and  a  half  per  cent, 
interest;  and  one  in  like  manner  made  payable 
after  thirty  years  from  their  date,  bearing  in- 
terest at  the  rate  of  four  per  cent.  The  five 
per  cent,  bonds  were  specified  in  the  Secre- 
tary's offer  of  sale  because  on  account  of  their 
high  rate  of  interest  they  would  command  a 
greater  premium,  and  therefore  a  larger  return 
of  gold,  and  for  the  further  reason  that  the  op- 
tion of  the  Government  regarding  their  pay- 
ment could  be  earlier  exercised. 

The  withdrawals  of  gold  did  not  cease  with 
the  offer  to  sell  bonds  for  the  replenishment  of 
the  reserve,  and  on  the  day  before  the  date  lim- 
ited for  the  opening  of  bids  the  fund  had  de- 

139 


The  Bond  Issues 

creased  to  less  than  $66,000,000.  In  the  mean- 
time, the  perplexity  of  the  situation,  already 
intense,  was  made  more  so  by  the  fact  that  the 
bids  for  bonds  under  the  offer  of  the  Secretary 
came  in  so  slowly  that  a  few  days  before  the 
1st  of  February,  when  the  bids  were  to  be 
opened,  there  were  plain  indications  that  the 
contemplated  sale  would  fail  unless  prompt  and 
energetic  measures  were  taken  to  avoid  such 
a  perilous  result. 

Thereupon  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  in- 
vited to  a  conference,  in  the  city  of  New  York, 
a  number  of  bankers  and  presidents  of  moneyed 
institutions,  which  resulted  in  so  arousing  their 
patriotism,  as  well  as  their  solicitude  for  the 
protection  of  the  interests  they  represented, 
that  they  effectively  exerted  themselves,  barely 
in  time  to  prevent  a  disastrous  failure  of  the 
sale.  The  proceeds  of  this  sale,  received  from 
numerous  bidders  large  and  small,  aggregated 
$58,660,917.63  in  gold,  which  so  increased  the 
reserve  that  on  the  sixth  day  of  March,  1894, 
it  amounted  to  $107,440,802. 

It  was  hoped  that  this  measure  of  restoration 
and  this  exhibition  of  the  nation's  ability  to 
protect  its  financial  integrity  would  allay  ap- 
prehension and  restore  confidence  to  such  an  ex- 
tent as  to  render  further  bond  sales  unneces- 

140 


The  Bond  Issues 

sary.  It  was  soon  discovered,  however,  that  the 
complications  of  our  ill  condition  were  so  deep- 
seated  and  stubborn  that  the  treatment  resorted 
to  was  only  a  palliative  instead  of  a  cure. 

On  the  last  day  of  May,  1894,  less  than  three 
months  after  its  reinforcement,  as  mentioned, 
the  gold  reserve  had  been  again  so  depleted  by 
withdrawals  that  it  amounted  to  only  $78,693,- 
267.  An  almost  uninterrupted  downward  ten- 
dency followed,  notwithstanding  constant  ef- 
forts on  the  part  of  the  Government  to  check 
the  fall,  until,  on  the  fourteenth  day  of  Novem- 
ber, 1894,  the  fund  had  fallen  to  $61,878,374. 
In  the  meantime,  the  inclination  of  our  timid 
citizens  to  take  gold  from  the  reserve  for  hoard- 
ing ' '  had  grown  by  what  it  fed  on, ' '  while  large 
shipments  abroad  to  meet  foreign  indebted- 
ness or  for  profit  still  continued  and  increased 
in  amount. 

In  these  circumstances  the  inexorable  alter- 
native presented  itself  of  again  selling  Govern- 
ment bonds  for  the  replenishment  of  its  re- 
demption gold,  or  assuming  the  tremendous 
risk  of  neglecting  the  safety  and  permanence 
of  every  interest  dependent  upon  the  soundness 
of  our  national  finances.  An  obedient  regard 
for  official  duty  made  the  right  path  exceedingly 
plain. 

141 


The  Bond  Issues 

On  the  day  last  mentioned  a  public  proposal 
was  issued  inviting  bids  in  gold  for  the  pur- 
chase of  additional  five  per  cent,  bonds  to  the 
amount  of  $50,000,000.  Numerous  bids  were 
received  under  this  proposal,  one  of  which,  for 
"all  or  none"  of  the  bonds,  tendered  on  behalf 
of  thirty-three  banking  institutions  and  finan- 
ciers in  the  city  of  New  York,  being  consider- 
ably more  advantageous  to  the  Government 
than  all  other  bids,  was  accepted,  and  the  entire 
amount  was  awarded  to  these  parties.  This  re- 
sulted in  adding  to  the  reserve  the  sum  of  $58,- 
538,500. 

The  president  at  that  time  of  the  United 
States  Trust  Company,  one  of  the  strongest  and 
largest  financial  institutions  in  the  country, 
rendered  most  useful  and  patriotic  service  in 
making  both  this  and  the  previous  offer  of 
bonds  successful ;  and  his  company  was  a  prom- 
inent purchaser  on  both  occasions.  He  after- 
ward testified  under  oath  that  the  accepted  bid 
for  "all  or  none,"  in  which  his  company  was 
a  large  participant,  proved  unprofitable  to  the 
bidders. 

The  payment  of  gold  into  the  Treasury  on  ac- 
count of  this  sale  of  bonds  was  not  entirely  com- 
pleted until  after  the  1st  of  December,  1894. 
Then  followed  a  time  of  bitter  disappointment 

142 


The  Bond  Issues 

and  miserable  depression,  greater  than  any  that 
had  before  darkened  the  struggles  of  the  Execu- 
tive branch  of  the  Government  to  save  our  na- 
tion's  financial  integrity. 

The  addition  made  to  the  gold  reserve  by  this 
completed  transaction  seemed  to  be  of  no  sub- 
stantial benefit,  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  did  not 
actually  stimulate  the  disquieting  factors  of  the 
situation.  In  December,  1894,  during  which 
month  $58,538,500  in  gold,  realized  from  this 
second  sale  of  bonds,  was  fully  paid  in  and 
added  to  the  reserve,  the  withdrawals  from  the 
fund  amounted  to  nearly  $32,000,000 ;  and  this 
was  followed  in  the  next  month,  or  during  Jan- 
uary, 1895,  by  a  further  depletion  in  the  sum 
of  more  than  $45,000,000. 

In  view  of  the  crisis  which  these  suddenly  in- 
creased withdrawals  seemed  to  portend,  the  aid 
of  Congress  was  earnestly  invoked  in  a  special 
presidential  message  to  that  body,  dated  on  the 
28th  of  January,  1895,  in  which  the  gravity  and 
embarrassment  of  the  situation  were  set  forth 
in  the  following  terms : 

The  real  trouble  which  confronts  us  consists  in  a 
lack  of  confidence,  widespread  and  constantly  in- 
creasing, in  the  continuing  ability  or  disposition  of 
the  Government  to  pay  its  obligations  in  gold.  This 
lack  of  confidence  grows  to  some  extent  out  of  the 

M3 


palpable  and  apparent  embarrassment  attending  the 
efforts  of  the  Government  under  existing  laws  to 
procure  gold,  and  to  a  greater  extent  out  of  the  im- 
possibility of  either  keeping  it  in  the  Treasury  or 
canceling  obligations  by  its  expenditure  after  it  is 
obtained.  .  .  . 

The  most  dangerous  and  irritating  feature  of  the 
situation,  however,  remains  to  be  mentioned.  It  is 
found  in  the  means  by  which  the  Treasury  is  de- 
spoiled of  the  gold  thus  obtained  (by  the  sale  of 
bonds)  without  canceling  a  single  Government  ob- 
ligation, and  solely  for  the  benefit  of  those  who  find 
profit  in  shipping  it  abroad,  or  whose  fears  induce 
them  to  hoard  it  at  home.  We  have  outstanding 
about  $500,000,000  of  currency  notes  of  the  Govern- 
ment for  which  gold  may  be  demanded,  and,  curi- 
ously enough,  the  law  requires  that  when  presented, 
and,  in  fact,  redeemed  and  paid  in  gold,  they  shall 
be  reissued.  Thus  the  same  notes  may  do  duty  many 
times  in  drawing  gold  from  the  Treasury;  nor  can 
the  process  be  averted  so  long  as  private  parties,  for 
profit  or  otherwise,  see  an  advantage  in  repeating 
the  operation.  More  than  $300,000,000  of  these 
notes  have  been  redeemed  in  gold,  and,  notwith- 
standing such  redemption,  they  are  still  outstanding. 

After  giving  a  history  of  the  bond  issues  al- 
ready made  to  replenish  the  reserve,  and  of 
their  results,  it  was  further  stated : 

The  financial  events  of  the  past  year  suggest  facts 
and  conditions  which  should  certainly  arrest  atten- 
tion. More  than  $172,000,000  in  gold  have  been 

144 


The  Bond  Issues 

drawn  out  of  the  Treasury  during  the  year  for  the 
purpose  of  shipment  abroad  or  hoarding  at  home. 

While  nearly  $103,000,000  was  drawn  out  during 
the  first  ten  months  of  the  year,  a  sum  aggregating 
more  than  two-thirds  of  that  amount,  being  about 
$60,000,000,  was  drawn  out  during  the  following  two 
months,  thus  indicating  a  marked  acceleration  of 
the  depleting  process  with  the  lapse  of  time. 

Following  a  reference  to  existing  differences 
of  opinion  in  regard  to  the  extent  to  which 
silver  should  be  coined  or  used  in  our  currency, 
and  the  irrelevancy  of  such  differences  to  the 
matter  in  hand,  the  message  continued: 

While  I  am  not  unfriendly  to  silver,  and  while  I 
desire  to  see  it  recognized  to  such  an  extent  as  is 
consistent  with  financial  safety  and  the  preservation 
of  national  honor  and  credit,  I  am  not  willing  to 
see  gold  entirely  banished  from  our  currency  and 
finances.  To  avert  such  a  consequence  I  believe  thor- 
ough and  radical  remedial  legislation  should  be 
promptly  passed.  I  therefore  beg  the  Congress  to 
give  the  subject  immediate  attention. 

After  recommending  the  passage  of  a  law 
authorizing  the  issue  of  long-term  bonds,  bear- 
ing a  low  rate  of  interest,  to  be  used  for  the 
maintenance  of  an  adequate  gold  reserve  and 
in  exchange  for  outstanding  United  States  notes 
and  Treasury  notes  for  the  purpose  of  their 
cancelation,  and  after  giving  details  of  the  pro- 

145 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

posed  scheme,  the  message  concluded  as  fol- 
lows: 

In  conclusion,  I  desire  to  frankly  confess  my  re- 
luctance to  issue  more  bonds  in  present  circum- 
stances and  with  no  better  results  than  have  lately 
followed  that  course.  I  cannot,  however,  refrain 
from  adding  to  an  assurance  of  my  anxiety  to  co- 
operate with  the  present  Congress  in  any  reasonable 
measure  of  relief,  an  expression  of  my  determination 
to  leave  nothing  undone  which  furnishes  a  hope  for 
improving  the  situation,  or  checking  a  suspicion  of 
our  disinclination  or  disability  to  meet,  with  the 
strictest  honor,  every  national  obligation. 

This  appeal  to  Congress  for  legislative  aid 
was  absolutely  fruitless. 

On  the  eighth  day  of  February,  1895,  those 
who,  under  the  mandate  of  Executive  duty,  were 
striving,  thus  unaided,  to  avert  the  perils  of 
the  situation,  could  count  in  the  gold  reserve 
only  the  frightfully  low  sum  of  $41,340,181; 
and  it  must  be  remembered  that  this  was  only 
two  months  after  the  proceeds  of  the  second 
sale  of  bonds  had  been  added  to  the  fund.  In 
point  of  fact,  the  withdrawals  of  gold  during  the 
short  period  mentioned  had  exceeded  by  more 
than  $18,000,000  the  amount  of  such  proceeds ; 
and  several  million  dollars  more  had  been  de- 
manded, some  of  which,  though  actually  taken 

146 


The  Bond  Issues 

out,  was  unexpectedly,  and  on  account  of  the 
transaction  now  to  be  detailed,  returned  to  the 
Treasury. 

This  sudden  fall  in  the  reserve,  and  the  ap- 
parent certainty  of  the  continuance  of  its  rapid 
depletion,  seemed  to  justify  the  fear  that  before 
another  bond  sale  by  means  of  public  notice 
and  popular  subscription  could  be  perfected 
the  gold  reserve  might  be  entirely  exhausted; 
nor  could  we  keep  out  of  mind  the  apprehension 
that  in  consequence  of  repeated  dispositions  of 
bonds,  with  worse  instead  of  better  financial 
conditions  impending,  further  sales  by  popular 
subscription  might  fail  of  success,  except  upon 
terms  that  would  give  the  appearance  of  im- 
paired national  credit. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  no  other  way 
seemed  to  be  open  to  us  than  another  public 
offer  of  bonds ;  and  it  was  determined  to  move 
in  that  direction  immediately. 

In  anticipation  of  this  action  it  was  important 
to  obtain  certain  information  and  suggestions 
touching  the  feeling  and  disposition  of  those 
actively  prominent  in  financial  and  business  cir- 
cles. 

I  think  it  may  here  be  frankly  confessed  that 
it  never  occurred  to  any  of  us  to  consult,  in  this 
emergency,  farmers,  doctors,  lawyers,  shoe- 

'47 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

makers,  or  even  statesmen.  We  could  not  escape 
the  belief  that  the  prospect  of  obtaining  what 
we  needed  might  be  somewhat  improved  by 
making  application  to  those  whose  business  and 
surroundings  qualified  them  to  intelligently  re- 
spond. 

Therefore,  on  the  evening  of  the  seventh  day 
of  February,  1895,  an  interview  was  held  at  the 
White  House  with  Mr.  J.  P.  Morgan  of  New 
York ;  and  I  propose  to  give  the  details  of  that 
interview  as  gathered  from  a  recollection  which 
I  do  not  believe  can  be  at  fault.  Secretary  Car- 
lisle was  present  nearly  or  quite  all  the  time, 
Attorney-General  Olney  was  there  a  portion  of 
the  time,  and  Mr.  Morgan  and  a  young  man 
from  his  office  and  myself  all  the  time.  At  the 
outset  Mr.  Morgan  was  inclined  to  complain  of 
the  treatment  he  had  received  from  Treasury 
officials  in  the  repudiation  of  an  arrangement 
which  he  thought  he  had  been  encouraged  to 
perfect  in  connection  with  the  disposal  of  an- 
other issue  of  bonds.  I  said  to  Mr.  Morgan, 
whatever  there  might  be  in  all  this,  an- 
other offer  of  bonds  for  popular  subscription 
open  to  all  bidders  had  been  determined  upon, 
and  that  there  were  two  questions  I  wanted  to 
ask  him  which  he  ought  to  be  able  to  answer :  one 
was  whether  the  bonds  to  be  so  offered  would 

148 


probably  be  taken  at  a  good  price  on  short 
notice ;  and  the  other  was  whether,  in  case  there 
should  be  imminent  danger  of  the  disappear- 
ance of  what  remained  of  the  gold  reserve,  dur- 
ing the  time  that  must  elapse  between  published 
notice  and  the  opening  of  bids,  a  sufficient 
amount  of  gold  could  be  temporarily  obtained 
from  financial  institutions  in  the  city  of  New 
York  to  bridge  over  the  difficulty  and  save  the 
reserve  until  the  Government  could  realize  upon 
the  sale  of  its  bonds.  Mr.  Morgan  replied 
that  he  had  no  doubt  bonds  could  be  again  sold 
on  popular  subscription  at  some  price,  but  he 
could  not  say  what  the  price  would  be ;  and  to 
the  second  inquiry  his  answer  was  that,  in  his 
opinion,  such  an  advance  of  gold  as  might  be 
required  could  be  accomplished  if  the  gold 
could  be  kept  in  this  country,  but  that  there 
might  be  reluctance  to  making  such  an  advance 
if  it  was  to  be  immediately  withdrawn  for  ship- 
ment abroad,  leaving  our  financial  condition 
substantially  unimproved.  After  a  little  fur- 
ther discussion  of  the  situation  he  suddenly 
asked  me  why  we  did  not  buy  $100,000,000  in 
gold  at  a  fixed  price  and  pay  for  it  in  bonds,  un- 
der Section  3700  of  the  Kevised  Statutes.  This 
was  a  proposition  entirely  new  to  me.  I  turned 
to  the  Statutes  and  read  the  section  he  had  men- 

149 


tioned.  Secretary  Carlisle  confirmed  me  in  the 
opinion  that  this  law  abundantly  authorized 
such  a  transaction,  and  agreed  that  it  might  be 
expedient  if  favorable  terms  could  be  made. 
The  section  of  the  Statutes  referred  to  reads 
as  follows : 

Section  3700.  The  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
may  purchase  coin  with  any  of  the  bonds  or  notes  of 
the  United  States  authorized  by  law,  at  such  rates 
and  upon  such  terms  as  he  may  deem  most  advan- 
tageous to  the  public  interest. 

Mr.  Morgan  strongly  urged  that,  if  we  pro- 
ceeded under  this  law,  the  amount  of  gold  pur- 
chased should  not  be  less  than  $100,000,000; 
but  he  was  at  once  informed  that  in  no  event 
would  more  bonds  be  then  issued  than  would 
be  sufficient  to  provide  for  adding  to  the  reserve, 
about  $60,000,000,  the  amount  necessary  to  raise 
the  fund  to  $100,000,000. 

Not  many  months  afterward  I  became  con- 
vinced that  on  this  point  Mr.  Morgan  made  a 
wise  suggestion;  and  I  have  always  since  re- 
gretted that  it  was  not  adopted. 


150 


Ill 


It  can  hardly  be  necessary  to  state  that  any 
plan  which  would  protect  from  immediate  with- 
drawal the  gold  we  might  add  to  our  reserve 
could  not  fail  to  be  of  extreme  value.  Such 
of  these  withdrawals  as  were  made  for  hoard- 
ing gold  could  be  prevented  only  by  a  restora- 
tion of  confidence  among  those  of  our  people 
who  had  grown  suspicious  of  the  Government 's 
financial  ability;  but  the  considerable  drain 
from  the  reserve  for  the  purchase  of  the  very 
bonds  to  be  sold  for  its  reinforcement,  and  the 
much  larger  drain  made  by  those  who  profited 
by  the  shipment  of  gold  abroad,  could  be,  meas- 
urably at  least,  directly  arrested.  Thus  to  the 
extent  that  foreign  gold  might  be  brought  here 
and  used  for  the  purchase  of  bonds,  the  use  for 
that  purpose  of  such  as  was  held  by  our  own 
people  or  as  was  already  in  the  reserve  subject 
to  their  withdrawal  would  not  only  be  de- 
creased, but  the  current  of  the  passage  of  gold 
would  be  changed  and  would  flow  toward  us  in- 
stead of  away  from  us,  making  the  prospect  of 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

profit  in  gold  exportation  less  alluring.  An  in- 
flux of  gold  from  abroad  would  also  have  a  ten- 
dency to  decrease  the  sentimental  estimate  of  its 
desirability  which  its  unrelieved  scarcity  was 
apt  to  create  in  timid  minds.  It  was  especially 
plain  that  so  far  as  withdrawals  from  our  re- 
serve for  speculative  shipment  abroad  were  con- 
cerned, they  could  be  discouraged  by  the  efforts 
of  those  whose  financial  connections  in  other 
countries  enabled  them  to  sell  gold  exchange  on 
foreign  money  centers  at  a  price  which  would 
make  the  actual  transportation  of  the  coin  itself 
unprofitable. 

The  position  of  Mr.  Morgan  and  the  other 
parties  in  interest  whom  he  represented  was 
such  in  the  business  world  that  they  were  abun- 
dantly able,  not  only  to  furnish  the  gold  we 
needed,  but  to  protect  us  in  the  manner  indi- 
cated against  its  immediate  loss.  Their  will- 
ingness to  undertake  both  these  services  was 
developed  during  the  discussion  of  the  plan  pro- 
posed ;  and  after  careful  consideration  of  every 
detail  until  a  late  hour  of  the  night,  an  agree- 
ment was  made  by  which  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co. 
of  New  York,  for  themselves  and  for  J.  S.  Mor- 
gan &  Co.  of  London;  and  August  Belmont  & 
Co.  of  New  York,  for  themselves  and  for  N.  M. 
Kothschild  &  Son  of  London,  were  to  sell  and 

152 


The  Bond  Issues 

deliver  to  the  Government  3,500,000  ounces  of 
standard  gold  coin  of  the  United  States,  to  be 
paid  for  in  bonds  bearing  annual  interest  at  the 
rate  of  four  per  cent,  per  annum,  and  payable 
at  the  pleasure  of  the  Government  after  thirty 
years  from  their  date,  such  bonds  to  be  issued 
and  delivered  from  time  to  time  as  the  gold 
coin  to  be  furnished  was  deposited  by  said  par- 
ties in  the  subtreasuries  or  other  legal  deposi- 
tories of  the  United  States.  At  least  one  half 
of  the  coin  so  delivered  was  to  be  obtained  in 
Europe,  and  shipped  from  there  in  amounts  not 
less  than  300,000  ounces  per  month,  at  the  ex- 
pense and  risk  of  the  parties  furnishing  the 
same ;  and  so  far  as  it  was  in  their  power  they 
were  to  "  exert  all  financial  influence  and  make 
all  legitimate  efforts  to  protect  the  Treasury  of 
the  United  States  against  the  withdrawals  of 
gold  pending  the  complete  performance  of  the 
contract. ' ' 

Four  per  cent,  bonds  were  selected  for  use  in 
this  transaction  instead  of  ten-year  bonds  bear- 
ing five  per  cent,  interest,  because  their  matu- 
rity was  extended  to  thirty  years,  thus  offering 
a  more  permanent  and  inviting  investment,  and 
for  the  further  reason  that  $100,000,000  of 
shorter  five  per  cent,  bonds  had  already  been 
issued,  and  it  was,  therefore,  deemed  desirable 

'53 


The  Bond  Issues 

to  postpone  these  further  bond  obligations  of 
the  Government  to  a  later  date.  The  price 
agreed  upon  for  the  gold  coin  to  be  delivered 
was  such  that  the  bonds  given  in  payment  there- 
for would  yield  to  the  investor  an  annual  in- 
come of  three  and  three  fourths  per  cent. 

It  has  already  been  stated  that  the  only  bonds 
which  could  be  utilized  in  our  efforts  to  main- 
tain our  gold  reserve  were  those  described  in  a 
law  passed  as  early  as  1870,  and  made  available 
for  our  uses  by  an  act  passed  in  1875.  The 
terms  of  these  bonds  were  ill  suited  to  later 
ideas  of  investment,  and  they  were  made  payable 
in  coin  and  not  specifically  in  gold.  Nothing  at 
any  time  induced  the  exchange  of  gold  for  these 
coin  bonds,  except  a  reliance  upon  such  a  meas- 
ure of  good  faith  on  the  part  of  the  Govern- 
ment, and  honesty  on  the  part  of  the  people, 
as  would  assure  their  payment  in  gold  coin  and 
not  in  depreciated  silver. 

It  was  exceedingly  fortunate  that,  at  the  time 
this  agreement  was  under  consideration,  certain 
political  movements  calculated  to  undermine 
this  reliance  upon  the  Government's  continued 
financial  integrity  were  not  in  sight ;  but  it  was, 
nevertheless,  very  apparent  that  the  difficulties 
of  the  situation  would  be  greatly  lessened  if,  in 
safeguarding  our  reserve,  bonds  could  be  used 

154 


The  Bond  Issues 

payable  by  their  terms  in  gold,  and  bearing  a 
rate  of  interest  not  exceeding  three  per  cent. 
Accordingly,  at  the  instance  of  Secretary  Car- 
lisle, a  bill  had  been  introduced  in  the  House  of 
Representatives,  some  time  before  the  Morgan- 
Belmont  agreement  was  entered  upon,  which 
authorized  the  issue  of  bonds  of  that  descrip- 
tion. A  few  hours  before  the  agreement  was 
consummated  this  sane  and  sensible  legisla- 
tion was  brought  to  a  vote  in  the  House  and 
rejected. 

When,  in  our  interview  with  Mr.  Morgan,  the 
price  for  the  gold  to  be  furnished  was  con- 
sidered, he  gave  reasons  which  we  could  not  well 
answer  in  support  of  the  terms  finally  agreed 
upon;  but  he  said  that  the  parties  offering  to 
furnish  the  gold  would  be  glad  to  accept  at  par 
three  per  cent,  bonds,  payable  by  their  terms  in 
gold  instead  of  in  coin,  in  case  their  issue  could 
be  authorized.  He  expressed  not  only  a  will- 
ingness but  a  strong  desire  that  a  substitution 
might  be  made  of  such  bonds  in  lieu  of  those 
already  selected,  and  readily  agreed  to  allow 
us  time  to  procure  the  necessary  legislation  for 
that  purpose.  He  explained,  however,  that  only 
a  short  time  could  be  stipulated  for  such  a  sub- 
stitution, because  in  order  to  carry  out  suc- 
cessfully the  agreement  contemplated,  the  bonds 

155 


The  Bond  Issues 

must  be  offered  in  advance  to  investors  both 
here  and  abroad,  and  that  after  numerous  sub- 
scriptions had  been  received  from  outside  par- 
ties the  form  and  condition  of  the  securities 
could  not  be  changed;  and  he  added  that,  but 
for  this,  there  would  be  no  objection  to  the 
concession  of  all  the  time  desired.  It  was  finally 
agreed  that  ten  days  should  be  allowed  us  to 
secure  from  Congress  the  legislation  necessary 
to  permit  the  desired  substitution  of  bonds.  A 
simple  calculation  demonstrated  that  by  such 
a  substitution  the  Government  would  save  on 
account  of  interest  more  than  $16,000,000  be- 
fore the  maturity  of  the  bonds.  It  was  further 
stipulated  on  the  part  of  the  Government  that 
if  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  should  desire 
to  sell  any  further  bonds  on  or  before  October 
1,  1895,  they  should  first  be  offered  to  the  par- 
ties then  represented  by  Mr.  Morgan.  This 
stipulation  did  not  become  operative. 

When  our  conference  terminated  it  was  un- 
derstood that  Secretary  Carlisle  and  Attorney- 
General  Olney  should  act  for  the  Government 
at  a  meeting  between  the  parties  early  the  fol- 
lowing day,  at  which  the  agreement  we  had  made 
was  to  be  reduced  to  writing ;  and  thereupon  I 
prepared  a  message  which  was  submitted  to  the 
Congress  at  the  opening  of  its  session  on  the 

156 


The  Bond  Issues 

following  day,  in  which  the  details  of  our  agree- 
ment were  set  forth  and  the  amount  which 
would  be  saved  to  the  Government  by  the  sub- 
stitution of  three  per  cent,  gold  bonds  was 
plainly  stated;  but  having  no  memorandum  of 
the  agreement  before  me,  in  my  haste  I  care- 
lessly omitted  to  mention  the  efforts  agreed  on 
by  Mr.  Morgan  and  his  associates  to  prevent 
gold  shipments.  The  next  morning  a  contract 
embodying  our  agreement  was  drawn  and 
signed,  and  a  copy  at  once  given  to  the  chair- 
man of  the  Ways  and  Means  Committee  of  the 
House,  so  that  the  delay  of  a  demand  for  its  in- 
spection might  be  avoided.  A  bill  was  also  im- 
mediately introduced  again  giving  authority  to 
issue  three  per  cent,  bonds,  payable  by  their 
terms  in  gold,  to  be  substituted  in  place  of  the 
four  per  cent,  bonds  as  provided  in  the  con- 
tract-to the  end  that  $16,000,000  might  be 
saved  to  the  Government,  and  the  public  wel- 
fare in  every  way  subserved. 

The  object  of  this  message  was  twofold.  It 
was  deemed  important,  considering  the  critical 
condition  of  our  gold  reserve,  that  the  public 
should  be  speedily  informed  of  the  steps  taken 
for  its  protection ;  and  in  addition,  though  pre- 
vious efforts  to  obtain  helpful  legislation  had 
resulted  in  discouragement,  it  was  hoped  that 

'57 


when  the  saving  by  the  Government  of  $16,- 
000,000  was  seen  to  depend  on  the  action  of 
Congress  there  might  be  a  response  that  would 
accord  with  patriotic  public  duty. 

Quite  in  keeping  with  the  congressional  habit 
prevailing  at  that  time,  the  needed  legislation 
was  refused,  and  this  money  was  not  saved. 

The  contract  was  thereupon  carried  out  as 
originally  made.  In  its  execution  four  per 
cent,  bonds  were  delivered  amounting  to  $62,- 
315,400,  and  the  sum  of  $65,116,244.62  in  gold 
received  as  their  price.  The  last  deposit  in  com- 
pletion of  the  contract  was  made  in  June,  1895, 
but  additional  gold  was  obtained  from  the  con- 
tracting parties  in  exchange  for  United  States 
notes  and  Treasury  notes  until  in  September, 
1895,  when  the  entire  amount  of  gold  received 
from  them  under  the  contract  and  through  such 
exchanges  had  amounted  to  more  than  $81,000,- 
000.  The  terms  of  the  agreement  were  so  well 
carried  out,  not  only  in  the  matter  of  furnish- 
ing gold,  but  in  procuring  it  from  abroad  and 
protecting  the  reserve  from  withdrawals,  that 
during  its  continuance  the  operation  of  the 
11  endless  chain"  which  had  theretofore  drained 
our  gold  was  interrupted.  No  gold  was,  dur- 
ing that  period,  taken  from  the  Treasury  to  be 
used  in  the  purchase  of  bonds,  as  had  pre- 
158 


viously  been  the  case,  nor  was  any  withdrawn 
for  shipment  abroad. 

It  became  manifest,  however,  soon  after  this 
contract  was  fully  performed,  that  our  financial 
ailments  had  reached  a  stage  so  nearly  chronic 
that  their  cure  by  any  treatment  within  Execu- 
tive reach  might  well  be  considered  a  matter  of 
anxious  doubt.  In  the  latter  months  of  the  year 
1895  a  scarcity  of  foreign  exchange  and  its  high 
rate,  the  termination  of  the  safeguards  of  the 
Morgan-Belmont  contract,  and,  as  a  result,  the 
renewal  of  opportunity  profitably  to  withdraw 
gold  for  export  with  a  newly  stimulated  popu- 
lar apprehension,  and  perhaps  other  disturb- 
ing incidents,  brought  about  a  recurrence  of 
serious  depletions  of  gold  from  the  reserve. 

In  the  annual  Executive  message  sent  to  Con- 
gress on  the  second  day  of  December,  1895,  the 
situation  of  our  finances  and  currency  was  set 
forth  in  detail,  and  another  earnest  plea  was 
made  for  remedial  legislative  action.  After 
mentioning  the  immediately  satisfactory  results 
of  the  contract  for  the  purchase  of  gold,  the 
message  continued : 

Though  the  contract  mentioned  stayed  for  a  time 
the  tide  of  gold  withdrawals,  its  good  results  could 
not  be  permanent.  Recent  withdrawals  have  re- 
duced the  reserve  from  $107,571,230  on  the  eighth 

159 


The  Bond  Issues 

day  of  July,  1895,  to  $79,333,966.  How  long  it  will 
remain  large  enough  to  render  its  increase  unneces- 
sary is  only  a  matter  of  conjecture,  though  quite 
large  withdrawals  for  shipment  in  the  immediate 
future  are  predicted  in  well-informed  quarters. 
About  $16,000,000  has  been  withdrawn  during  the 
month  of  November. 

The  prediction  of  further  withdrawals  men- 
tioned in  this  message  was  so  fully  verified  that 
eighteen  days  after  its  transmission,  and  on  the 
twentieth  day  of  December,  1895,  another  Ex- 
ecutive communication  was  sent  to  Congress, 
in  contemplation  of  its  holiday  recess,  in  which, 
after  referring  to  the  details  contained  in  the 
former  message,  it  was  stated : 

The  contingency  then  feared  has  reached  us,  and 
the  withdrawals  of  gold  since  the  communication  re- 
ferred to,  and  others  that  appear  inevitable,  threaten 
such  a  depletion  in  our  Government's  gold  reserve  as 
brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  necessity  of  further 
action  for  its  protection.  This  condition  is  intensi- 
fied by  the  prevalence  in  certain  quarters  of  sudden 
and  unusual  apprehension  and  timidity  in  business 
circles. 

The  real  and  sensible  cure  for  our  recurring  trou- 
bles can  only  be  effected  by  a  complete  change  in 
our  financial  scheme.  Pending  that,  the  Executive 
branch  of  the  Government  will  not  relax  its  efforts 
nor  abandon  its  determination  to  use  every  means 
within  its  reach  to  maintain  before  the  world  Ameri- 
go 


The  Bond  Issues 

can  credit,  nor  will  there  be  any  hesitation  in  ex- 
hibiting its  confidence  in  the  resources  of  our  coun- 
try and  the  constant  patriotism  of  our  people. 

In  view,  however,  of  the  peculiar  situation  now 
confronting  us,  I  have  ventured  to  herein  express  the 
earnest  hope  that  the  Congress,  in  default  of  the 
inauguration  of  a  better  system  of  finance,  will  not 
take  a  recess  from  its  labors  before  it  has,  by  legis- 
lative enactment  or  declaration,  done  something,  not 
only  to  remind  those  apprehensive  among  our  own 
people  that  the  resources  of  this  Government  and  a 
scrupulous  regard  for  honest  dealing  afford  a  sure 
guarantee  of  unquestioned  safety  and  soundness,  but 
to  reassure  the  world  that  with  these  factors,  and  the 
patriotism  of  our  citizens,  the  ability  and  determina- 
tion of  our  nation  to  meet  in  any  circumstances  every 
obligation  it  incurs  do  not  admit  of  question. 

Perhaps  it  should  not  have  been  expected 
that  members  of  Congress  would  permit  trou- 
blesome thoughts  of  the  Government's  financial 
difficulties  to  disturb  the  pleasant  anticipations 
of  their  holiday  recess;  at  any  rate,  these  dif- 
ficulties and  the  appeal  of  the  President  for  at 
least  some  manifestation  of  a  disposition  to  aid 
in  their  remedy  were  completely  ignored. 

On  the  sixth  day  of  January,  1896,  the  gold 
reserve  having  fallen  to  $61,251,710,  its  im- 
mediate repair  became  imperative.  Though 
our  resort  to  the  expedient  of  purchasing  gold 
with  bonds  under  contract  had  been  productive 

11  161 


The  Bond  Issues 

of  very  satisfactory  results,  it  by  no  means  in- 
dicated our  abandonment  of  the  policy  of  in- 
viting offerings  of  gold  by  public  advertise- 
ment. It  was  rather  an  exceptional  departure 
from  that  policy,  made  necessary  by  the  dan- 
gerously low  state  of  the  reserve  on  account  of 
extensive  and  sudden  depletions,  and  the  peril 
attending  any  delay  in  replenishing  it.  We 
had  not  lost  faith  in  the  loyalty  and  patriotism 
of  the  people,  nor  did  we  doubt  their  willingness 
to  respond  to  an  appeal  from  their  Government 
in  any  emergency.  We  also  confidently  believed 
that  if  the  bonds  issued  for  the  purpose  of  in- 
creasing our  stock  of  gold  were  widely  distrib- 
uted among  our  people,  self-interest  as  well  as 
patriotism  would  stimulate  the  solicitude  of  the 
masses  of  our  citizens  for  the  welfare  of  the 
nation.  No  reason  for  discouragement  had 
been  found  in  public  offerings  for  bonds,  so  far 
as  obtaining  a  needed  supply  of  gold  and  a  fair 
price  for  our  bonds  were  concerned.  The  fail- 
ure of  their  wide  distribution  among  the  people 
when  so  disposed  of  seemed  to  be  largely  ow- 
ing to  the  fact  that  the  bonds  themselves  were 
so  antiquated  in  form,  and  bore  so  high  a  rate 
of  interest,  that  it  was  difficult  for  an  ordinary 
person  to  make  the  rather  confusing  computa- 
tion of  premium  and  other  factors  necessary  to 

162 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

a  safe  and  intelligent  bid.  In  a  transaction  of 
this  sort,  where  the  smallest  fraction  of  a  cent 
may  determine  the  success  of  an  offer,  those  ac- 
customed to  the  niceties  of  financial  calculations 
are  apt  to  hold  the  field  to  the  exclusion  of  many 
who,  unaided,  dare  not  trust  themselves  in  the 
haze  of  such  intricacies.  If  Congress  had  pro- 
vided for  the  issuance  of  bonds  bearing  a  low 
rate  of  interest,  which  could  have  been  offered 
to  the  public  at  par,  I  am  convinced  that  the 
plain  people  of  the  land  would  more  generally 
have  become  purchasers.  Another  difficulty  that 
had  to  some  extent  prevented  a  more  common 
participation  by  the  people  in  prior  public  sales 
arose,  it  was  thought,  from  their  lack  of  notice 
of  the  pendency  of  such  sales,  and  want  of  in- 
formation as  to  the  advantages  of  the  invest- 
ment offered,  and  the  procedure  necessary  to 
present  their  bids  in  proper  form. 

In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  gold  then  in  the 
reserve  amounted  to  $20,000,000  more  than  it 
contained  eleven  months  earlier,  when  the  Mor- 
gan-Belmont  contract  was  made,  and  because, 
for  that  reason,  more  time  could  be  allowed 
for  its  replenishment,  there  was  no  hesitation 
in  deciding  upon  a  return  to  our  original  plan 
of  offering  bonds  in  exchange  for  gold  by  public 
subscription. 

163 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

Having  determined  upon  a  return  to  this 
method,  it  was  deemed  wise,  upon  consideration 
of  all  the  circumstances,  to  make  some  modifica- 
tion of  prior  action  in  such  cases.  Instead  of 
short-term  five  per  cent,  bonds,  the  longer-term 
bonds  bearing  four  per  cent,  interest  were  sub- 
stituted, as,  on  the  whole,  the  best  we  could 
offer  for  popular  subscription.  Since  two  of- 
ferings of  $50,000,000  each  had  proved  to  be  of 
only  very  temporary  benefit,  it  was  determined 
to  double  the  amount  and  offer  $100,000,000  for 
subscription.  Nearly  a  month  was  to  be  given 
instead  of  a  shorter  time,  as  theretofore,  between 
the  date  of  notice  of  the  offer  and  the  opening 
of  the  bids;  and  extraordinary  efforts  were  to 
be  made  to  give  the  most  thorough  publicity 
to  the  offerings— to  the  end  that  we  might  stim- 
ulate in  every  possible  way  the  desire  of  the 
masses  of  our  people  to  invest  in  the  bonds. 
Especial  information  and  aid  were  to  be  fur- 
nished for  the  guidance  of  those  inclined  to 
subscribe;  and  successful  bidders  were  to  be 
allowed  to  pay  for  the  bonds  awarded  to  them 
in  instalments.  The  lowest  denomination  of 
the  bonds  was  to  be  fifty  dollars,  and  the  larger 
ones  were  to  be  in  multiples  of  that  sum.  In 
point  of  fact,  it  was  resolved  that  nothing 
should  be  left  undone  which  would  in  any  way 

164 


promote  the  success  of  this  additional  and  in- 
creased offer  of  bond  subscription  to  the  pub- 
lic. 

Accordingly,  on  the  sixth  day  of  January, 
1896,  a  circular  bearing  that  date  was  issued, 
giving  notice  that  proposals  would  be  received 
until  the  fifth  day  of  February  following  for 
gold  coin  purchases  of  $100,000,000  of  the  four 
per  cent,  bonds  of  the  United  States,  upon  the 
terms  above  mentioned.  These  circulars  were 
extensively  published  in  the  newspapers 
throughout  the  country.  Copies,  together  with 
a  letter  of  instruction  to  bidders,  containing, 
among  other  things,  a  computation  showing 
the  income  the  bonds  would  yield  to  the  in- 
vestor upon  their  purchase  at  prices  therein 
specified,  and  accompanied  by  blanks  for  sub- 
scription, were  sent  to  the  postmasters  in  every 
State  and  Territory  with  directions  that  they 
should  be  conspicuously  displayed  in  their  of- 
fices. The  Comptroller  of  the  Currency  pre- 
pared and  sent  to  all  national  banks  a  circular 
letter,  urging  them  to  call  the  attention  of  their 
patrons  to  the  desirability  of  obtaining  the 
bonds  as  an  investment,  and  to  aid  in  stimu- 
lating subscriptions;  and  with  this  was  for- 
warded a  complete  set  of  papers  similar  to 
those  sent  to  the  postmasters.  These  papers 

165 


The  Bond  Issues 

were  also  sent  to  other  banks  and  financial 
institutions  and  to  bankers  in  all  parts  of  the 
country,  and,  in  addition,  notice  was  given  that 
they  could  be  obtained  upon  application  to  the 
Treasury  Department  or  any  of  the  subtreas- 
uries  of  the  United  States.  Soon  afterward, 
in  view  of  the  large  amount  of  the  bonds  of- 
fered, and  as  a  precaution  against  an  undue 
strain  upon  the  general  money  market,  as  well 
as  to  permit  the  greatest  possible  opportunity 
for  subscription,  the  terms  of  the  original  offer 
of  the  Secretary  of  the  Treasury  were  modi- 
fied by  reducing  in  amount  the  instalments  of 
the  purchase  price  and  extending  the  time  for 
their  payment. 

On  an  examination  of  the  bids  at  the  expira- 
tion of  the  time  limited  for  their  presentation, 
it  was  found  that  4635  bids  had  been  received, 
after  rejecting  six  which  were  palpably  not 
genuine  or  not  made  in  good  faith.  The  bid- 
ders were  scattered  through  forty-seven  of  our 
States  and  Territories,  and  the  aggregate 
amount  represented  by  their  bids  was  $526,- 
970,000.  The  number  of  accepted  bids  upon 
which  bonds  were  awarded  was  only  828,  and 
of  these  ten  were  forfeited  after  acceptance,  on 
account  of  non-payment  of  the  first  instalment 
of  the  purchase  price.  Several  of  the  bids  ac- 

166 


Tbe  Bond  Issues 

cepted  were  for  a  single  fifty-dollar  bond,  and 
they  varied  in  amount  from  that  to  one  bid 
made  by  J.  P.  Morgan  &  Co.  and  several  as- 
sociates for  the  entire  issue  of  $100,000,000, 
for  which  they  offered  110.6877  on  the  dollar. 
To  all  the  other  827  accepted  bidders  who  of- 
fered even  the  smallest  fraction  of  a  farthing 
more  than  this  the  full  number  of  bonds  for 
which  they  bid  were  awarded. 

The  aggregate  of  the  bonds  awarded  to  these 
bidders,  excluding  the  Morgan  bid,  amounted 
to  $62,321,150.  The  remainder  of  the  entire 
offering,  including  more  than  $4,700,000  of  the 
awards  which  became  forfeited  for  non-pay- 
ment as  above  mentioned,  were  awarded  to 
Mr.  Morgan  and  his  associates,  their  bid  being 
the  highest  next  to  those  on  which  bonds  had 
been  awarded  in  full,  as  already  stated. 

The  aggregate  of  the  prices  received  for 
these  bonds  represented,  by  reason  of  the  pre- 
miums paid,  an  income  to  the  investor  of  a 
trifle  less  than  three  and  four  tenths  per  cent. 

As  a  result  of  this  large  sale  of  bonds,  the 
gold  reserve,  which,  on  the  last  day  of  Jan- 
uary, 1896,  amounted  to  less  than  $50,000,000, 
was  so  increased  that  at  the  end  of  February, 
in  spite  of  withdrawals  in  the  meantime,  it 
stood  at  nearly  $124,000,000. 

167 


The  Bond  Issues 

It  will  be  observed  that,  notwithstanding  all 
the  efforts  made  to  distribute  this  issue  of 
bonds  among  the  people,  but  827  bids  out  of 
4641  were  entitled  to  awards  as  being  above 
the  Morgan,  bid ;  and  that  more  than  one  third 
of  all  the  bonds  sold  were  awarded  on  the 
single  bid  of  Mr.  Morgan  and  his  associates. 

The  price  received  on  this  public  sale  was 
apparently  somewhat  better  for  the  Govern- 
ment than  that  secured  by  the  Morgan-Bel- 
mont  contract;  but  their  agreement  required 
of  them  such  labor,  risk,  and  expense  as  per- 
haps entitled  them  to  a  favorable  bargain.  In 
any  event,  the  advantages  the  Government 
derived  from  this  contract  were  certainly  very 
valuable  and  should  not  be  overlooked.  On 
every  sale  of  bonds  by  public  offering,  not 
excluding  that  just  mentioned,  large  amounts 
of  gold  were  withdrawn  from  the  Treasury 
and  used  in  paying  for  the  bonds  offered.  In 
the  execution  of  the  contract  of  February,  1895, 
no  gold  was  withdrawn  for  the  purchase  of  the 
bonds,  and  the  reserve  received  the  full  benefit 
of  the  transaction.  Each  sale  by  public  adver- 
tisement made  prior  to  the  time  of  the  con- 
tract had  been  so  quickly  followed  by  extensive 
and  wasting  withdrawals  of  gold  from  the  re- 
serve, that  scarcely  a  breathing-time  was  al- 

168 


The  Bond  Issues 

lowed  before  we  were  again  overtaken  by  the 
necessity  for  its  reinforcement.  Even  after 
the  notice  given  for  the  last  sale  on  the  eighth 
day  of  January,  1896,  and  between  that  date 
and  the  1st  of  June  following,  these  with- 
drawals amounted  to  more  than  $73,000,000, 
while  during  the  six  months  or  more  of  the  ex- 
istence of  the  Morgan-Belmont  contract  the 
withdrawals  of  gold  for  export  were  entirely 
prevented  and  a  season  of  financial  quiet  and 
peace  was  secured. 

Whatever  may  be  the  comparative  merits  of 
the  two  plans  for  maintaining  our  gold  reserve, 
both  of  them  when  utilized  were  abundantly 
and  clearly  justified. 

Whether  from  fatigue  of  malign  conditions 
or  other  causes,  ever  since  the  last  large  sale 
of  bonds  was  made  the  gold  reserve  has  been 
so  free  from  depletion  that  its  condition  has 
caused  no  alarm. 

Two  hundred  and  sixty-two  millions  of  dol- 
lars in  bonds  were  issued  on  its  account  during 
the  critical  time  covered  by  this  narrative ;  but 
the  credit  and  fair  fame  of  our  nation  were 
saved. 

I  have  attempted  to  give  a  detailed  history 
of  the  crime  charged  against  an  administration 
which  ''issued  bonds  of  the  Government  in 

169 


The  Bond  Issues 

time  of  peace."  Without  shame  and  without 
repentance,  I  confess  my  share  of  the  guilt;  and 
I  refuse  to  shield  my  accomplices  in  this  crime 
who,  with  me,  held  high  places  in  that  admin- 
istration. And  though  Mr.  Morgan  and  Mr. 
Belmont  and  scores  of  other  bankers  and  finan- 
ciers who  were  accessories  in  these  transac- 
tions may  be  steeped  in  destructive  propensi- 
ties, and  may  be  constantly  busy  in  sinful 
schemes,  I  shall  always  recall  with  satisfaction 
and  self-congratulation  my  association  with 
them  at  a  time  when  our  country  sorely  needed 
their  aid. 


170 


THE  VENEZUELAN  BOUNDARY 
CONTROVERSY 


THE  VENEZUELAN  BOUNDARY 
CONTROVERSY 


THERE  is  no  better  illustration  of  the  truth 
that  nations  and  individuals  are  affected 
in  the  same  manner  by  like  causes  than  is  often 
furnished  by  the  beginning,  progress,  and  re- 
sults of  a  national  boundary  dispute.  We  all 
know  that  among  individuals,  when  neighbors 
have  entered  upon  a  quarrel  concerning  their 
division-line  or  the  location  of  a  line  fence,  they 
will  litigate  until  all  account  of  cost  and  all 
regard  for  the  merits  of  the  contention  give 
place  to  a  ruthless  and  all-dominating  deter- 
mination, by  fair  means  or  foul,  to  win ;  and  if 
fisticuffs  and  forcible  possession  are  resorted 
to,  the  big,  strong  neighbor  rejoices  in  his 
strength  as  he  mauls  and  disfigures  his  small 
and  weak  antagonist. 

It  will  be  found  that  nations  behave  in  like 
fashion.     One  or  the  other  of  two  national 

173 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

neighbors  claims  that  their  dividing-line  should 
be  defined  or  rectified  in  a  certain  manner.  If 
this  is  questioned,  a  season  of  diplomatic  un- 
truthfulness  and  finesse  sometimes  intervenes 
for  the  sake  of  appearances.  Developments 
soon  follow,  however,  that  expose  a  grim  deter- 
mination behind  fine  phrases  of  diplomacy ;  and 
in  the  end  the  weaker  nation  frequently  awakens 
to  the  fact  that  it  must  either  accede  to  an  ul- 
timatum dictated  by  its  stronger  adversary, 
or  look  in  the  face  of  war  and  a  spoliation  of 
its  territory;  and  if  such  a  stage  is  reached, 
superior  strength  and  fighting  ability,  instead 
of  suggesting  magnanimity,  are  graspingly 
used  to  enforce  extreme  demands  if  not  to  con- 
summate extensive  conquest  or  complete  subju- 
gation. 

I  propose  to  call  attention  to  one  of  these 
unhappy  national  boundary  disputes,  between 
the  kingdom  of  Great  Britain  and  the  South 
American  republic  of  Venezuela,  involving  the 
boundary-line  separating  Venezuela  from  the 
English  colony  of  British  Guiana,  which  ad- 
joins Venezuela  on  the  east. 

Venezuela,  once  a  Spanish  possession,  de- 
clared her  independence  in  1810,  and  a  few 
years  afterward  united  with  two  other  of 
Spain's  revolted  colonies  in  forming  the  old 

174 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Colombian  federal  union,  which  was  recognized 
by  the  United  States  in  1822.  In  1836  this 
union  was  dissolved  and  Venezuela  became 
again  a  separate  and  independent  republic,  be- 
ing promptly  recognized  as  such  by  our  Gov- 
ernment and  by  other  powers.  Spain,  however, 
halted  in  her  recognition  until  1845,  when  she 
quite  superfluously  ceded  to  Venezuela  by 
treaty  the  territory  which  as  an  independent 
republic  she  had  actually  owned  and  possessed 
since  1810.  But  neither  in  this  treaty  nor  in 
any  other  mention  of  the  area  of  the  republic 
were  its  boundaries  described  with  more  defi- 
niteness  than  as  being ' '  the  same  as  those  which 
marked  the  ancient  viceroyalty  and  captaincy- 
general  of  New  Granada  and  Venezuela  in  the 
year  1810." 

England  derived  title  to  the  colony  of  Guiana 
from  Holland  in  1814,  by  a  treaty  in  which  the 
territory  was  described  as  "the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  and  the  establishments  of  Demerara,  Es- 
sequibo,  and  Berbice. ' '  No  boundaries  of  those 
settlements  or  "establishments"  were  given  in 
the  treaty,  nor  does  it  appear  that  any  such 
boundaries  had  ever  been  particularly  defined. 

It  is  quite  apparent  that  the  limits  of  these 
adjoining  countries  thus  lacking  any  mention 
of  definite  metes  and  bounds,  were  in  need  of 

I7S 


extraneous  assistance  before  they  could  be  ex- 
actly fixed,  and  that  their  proper  location  was 
quite  likely  to  lead  to  serious  disagreement. 
In  such  circumstances  threatening  complica- 
tions can  frequently  be  avoided  if  the  adjoin- 
ing neighbors  agree  upon  a  divisional  line 
promptly,  and  before  their  demands  are  stimu- 
lated and  their  tenacity  increased  by  a  real  or 
fancied  advance  in  the  value  of  the  posses- 
sions to  be  divided,  or  other  incidents  have  in- 
tervened to  render  it  more  difficult  to  make  con- 
cessions. 

I  shall  not  attempt  to  sketch  the  facts  and 
arguments  that  bear  upon  the  exact  merits 
of  this  boundary  controversy  between  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela.  They  have  been  thor- 
oughly examined  by  an  arbitral  tribunal  to 
which  the  entire  difficulty  was  referred,  and  by 
whose  determination  the  boundary  between  the 
two  countries  has  been  fixed — perhaps  in  strict 
accord  with  justice,  but  at  all  events  finally  and 
irrevocably.  Inasmuch,  however,  as  our  own 
country  became  in  a  sense  involved  in  the  con- 
troversy, or  at  least  deeply  concerned  in  its  set- 
tlement, I  have  thought  there  might  be  interest 
in  an  explanation  of  the  manner  and  the  pro- 
cesses by  which  the  interposition  of  the  United 
States  Government  was  brought  about.  I  must 

176 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

not  be  expected  to  exclude  from  mention  every 
circumstance  that  may  relate  to  the  merits  of 
the  dispute  as  between  the  parties  primarily 
concerned;  but  so  far  as  I  make  use  of  such 
circumstances  I  intend  to  do  so  only  in  aid  and 
simplification  of  the  explanation  I  have  under- 
taken. 

This  dispute  began  in  1841.  On  October  5 
of  that  year  the  Venezuelan  minister  to  Great 
Britain,  in  a  note  to  Lord  Aberdeen,  Prin- 
cipal Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
after  reminding  the  secretary  that  a  proposal 
made  by  Venezuela  on  the  28th  of  January, 
1841,  for  joint  action  in  the  matter  of  fixing  a 
divisional  boundary,  still  awaited  the  accept- 
ance of  Great  Britain,  wrote  as  follows : 

The  Honorable  Earl  of  Aberdeen  may  now  judge 
of  the  surprise  of  the  Government  of  Venezuela  upon 
learning  that  in  the  territory  of  the  Republic  a  sen- 
try-box has  been  erected  upon  which  the  British  flag 
has  been  raised.  The  Venezuelan  Government  is  in 
ignorance  of  the  origin  and  purport  of  these  proceed- 
ings, and  hopes  that  they  may  receive  some  satisfac- 
tory explanation  of  this  action.  In  the  meantime  the 
undersigned,  in  compliance  with  the  instructions 
communicated  to  him,  urges  upon  the  Honorable  Earl 
of  Aberdeen  the  necessity  of  entering  into  a  treaty 
of  boundaries  as  a  previous  step  to  the  fixation  of 
limits,  and  begs  to  ask  for  an  answer  to  the  above- 
mentioned  communication  of  January  28. 

12  '77 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Lord  Aberdeen,  in  his  reply,  dated  October 
21,  1841,  makes  the  following  statement: 

Her  Majesty's  Government  has  received  from  the 
Governor  of  British  Guiana,  Mr.  Schomburgk 's  re- 
port of  his  proceedings  in  execution  of  the  commis- 
sion with  which  he  has  been  charged.  That  report 
states  that  Mr.  Schomburgk  set  out  from  Demerara 
in  April  last  and  was  on  his  return  to  the  Essequibo 
River  at  the  end  of  June.  It  appears  that  Mr. 
Schomburgk  planted  boundary  posts  at  certain 
points  of  the  country  which  he  has  surveyed,  and 
that  he  was  fully  aware  that  the  demarcation  so 
made  was  merely  a  preliminary  measure,  open  to 
further  discussion  between  the  Governments  of  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela.  But  it  does  not  appear  that 
Mr.  Schomburgk  left  behind  him  any  guard-house, 
sentry-box,  or  other  building  having  the  British  flag. 

With  respect  to  the  proposal  of  the  Venezuelan 
Government  that  the  Governments  of  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela  should  conclude  a  treaty  as  a  prelimi- 
nary step  to  the  demarcation  of  the  boundaries  be- 
tween British  Guiana  and  Venezuela,  the  under- 
signed begs  leave  to  observe  that  it  appears  to  him 
that  if  it  should  be  necessary  to  make  a  treaty  upon 
the  subject  of  the  boundaries  in  question,  such  a 
measure  should  follow  rather  than  precede  the  opera- 
tion of  the  survey. 

In  a  communication  dated  the  18th  of  No- 
vember, 1841,  the  Venezuelan  minister,  after 
again  complaining  of  the  acts  of  Schomburgk 
and  alleging  that  he  "has  planted  at  a  point  on 

178 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  several  posts  bearing 
Her  Majesty's  initials,  and  raised  at  the  same 
place,  with  a  show  of  armed  forces,  the  British 
flag,  and  also  performed  several  other  acts  of 
dominion  and  government, ' '  refers  to  the  great 
dissatisfaction  aroused  in  Venezuela  by  what 
he  calls  "this  undeserved  offense,"  and  adds: 
*  *  The  undersigned  therefore  has  no  doubts  but 
that  he  will  obtain  from  Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment a  reparation  for  the  wrong  done  to 
the  dignity  of  the  Republic,  and  that  those  signs 
which  have  so  unpleasantly  shaken  public  con- 
fidence will  be  ordered  removed. ' ' 

No  early  response  having  been  made  to  this 
communication,  another  was  addressed  to  Lord 
Aberdeen,  dated  December  8,  1841,  in  which 
the  representative  of  Venezuela  refers  to  his 
previous  unanswered  note  and  to  a  recent  order 
received  from  his  government,  which  he  says 
directs  him  "to  insist  not  only  upon  the  con- 
clusion of  a  treaty  fixing  the  boundaries  be- 
tween Venezuela  and  British  Guiana,  but  also, 
and  this  very  particularly,  to  insist  upon  the 
removal  of  the  signs  set  up,  contrary  to  all 
rights,  by  the  surveyor  R.  H.  Schomburgk  in 
Barima  and  in  other  points  of  the  Venezuelan 
territory";  and  he  continues:  "In  his  afore- 
mentioned communication  of  the  18th  of  last 

179 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

month,  the  undersigned  has  already  informed 
the  Honorable  Earl  of  Aberdeen  of  the  dissatis- 
faction prevailing  among  the  Venezuelans  on 
this  account,  and  now  adds  that  this  dissatisfac- 
tion, far  from  diminishing,  grows  stronger— as 
is  but  natural— as  time  goes  on  and  no  repara- 
tion of  the  wrongs  is  made. ' ' 

These  two  notes  of  the  Venezuelan  minister 
were  answered  on  the  eleventh  day  of  Decem- 
ber, 1841.  In  his  reply  Lord  Aberdeen  says: 

The  undersigned  begs  leave  to  refer  to  his  note  of 
the  21st  of  October  last,  in  which  he  explained  that 
the  proceeding  of  Mr.  Schomburgk  in  planting  boun- 
dary posts  at  certain  points  of  the  country  which 
he  has  surveyed  was  merely  a  preliminary  measure 
open  to  future  discussion  between  the  two  Govern- 
ments, and  that  it  would  be  premature  to  make  a 
boundary  treaty  before  the  survey  will  be  com- 
pleted. The  undersigned  has  only  further  to  state 
that  much  unnecessary  inconvenience  would  result 
from  the  removal  of  the  posts  fixed  by  Mr.  Schom- 
burgk, as  they  will  afford  the  only  tangible  means  by 
which  Her  Majesty's  Government  can  be  prepared 
to  discuss  the  question  of  the  boundaries  with  the 
Government  of  Venezuela.  These  posts  were  erected 
for  that  express  purpose,  and  not,  as  the  Venezuelan 
Government  appears  to  apprehend,  as  indications  of 
dominion  and  empire  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain. 

In  a  reply  to  this  note,  after  referring  to  the 
explanation  of  the  purpose  of  these  posts  or 

1 80 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

signs  which  Lord  Aberdeen  had  given,  it  was 
said,  in  further  urging  their  removal:  ''The 
undersigned  regrets  to  be  obliged  to  again  in- 
sist upon  this  point ;  but  the  damages  sustained 
by  Venezuela  on  account  of  the  permanence  of 
said  signs  are  so  serious  that  he  hopes  in  view 
of  those  facts  that  the  trouble  resulting  from 
their  removal  may  not  appear  useless."  The 
minister  followed  this  insistence  with  such  ear- 
nest argument  that  on  the  thirty-first  day  of 
January,  1842,  nearly  four  months  after  the 
matter  was  first  agitated,  Lord  Aberdeen  in- 
formed the  Venezuelan  minister  that  instruc- 
tions would  be  sent  to  the  governor  of  British 
Guiana  directing  him  to  remove  the  posts  which 
had  been  placed  by  Mr.  Schomburgk  near  the 
Orinoco.  He,  however,  accompanied  this  as- 
surance with  the  distinct  declaration  "that  al- 
though, in  order  to  put  an  end  to  the  misappre- 
hension which  appears  to  prevail  in  Venezuela 
with  regard  to  the  object  of  Mr.  Schomburgk 's 
survey,  the  undersigned  has  consented  to  com- 
ply with  the  renewed  representation  of  the  Min- 
ister upon  this  affair,  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment must  not  be  understood  to  abandon  any 
portion  of  the  rights  of  Great  Britain  over  the 
territory  which  was  formerly  held  by  the  Dutch 
in  Guiana." 

181 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

It  should  be  here  stated  that  the  work  which 
Schomburgk  performed  at  the  instance  of  the 
British  Government  consisted  not  only  in  plac- 
ing monuments  of  some  sort  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Orinoco  River,  upon  territory  claimed  by  Ven- 
ezuela, but  also  in  locating  from  such  monu- 
ments a  complete  dividing-line  running  far  in- 
land and  annexing  to  British  Guiana  on  the 
west  a  large  region  which  Venezuela  also 
claimed.  This  line,  as  originally  located  or  as 
afterward  still  further  extended  to  the  west, 
came  to  be  called  "the  Schomburgk  line." 

The  Orinoco  River,  flowing  eastward  to  the 
sea,  is  a  very  broad  and  deep  waterway,  which, 
with  its  affluents,  would  in  any  event,  and  how- 
ever the  bounds  of  Venezuela  might  be  limited, 
traverse  a  very  extensive  portion  of  that  coun- 
try's area;  and  its  control  and  free  navigation 
are  immensely  important  factors  in  the  prog- 
ress and  prosperity  of  the  republic.  Substan- 
tially at  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco,  and  on  its 
south  side,  two  quite  large  rivers,  the  Barima 
and  the  Amacuro,  flow  into  the  sea.  The  region 
adjacent  to  the  mouth  of  those  rivers  has,  some- 
times at  least,  been  called  Barima;  and  it  was 
here  that  the  posts  or  signs  complained  of  by 
Venezuela  were  placed. 

The  coast  from  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco 
182 


Eiver  slopes  or  drops  to  the  east  and  south; 
and  some  distance  from  that  river's  mouth, 
in  the  directions  mentioned,  the  Essequibo,  a 
large  river  flowing  for  a  long  distance  from  the 
south,  empties  into  the  sea. 

After  the  correspondence  I  have  mentioned, 
which  resulted  in  the  removal  of  the  so-called 
initial 'monuments  of  the  Schomburgk  line  from 
the  Barima  region,  there  seems  to  have  been 
less  activity  in  the  boundary  discussion  until 
January  31,  1844,  when  the  Venezuelan  min- 
ister to  England  again  addressed  Lord  Aber- 
deen on  the  subject.  He  referred  to  the  erec- 
tion of  the  Schomburgk  monuments  and  the 
complaints  of  Venezuela  on  that  account,  and 
stated  that  since  the  removal  of  those  monu- 
ments he  had  not  ceased  to  urge  Lord  Aber- 
deen "to  commence  without  delay  negotiations 
for  a  treaty  fixing  definitely  the  boundary-line 
that  shall  divide  the  two  countries."  He  adds 
the  following  very  sensible  statement:  "Al- 
though it  was  undoubtedly  the  duty  of  the  one 
who  promoted  this  question  to  take  the  first  step 
toward  the  negotiation  of  the  treaty,  the  un- 
dersigned being  well  aware  that  other  impor- 
tant matters  claim  the  attention  of  Her  Maj- 
esty's Government,  and  as  he  ought  not  to  wait 
indefinitely,  hastens  to  propose  an  agreement 

183 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

which,  if  left  for  a  later  date,  may  be  difficult 
to  conclude."  It  is  disappointing  to  observe 
that  the  good  sense  exhibited  in  this  state- 
ment did  not  hold  out  to  the  end  of  the  min- 
ister's communication.  After  a  labored  presen- 
tation of  historical  incidents,  beginning  with 
the  discovery  of  the  American  continent,  he  con- 
cludes by  .putting  forward  the  Essequibo  River 
as  the  proper  boundary-line  between  the  two 
countries.  This  was  a  proposition  of  such  ex- 
treme pretensions  that  the  Venezuelan  repre- 
sentative knew,  or  ought  to  have  known,  it 
would  not  be  considered  for  a  moment  by  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain;  and  it  seems  to 
me  that  a  diplomatic  error  was  made  when, 
failing  to  apprehend  the  fact  that  the  exigencies 
of  the  situation  called  for  a  show  of  concession, 
the  Venezuelan  minister,  instead  of  intimating 
a  disposition  to  negotiate,  gave  Great  Britain 
an  opportunity  to  be  first  in  making  proposals 
apparently  calculated  to  meet  the  needs  of  con- 
ciliation and  compromise. 

Thus  two  months  after  the  receipt  of  this 
communication, — on  the  thirtieth  day  of  March, 
1844,— Lord  Aberdeen  sent  his  reply.  After 
combating  the  allegations  contained  in  the  let- 
ter of  the  Venezuelan  representative,  he  re- 
marked that  if  he  were  inclined  to  act  upon  the 

184 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

spirit  of  that  letter,  it  was  evident  that  he  ought 
to  claim  on  behalf  of  Great  Britain,  as  the 
rightful  successor  to  Holland,  all  the  coast  from 
the  Orinoco  to  the  Essequibo.  Then  follows 
this  significant  declaration: 

But  the  undersigned  believes  that  the  negotiations 
would  not  be  free  from  difficulties  if  claims  that 
cannot  be  sustained  are  presented,  and  shall  not 
therefore  follow  Senor  Fortique's  example,  but  state 
here  the  concessions  that  Great  Britain  is  disposed 
to  make  of  her  rights,  prompted  by  a  friendly  con- 
sideration for  Venezuela  and  by  her  desire  to  avoid 
all  cause  of  serious  controversies  between  the  two 
countries.  Being  convinced  that  the  most  important 
object  for  the  interests  of  Venezuela  is  the  exclusive 
possession  of  the  Orinoco,  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment is  ready  to  yield  to  the  Republic  of  Venezuela 
a  portion  of  the  coast  sufficient  to  insure  her  the  free 
control  of  the  mouth  of  this  her  principal  river,  and 
to  prevent  its  being  under  the  control  of  any  foreign 
power. 

Lord  Aberdeen  further  declared  that,  "with 
this  end  in  view,  and  being  persuaded  that  a 
concession  of  the  greatest  importance  has  been 
made  to  Venezuela,"  he  would  consent  on  be- 
half of  Great  Britain  to  a  boundary  which  he 
particularly  defined,  and  in  general  terms  may 
be  described  as  beginning  in  the  mouth  of  the 
Moroco  River,  which  is  on  the  coast  southeast 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  River  and  about 

185 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

two  thirds  of  the  distance  between  that  point 
and  the  Essequibo  River,  said  boundary  run- 
ning inland  from  that  point  until  it  included  in 
its  course  considerably  more  territory  than  was 
embraced  within  the  original  Schomburgk  line, 
though  it  excluded  the  region  embraced  within 
that  line  adjacent  to  the  Barima  and  Amacuro 
rivers  and  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco. 

This  boundary,  as  proposed  by  Lord  Aber- 
deen, was  not  satisfactory  to  Venezuela;  and 
soon  after  its  submission  her  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative died.  This  interruption  was  quickly 
followed  by  a  long  period  of  distressing  inter- 
nal strifes  and  revolutions,  which  so  distracted 
and  disturbed  her  government  that  for  more 
than  thirty  years  she  was  not  in  condition  to 
renew  negotiations  for  an  adjustment  of  her 
territorial  limits. 

During  all  this  time  Great  Britain  seemed 
not  especially  unwilling  to  allow  these  negotia- 
tions to  remain  in  abeyance. 

This  interval  was  not,  however,  entirely  de- 
void of  boundary  incidents.  In  1850  great  ex- 
citement and  indignation  were  aroused  among 
the  Venezuelans  by  a  rumor  that  Great  Britain 
intended  to  take  possession  of  Venezuelan  Gui- 
ana, a  province  adjoining  British  Guiana  on  the 
west,  and  a  part  of  the  territory  claimed  by 

1 86 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Venezuela ;  and  the  feeling  thus  engendered  be- 
came so  extreme,  both  among  the  people  and  on 
the  part  of  the  government  of  the  republic,  that 
all  remaining  friendliness  between  the  two 
countries  was  seriously  menaced.  Demonstra- 
tions indicating  that  Venezuela  was  determined 
to  repel  the  rumored  movement  as  an  invasion 
of  her  rights,  were  met  by  instructions  given  by 
Great  Britain  to  the  commander  of  her  Maj- 
esty's naval  forces  in  the  West  Indies  as  to 
the  course  he  was  to  pursue  if  the  Venezuelan 
forces  should  construct  fortifications  within  the 
territory  in  dispute.  At  the  same  time,  Mr. 
Balford  Hinton  Wilson,  England's  representa- 
tive at  Caracas,  in  a  note  addressed  to  the  Min- 
ister of  Foreign  Affairs  for  Venezuela,  indig- 
nantly characterized  these  disquieting  rumors 
of  Great  Britain 's  intention  to  occupy  the  lands 
mentioned,  as  mischievous,  and  maliciously 
false;  but  he  also  declared  that,  on  the  other 
hand,  her  Majesty's  Government  would  not  see 
with  indifference  the  aggressions  of  Venezuela 
upon  the  disputed  territory. 

This  note  contained,  in  addition,  a  rather  im- 
pressive pronouncement  in  these  words : 

The  Venezuelan  Government,  in  justice  to  Great 
Britain,  cannot  mistrust  for  a  moment  the  sincerity 
of  the  formal  declaration,  which  is  now  made  in  the 

187 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

name  and  by  the  express  order  of  Her  Majesty's 
Government,  that  Great  Britain  has  no  intention  to 
occupy  or  encroach  upon  the  territory  in  dispute; 
therefore  the  Venezuelan  Government,  in  an  equal 
spirit  of  good  faith  and  friendship,  cannot  refuse  to 
make  a  similar  declaration  to  Her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, namely,  that  Venezuela  herself  has  no  inten- 
tion to  occupy  or  encroach  upon  the  territory  in 
dispute. 

The  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  for  Vene- 
zuela responded  to  this  communication  in  the 
following  terms: 

The  undersigned  has  been  instructed  by  His  Ex- 
cellency the  President  of  the  Republic  to  give  the 
following  answer:  The  Government  never  could  be 
persuaded  that  Great  Britain,  in  contempt  of  the 
negotiation  opened  on  the  subject  and  the  alleged 
rights  in  the  question  of  limits  pending  between  the 
two  countries,  would  want  to  use  force  in  order  to 
occupy  the  land  that  each  side  claims— much  less 
after  Mr.  Wilson's  repeated  assurance,  which  the  Ex- 
ecutive Power  believes  to  have  been  most  sincere, 
that  those  imputations  had  no  foundation  whatever, 
being,  on  the  contrary,  quite  the  reverse  of  the  truth. 
Fully  confident  of  this,  and  fortified  by  the  protest 
embodied  in  the  note  referred  to,  the  Government 
has  no  difficulty  in  declaring,  as  they  do  declare,  that 
Venezuela  has  no  intention  of  occupying  or  en- 
croaching upon  any  portion  of  the  territory  the  pos- 
session of  which  is  in  controversy;  neither  will  she 
look  with  indifference  on  a  contrary  proceeding  on 
the  part  of  Great  Britain. 

1 88 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

In  furtherance  of  these  declarations  the  Eng- 
lish Government  stipulated  that  it  would  not 
"order  or  sanction  such  occupations  or  en- 
croachments on  the  part  of  the  British  authori- 
ties"; and  Venezuela  agreed  on  her  part  to 
' '  instruct  the  authorities  of  Venezuelan  Guiana 
to  refrain  from  taking  any  step  which  might 
clash  with  the  engagement  hereby  made  by  the 
Government. ' ' 

I  suspect  there  was  some  justification  on  each 
side  for  the  accusations  afterward  interchanged 
between  the  parties  that  this  understanding  or 
agreement,  in  its  strict  letter  and  spirit,  had  not 
been  scrupulously  observed. 

As  we  now  pass  from  this  incident  to  a  date 
more  than  twenty-five  years  afterward,  when 
attempts  to  negotiate  for  a  settlement  of  the 
boundary  controversy  were  resumed,  it  may  be 
profitable,  before  going  further,  to  glance  at 
some  of  the  conditions  existing  at  the  time  of 
such  resumption. 


189 


II 


In  1876— thirty-two  years  after  the  discon- 
tinuance of  efforts  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela  to  fix  by  agreement  a  line  which 
should  divide  their  possessions — Venezuela  was 
confronted,  upon  the  renewal  of  negotiations 
for  that  purpose,  by  the  following  conditions: 

The  claim  by  her,  of  a  divisional  line,  founded 
upon  her  conception  of  strict  right,  which  her 
powerful  opponent  had  insisted  could  not  in 
any  way  be  plausibly  supported,  and  which 
therefore  she  would  in  no  event  accept. 

An  indefiniteness  in  the  limits  claimed  by 
Great  Britain— so  great  that,  of  two  boundary- 
lines  indicated  or  suggested  by  her,  one  had 
been  plainly  declared  to  be  "merely  a  prelim- 
inary measure  open  to  future  discussion  be- 
tween the  Governments  of  Great  Britain  and 
Venezuela,"  while  the  other  was  distinctly 
claimed  to  be  based  not  on  any  acknowledgment 
of  the  republic's  rights,  but  simply  upon  gen- 
erous concessions  and  a  "desire  to  avoid  all 

190 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

cause  of  serious  controversies  between  the  two 
countries. ' ' 

A  controversy  growing  out  of  this  situation 
impossible  of  friendly  settlement  except  by  such 
arrangement  and  accommodation  as  would  sat- 
isfy Great  Britain,  or  by  a  submission  of  the 
dispute  to  arbitration. 

A  constant  danger  of  such  an  extension  of 
British  settlements  in  the  disputed  territory  as 
would  necessarily  complicate  the  situation  and 
furnish  a  convenient  pretext  for  the  refusal  of 
any  concession  respecting  the  lands  containing 
such  settlements. 

A  continual  profession  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain  of  her  present  readiness  to  make  benev- 
olent concessions  and  of  her  willingness  to  co- 
operate in  a  speedy  adjustment,  while  at  the 
same  time  neither  reducing  her  pretensions,  nor 
attempting  in  a  conspicuous  manner  to  hasten 
negotiations  to  a  conclusion. 

A  tremendous  disparity  in  power  and 
strength  between  Venezuela  and  her  adversary, 
which  gave  her  no  hope  of  defending  her  terri- 
tory or  preventing  its  annexation  to  the  pos- 
sessions of  Great  Britain  in  case  the  extremity 
of  force  or  war  was  reached. 

The  renewed  negotiations  began  with  a  com- 
munication dated  November  14,  1876,  ad- 

191 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

dressed  by  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  for 
Venezuela  to  Lord  Derby,  then  Great  Britain's 
principal  Secretary  of  State.  In  this  communi- 
cation the  efforts  made  between  the  years  1841 
and  1844  to  establish  by  agreement  a  divisional 
line  between  the  two  countries,  and  their  inter- 
ruption, were  referred  to,  and  the  earnest  desire 
was  expressed  that  negotiations  for  that  pur- 
pose might  at  once  be  resumed.  The  minister 
suggested  no  other  line  than  the  Essequibo 
River,  but  in  conclusion  declared  that  the  Pres- 
ident of  Venezuela  was  led  to  ''hope  that  the 
solution  of  this  question,  already  for  so  many 
years  delayed,  will  be  a  work  of  very  speedy 
and  cordial  agreement." 

On  the  same  day  that  this  note  was  written  to 
Lord  Derby,  one  was  also  written  by  the  same 
Venezuelan  official  to  Mr.  Fish,  then  our  Secre- 
tary of  State.  After  speaking  of  the  United 
States  as  "the  most  powerful  and  the  oldest  of 
the  Republics  of  the  new  continent,  and  called 
on  to  lend  to  others  its  powerful  moral  support 
in  disputes  with  European  nations,"  the  min- 
ister directs  attention  to  the  boundary  contro- 
versy between  Venezuela  and  Great  Britain  and 
the  great  necessity  of  bringing  it  to  a  speedy 
termination.  He  concludes  as  follows:  "But 
whatever  may  be  the  result  of  the  new  steps  of 

192 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

the  Government,  it  has  desired  that  the  Ameri- 
can Government  might  at  once  take  cognizance 
of  them,  convinced,  as  it  is,  that  it  will  give  the 
subject  its  kind  consideration  and  take  an  in- 
terest in  having  due  justice  done  to  Venezuela. '  ' 
A  memorandum  was  inclosed  with  the  note, 
setting  forth  the  claims  of  Venezuela  touching 
the  boundary  location. 

This  appears  to  be  the  first  communication 
addressed  to  our  Government  on  the  subject  of 
a  controversy  in  which  we  afterward  became 
very  seriously  concerned. 

A  short  time  after  the  date  of  these  commu- 
nications, a  Venezuelan  envoy  to  Great  Britain 
was  appointed;  and,  on  the  thirteenth  day  of 
February,  1877,  he  addressed  to  Lord  Derby  a 
note  in  which,  after  asserting  the  right  of  Ven- 
ezuela to  insist  upon  the  boundary  previously 
claimed  by  her,  he  declared  the  willingness  of 
his  government  "to  settle  this  long-pending 
question  in  the  most  amicable  manner,"  and 
suggested  either  the  acceptance  of  a  boundary- 
line  such  as  would  result  from  a  presentation 
by  both  parties  of  Spanish  and  Dutch  titles, 
maps,  documents,  and  proofs  existing  before 
the  advent  in  South  America  of  either  Vene- 
zuela or  British  Guiana,  or  the  adoption  of 
"a  conventional  line  fixed  by  mutual  accord 

193 


13 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

between  the  Governments  of  Venezuela  and 
Great  Britain  after  a  careful  and  friendly  con- 
sideration of  the  case,  keeping  in  view  the 
documents  presented  by  both  sides,  solely  with 
the  object  of  reconciling  their  mutual  interests, 
and  to  fix  a  boundary  as  equitable  as  possible. ' ' 
The  suggestion  is  made  that  the  adoption  of  a 
divisional  line  is  important  "to  prevent  the 
occurrence  of  serious  differences  in  the  future, 
particularly  as  Guiana  is  attracting  the  general 
attention  of  the  world  on  account  of  the  im- 
mense riches  which  are  daily  being  discovered 
there. ' ' 

Let  us  here  note  that  this  renewal  by  Vene- 
zuela of  her  efforts  to  settle  her  boundary-line 
was  accompanied  by  two  new  features.  These, 
though  in  themselves  entirely  independent,  be- 
came so  related  to  each  other,  and  in  their 
subsequent  combination  and  development  they 
so  imperiously  affected  our  Government,  that 
their  coincident  appearance  at  this  particular 
stage  of  the  controversy  may  well  strike  us  as 
significant.  One  of  these  features  was  the  aban- 
donment by  Venezuela  of  her  insistence  upon 
a  line  representing  her  extreme  claims,  and 
which  England  would  not  in  any  contingency 
accept,  thus  clearing  the  field  for  possible 
arbitration;  and  the  other  was  her  earnest  ap- 

194 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

peal  to  us  for  our  friendly  aid.  Neither  should 
we  fail  to  notice  the  new  and  important  refer- 
ence of  the  Venezuelan  envoy  to  the  immense 
riches  being  discovered  in  the  disputed  terri- 
tory. Gold  beneath  soil  in  controversy  does 
not  always  hasten  the  adjustment  of  uncertain 
or  disputed  boundary-lines. 

On  the  twenty-fourth  day  of  March,  1877, 
Lord  Derby  informed  the  Venezuelan  envoy 
that  the  governor  of  British  Guiana  was  shortly 
expected  in  London,  and  that  he  was  anxious 
to  await  his  arrival  before  taking  any  steps  in 
the  boundary  discussion. 

After  waiting  for  more  than  two  years  for  a 
further  answer  from  the  English  Government, 
the  Venezuelan  representative  in  London,  on 
the  19th  of  May,  1879,  addressed  a  note  on  the 
subject  to  Lord  Salisbury,  who,  in  the  mean- 
time, had  succeeded  Lord  Derby.  In  this  note 
reference  was  made  to  the  communication  sent 
to  Lord  Derby  in  1877,  to  the  desire  expressed 
by  him  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  governor  of 
British  Guiana  before  making  reply,  and  to  the 
fact  that  the  communication  mentioned  still 
remained  unanswered ;  and  on  behalf  of  Vene- 
zuela her  representative  repeated  the  alterna- 
tive proposition  made  by  him  in  February, 
1877,  in  these  words:  "The  boundary  treaty 

195 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

may  be  based  either  on  the  acceptance  of  the 
line  of  strict  right  as  shown  by  the  records,  doc- 
uments, and  other  authoritative  proofs  which 
each  party  may  exhibit,  or  on  the  acceptance  at 
once  by  both  Governments  of  a  frontier  of  ac- 
commodation which  shall  satisfy  the  respective 
interests  of  the  two  countries";  and  he  con- 
cluded his  note  as  follows: 

If  Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  should 
prefer  the  frontier  of  accommodation  or  convenience, 
then  it  would  be  desirable  that  it  should  vouchsafe 
to  make  a  proposition  of  an  arrangement,  on  the 
understanding  that,  in  order  to  obviate  future  diffi- 
culties and  to  give  Great  Britain  the  fullest  proof 
of  the  consideration  and  friendship  which  Venezuela 
professes  for  her,  my  Government  would  not  hesi- 
tate to  accept  a  demarcation  that  should  satisfy  as 
far  as  possible  the  interests  of  the  Republic. 

At  all  events,  my  Lord,  something  will  have  to  be 
done  to  prevent  this  question  from  pending  any 
longer. 

Thirty-eight  years  ago  my  Government  wrote  urg- 
ing Her  Majesty's  Government  to  have  the  Boundary 
Treaty  concluded,  and  now  this  affair  is  in  the  same 
position  as  in  1841,  without  any  settlement;  mean- 
while Guiana  has  become  of  more  importance  than 
it  was  then,  by  reason  of  the  large  deposits  of  gold 
which  have  been  and  still  are  met  with  in  that  region. 

Now,  at  the  date  of  this  communication  Eng- 
land 's  most  extreme  claims  were  indicated 

196 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

either  by  the  Schomburgk  line  or  by  the  line 
which  Lord  Aberdeen  suggested  in  1844  as  a 
concession.  These  were  indeed  the  only  lines 
which  Great  Britain  had  thus  far  presented. 
When  in  such  circumstances,  and  with  these 
lines  distinctly  in  mind,  the  envoy  of  Venezuela 
offered  to  abandon  for  his  country  her  most 
extreme  claims,  and  asked  that  Great  Britain 
should  '  *  vouchsafe  to  make  a  proposition  of  an 
arrangement"  upon  the  basis  of  a  "frontier  of 
accommodation  or  convenience,"  what  answer 
had  he  a  right  to  expect?  Most  assuredly  he 
had  a  right  to  expect  that  if  Great  Britain 
should  prefer  to  proceed  upon  the  theory  of 
" accommodation  or  convenience,"  she  would 
respond  by  offering  such  a  reduction  of  the 
claims  she  had  already  made  as  would  indicate 
a  degree  of  concession  or  "accommodation"  on 
her  part  that  should  entitle  her  to  expect  simi- 
lar concession  from  Venezuela. 

What  was  the  answer  actually  made?  After 
a  delay  of  nearly  eight  months,  on  the  tenth  day 
of  January,  1880,  Lord  Salisbury  replied  that 
her  Majesty's  Government  were  of  the  opinion 
that  to  argue  the  matter  on  the  ground  of  strict 
right  would  involve  so  many  intricate  questions 
that  it  would  be  very  unlikely  to  lead  to  a  satis- 
factory solution  of  the  question,  and  they  would 

197 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

therefore  prefer  the  alternative  "of  endeavor- 
ing to  come  to  an  agreement  as  to  the  acceptance 
by  the  two  Governments  of  a  frontier  of  ac- 
commodation which  shall  satisfy  the  respective 
interests  of  the  two  countries." 

He  then  gives  a  most  startling  statement  of 
the  English  Government's  claim,  by  specifying 
boundaries  which  overlap  the  Schomburgk  line 
and  every  other  line  that  had  been  thought  of 
or  dreamed  of  before,  declaring  that  such  claim 
is  justified  "by  virtue  of  ancient  treaties  with 
the  aboriginal  tribes  and  of  subsequent  cessions 
from  Holland."  He  sets  against  this  claim, 
or  "  on  the  other  hand, "  as  he  says,  the  fact  that 
the  President  of  Venezuela,  in  a  message  dated 
February  20, 1877, ' '  put  forward  a  claim  on  the 
part  of  Venezuela  to  the  river  Essequibo  as  the 
boundary  to  which  the  Republic  was  entitled" 
—thereby  giving  prejudicial  importance  to 
a  claim  of  boundary  made  by  the  President 
of  Venezuela  three  years  before,  notwithstand- 
ing his  Lordship  was  answering  a  commu- 
nication in  which  Venezuela's  present  diplo- 
matic representative  distinctly  proposed  "a 
frontier  of  accommodation."  His  declaration, 
therefore,  that  the  boundary  which  was  thus  put 
forward  by  the  President  of  Venezuela  would 
involve  "the  surrender  of  a  province  now  in- 

IQ8 


habited  by  forty  thousand  British  subjects," 
seems  quite  irrelevant,  because  such  a  boundary 
was  not  then  under  consideration ;  and  in  pass- 
ing it  may  occur  to  us  that  the  great  delay  in 
settling  the  boundaries  between  the  two  coun- 
tries had  given  abundant  opportunity  for  such 
inhabitation  as  Lord  Salisbury  suggests.  His 
Lordship  having  thus  built  up  a  contention  in 
which  he  puts  on  one  side  a  line  which  for  the 
sake  of  pacific  accommodation  Venezuela  no 
longer  proposes  to  insist  upon,  and  on  the 
other  a  line  for  Great  Britain  so  grotesquely 
extreme  as  to  appear  fanciful,  soberly  observes : 

The  difference,  therefore,  between  these  two 
claims  is  so  great  that  it  is  clear  that,  in  order  to 
arrive  at  a  satisfactory  arrangement,  each  party 
must  be  prepared  to  make  considerable  concessions 
to  the  other;  and  although  the  claim  of  Venezuela 
to  the  Essequibo  River  boundary  could  not  under 
any  circumstances  be  entertained,  I  beg  leave  to 
assure  you  that  Her  Majesty's  Government  are  anx- 
ious to  meet  the  Venezuelan  Government  in  a  spirit 
of  conciliation,  and  would  be  willing,  in  the  event  of 
a  renewal  of  negotiations  for  a  general  settlement  of 
boundaries,  to  waive  a  portion  of  what  they  con- 
sider to  be  their  strict  right,  if  Venezuela  is  really 
disposed  to  make  corresponding  concessions  on  her 
part. 

And  ignoring  entirely  the  humbly  respectful 
request  of  the  Venezuelan  minister  that  Great 

199 


Britain  would  "vouchsafe  to  make  a  proposi- 
tion of  an  arrangement,"  his  Lordship  thus 
concludes  his  communication:  "Her  Majesty's 
Government  will  therefore  be  glad  to  receive, 
and  will  undertake  to  consider  in  the  most 
friendly  spirit,  any  proposal  that  the  Venezue- 
lan Government  may  think  fit  to  make  for  the 
establishment  of  a  boundary  satisfactory  to 
both  nations." 

This  is  diplomacy— of  a  certain  sort.  It  is  a 
deep  and  mysterious  science ;  and  we  probably 
cannot  do  better  than  to  confess  our  inability 
to  understand  its  intricacies  and  sinuosities; 
but  at  this  point  we  can  hardly  keep  out  of 
mind  the  methods  of  the  shrewd,  sharp  trader 
who  demands  exorbitant  terms,  and  at  the  same 
time  invites  negotiation,  looking  for  a  result 
abundantly  profitable  in  the  large  range  for 
dicker  which  he  has  created. 

An  answer  was  made  to  Lord  Salisbury's 
note  on  the  twelfth  day  of  April,  1880,  in  which 
the  Venezuelan  envoy  stated  in  direct  terms  that 
he  had  received  specific  instructions  from  his 
government  for  the  arrangement  of  the  dif- 
ficulty, by  abandoning  the  ground  of  strict  right 
and  ' '  concurring  in  the  adoption  for  both  coun- 
tries of  a  frontier  mutually  convenient,  and 
reconciling  in  the  best  possible  manner  their 
200 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

respective  interests— each  party  having  to  make 
concessions  to  the  other  for  the  purpose  of  at- 
taining such  an  important  result." 

It  will  be  remembered  that  in  1844,  when  this 
boundary  question  was  under  discussion,  Lord 
Aberdeen  proposed  a  line  beginning  in  the 
mouth  of  the  Moroco  River,  being  a  point  on 
the  coast  south  and  east  of  the  mouth  of  the 
Orinoco,  thus  giving  to  Venezuela  the  control  of 
that  river,  but  running  inland  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  include,  in  the  whole,  little  if  any  less 
area  than  that  included  in  the  Schomburgk  line  ; 
and  it  will  also  be  recalled  that  this  line  was 
not  then  acceptable  to  Venezuela.  It  appears, 
however,  that  the  delays  and  incidents  of  thirty- 
six  years  had  impressed  upon  the  government 
of  the  republic  the  serious  disadvantages  of  her 
situation  in  contention  with  Great  Britain ;  for 
we  find  in  this  reply  of  the  Venezuelan  envoy 
the  inquiry  "whether  Her  Britannic  Majesty's 
Government  is  disposed  now,  as  it  was  in  1844, 
to  accept  the  mouth  of  the  river  Moroco  as  the 
frontier  at  the  coast. ' '  To  this  Lord  Salisbury 
promptly  responded  that  the  attorney-general 
for  the  colony  of  British  Guiana  was  shortly 
expected  in  England,  and  that  her  Majesty's 
Government  would  prefer  to  postpone  the 
boundary  discussion  until  his  arrival. 

20 1 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

This  was  followed  by  a  silence  of  five  months, 
with  no  word  of  sign  from  England's  Foreign 
Office;  and  in  the  meantime  Earl  Granville 
had  succeeded  Lord  Salisbury  as  Secretary  of 
State  for  Foreign  Affairs.  After  waiting  thus 
long,  the  representative  of  Venezuela,  on  the 
23d  of  September,  1880,  reminded  Lord  Gran- 
ville that  in  the  preceding  April  his  imme- 
diate predecessor  had  informed  him  that  the 
arrival  of  the  attorney-general  of  British  Gui- 
ana was  awaited  before  deciding  the  question 
of  boundaries  between  the  two  Guianas;  and 
as  he  had  not,  after  the  lapse  of  five  months, 
been  honored  with  a  communication  on  the 
subject,  he  was  bound  to  suppose  that  the  at- 
torney-general had  not  accomplished  his  voy- 
age, in  which  case  it  was  useless  longer  to  wait 
for  him.  He  further  reminded  his  Lordship 
that  on  the  24th  of  March,  1877,  Lord  Derby, 
then  in  charge  of  British  foreign  affairs,  also 
desired  to  postpone  the  consideration  of  the 
question  until  the  arrival  in  London  of  the 
governor  of  British  Guiana,  who  was  then  ex- 
pected, but  jvho  apparently  never  came.  He 
then  proceeds  as  follows : 

Consequently  it  is  best  not  to  go  on  waiting  either 
for  the  Governor  or  for  the  Attorney-General  of  the 
Colony,  but  to  decide  these  questions  ourselves,  con- 

202 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

sidering  that  my  Government  is  now  engaged  in  pre- 
paring the  official  map  of  the  Republic  and  wishes 
of  course  to  mark  out  the  boundaries  on  the  East. 

In  my  despatch  of  the  12th  of  April  last,  I  in- 
formed your  Excellency  [Excellency's  predecessor?] 
that  as  a  basis  of  a  friendly  demarcation  my  Govern- 
ment was  disposed  to  accept  the  mouth  of  the  River 
Moroco  as  the  frontier  on  the  coast.  If  Her  Britannic 
Majesty's  Government  should  accept  this  point  of 
departure,  it  would  be  very  easy  to  determine  the 
general  course  of  the  frontier,  either  by  means  of 
notes  or  in  verbal  conferences,  as  your  Excellency 
might  prefer. 

On  the  twelfth  day  of  February,  1881,  Lord 
Granville,  replying  to  Venezuela's  two  notes 
dated  April  12  and  September  23,  1880,  in- 
formed her  representative,  without  explanation, 
that  her  Majesty's  Government  would  not  ac- 
cept the  mouth  of  the  Moroco  as  the  divisional 
boundary  on  the  coast. 

A  few  days  afterward,  in  an  answer  to  this 
refusal,  Venezuela's  representative  mentioned 
the  extreme  claims  of  the  two  countries  and  the 
fact  that  it  had  been  agreed  between  the  parties 
that  steps  should  be  taken  to  settle  upon  a 
frontier  of  accommodation;  that  in  pursuance 
thereof  he  had  proposed  as  the  point  of  depar- 
ture for  such  a  frontier  the  mouth  of  the  Moroco 
River,  which  was  in  agreement  thus  far  with 
the  proposition  made  by  Lord  Aberdeen  on 

203 


behalf  of  Great  Britain  in  1844;  and  perti- 
nently added:  "Thus  thirty-seven  years  ago 
Her  Britannic  Majesty's  Government  sponta- 
neously proposed  the  mouth  of  the  Moroco 
River  as  the  limit  on  the  coast,  a  limit  which 
your  Excellency  does  not  accept  now,  for  you 
are  pleased  to  tell  me  so  in  the  note  which  I 
have  the  honor  of  answering."  He  thereupon 
suggests  another  boundary,  beginning  on  the 
coast  at  a  point  one  mile  north  of  the  mouth 
of  the  Moroco  River  and  thence  extending  in- 
land in  such  manner  as  to  constitute  a  large 
concession  on  the  part  of  Venezuela,  but  fall- 
ing very  far  short  of  meeting  the  claims  of 
Great  Britain.  He  declares,  however,  that  this 
demarcation  "is  the  maximum  of  all  conces- 
sions which  in  this  matter  the  Government  of 
Venezuela  can  grant  by  way  of  friendly  ar- 
rangement. ' ' 

Apparently  anticipating,  as  he  well  might, 
that  the  boundary  he  proposed  would  fail  of 
acceptance,  he  suggests  that  in  such  case  the 
two  governments  would  have  no  alternative  but 
to  determine  the  frontier  by  strict  right,  and 
that  on  this  basis  they  would  find  it  impossible 
to  arrive  at  an  agreement.  Therefore  he  de- 
clares that  he  has  received  instructions  from 
his  government  to  urge  upon  Great  Britain  the 

204 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

submission  of  the  question  to  an  arbitrator,  to 
be  chosen  by  both  parties,  to  whose  award  both 
governments  should  submit. 

In  this  proposal  of  arbitration  by  Venezuela 
we  find  an  approach  to  a  new  phase  of  the  con- 
troversy. At  first,  the  two  countries  had  stood 
at  arm's-length,  each  asserting  strict  right  of 
boundary,  only  to  be  met  by  obstinate  and  un- 
yielding resistance.  Next,  the  field  of  mutual 
concession  and  accommodation  had  been  trav- 
ersed, with  no  result  except  damaging  and  dan- 
gerous delay.  And  now,  after  forty  years  of 
delusive  hope,  the  time  seemed  at  hand  when 
the  feebler  contestant  must  contemplate  igno- 
minious submission  to  dictatorial  exaction,  or 
forcible  resistance,  futile  and  distressing,  un- 
less honorable  rest  and  justice  could  be  found 
in  arbitration— the  refuge  which  civilization 
has  builded  among  the  nations  of  the  earth  for 
the  protection  of  the  weak  against  the  strong, 
and  the  citadel  from  which  the  ministries  of 
peace  issue  their  decrees  against  the  havoc 
and  barbarism  of  war. 

The  reply  of  Lord  Granville  to  the  communi- 
cation of  the  envoy  of  Venezuela  proposing  an 
alternative  of  arbitration  was  delayed  for  seven 
months;  and  when,  in  September,  1881,  it  was 
received,  it  contained  a  rejection  of  the  boun- 

.205 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

dary  offered  by  Venezuela  and  a  proposal  of  a 
new  line  apparently  lacking  almost  every  fea- 
ture of  concession;  and,  singularly  enough, 
there  was  not  in  this  reply  the  slightest  allu- 
sion to  Venezuela's  request  for  arbitration. 

I  do  not  find  that  this  communication  of 
Great  Britain  was  ever  specifically  answered, 
though  an  answer  was  often  requested.  No 
further  steps  appear  to  have  been  taken  until 
September  7,  1883,  when  Lord  Granville  in- 
structed the  British  minister  to  Venezuela  to 
invite  the  serious  attention  of  the  Venezuelan 
Government  to  the  questions  pending  between 
the  two  countries,  with  a  view  to  their  early 
settlement.  These  questions  are  specified  as 
relating  to  the  boundary,  to  certain  differential 
duties  imposed  on  imports  from  British  colo- 
nies, and  to  the  claims  of  British  creditors  of 
the  republic.  His  Lordship  declared  in  those 
instructions  that  as  a  preliminary  to  entering 
upon  negotiations  it  was  indispensable  that  an 
answer  should  be  given  to  the  pending  pro- 
posal which  had  been  made  by  her  Majesty's 
Government  in  regard  to  the  boundary. 

The  representations  made  to  the  Government 
of  Venezuela  by  the  British  minister,  in  obedi- 
ence to  those  instructions,  elicited  a  reply,  in 
which  a  provision  of  the  Venezuelan  constitu- 

206 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

tion  was  cited  prohibiting  the  alienation  or  ces- 
sion of  any  part  of  the  territory  of  the  repub- 
lic ;  and  it  was  suggested  that,  inasmuch  as  the 
Essequibo  line  seemed  abundantly  supported 
as  the  true  boundary  of  Venezuela,  a  conces- 
sion beyond  that  line  by  treaty  would  be  ob- 
noxious to  this  constitutional  prohibition, 
whereas  any  reduction  of  territory  brought 
about  by  a  decree  of  an  arbitral  tribunal 
would  obviate  the  difficulty.  Therefore  the 
urgent  necessity  was  submitted  for  the  selec- 
tion of  an  arbitrator,  "who,  freely  and  unani- 
mously chosen  by  the  two  Governments,  would 
judge  and  pronounce  a  sentence  of  a  definitive 
character. ' ' 

The  representative  of  her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment, in  a  response  dated  February  29,  1884, 
commented  upon  the  new  difficulty  introduced 
by  the  statement  concerning  the  prohibition 
contained  in  the  constitution  of  the  republic, 
and  expressed  a  fear  that  if  arbitration  was 
agreed  to,  the  same  prohibition  might  be  in- 
voked as  an  excuse  for  not  abiding  by  an 
award  unfavorable  to  Venezuela;  and  it  was 
declared  that  if,  on  the  other  hand,  the  arbi- 
trator should  decide  in  favor  of  the  Venezuelan 
Government  to  the  full  extent  of  their  claim, 
"a  large  and  important  territory  which  has 

207 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

for  a  long  period  been  inhabited  and  occupied 
by  Her  Majesty's  subjects  and  treated  as  a 
part  of  the  Colony  of  British  Guiana  would  be 
severed  from  the  Queen's  dominions."  This 
declaration  is  immediately  followed  by  a  con- 
clusion in  these  words: 

For  the  above-mentioned  reasons,  therefore,  the 
circumstances  of  the  case  do  not  appear  to  Her 
Majesty's  Government  to  be  such  as  to  render  arbi- 
tration applicable  for  a  solution  of  the  difficulty; 
and  I  have  accordingly  to  request  you,  in  making  this 
known  to  the  Venezuelan  Government,  to  express  to 
them  the  hope  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  that 
some  other  means  may  be  devised  for  bringing  this 
long-standing  matter  to  an  issue  satisfactory  to  both 
powers. 

Let  us  pause  here  for  a  moment's  examina- 
tion of  the  surprising  refusal  of  Great  Britain 
to  submit  this  difficulty  to  arbitration,  and  the 
more  surprising  reasons  presented  for  its  justi- 
fication. The  refusal  was  surprising  because 
the  controversy  had  reached  such  a  stage  that 
arbitration  was  evidently  the  only  means  by 
which  it  could  be  settled  consistently  with  har- 
monious relations  between  the  two  countries. 

It  was  on  this  ground  that  Venezuela  pro- 
posed arbitration;  and  she  strongly  urged  it 
on  the  further  ground  that  inasmuch  as  the  pro- 
hibition of  her  constitution  prevented  the  re- 

208 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

linquishment,  by  treaty  or  voluntary  act,  of  any 
part  of  the  territory  which  her  people  and  their 
government  claimed  to  be  indubitably  Venezue- 
lan, such  a  relinquishment  would  present  no 
difficulties  if  it  was  in  obedience  to  a  decree  of 
a  tribunal  to  which  the  question  of  ownership 
had  been  mutually  submitted. 

In  giving  her  reasons  for  rejecting  arbitra- 
tion Great  Britain  says  in  effect:  The  plan 
you  urge  for  the  utter  and  complete  elimina- 
tion of  this  constitutional  prohibition— for  its 
expurgation  and  destruction  so  far  as  it  is  re- 
lated to  the  pending  dispute— is  objectionable, 
because  we  fear  the  prohibition  thus  eliminated, 
expunged,  and  destroyed  will  still  be  used  as  a 
pretext  for  disobedience  to  an  award  which,  for 
the  express  purpose  of  avoiding  this  constitu- 
tional restraint,  you  have  invited. 

The  remaining  objection  interposed  by  Great 
Britain  to  the  arbitration  requested  by  Vene- 
zuela is  based  upon  the  fear  that  an  award 
might  be  made  in  favor  of  the  Venezuelan 
claim,  in  which  case  "a  large  and  important 
territory  which  has  for  a  long  period  been  in- 
habited and  occupied  by  Her  Majesty's  sub- 
jects and  treated  as  a  part  of  the  Colony  of 
British  Guiana  would  be  severed  from  the 
Queen 's  dominions. ' ' 

14  209 


It  first  occurs  to  us  that  a  contention  may  well 
be  suspected  of  weakness  when  its  supporters 
are  unwilling  to  subject  it  to  the  test  of  im- 
partial arbitration.  Certain  inquiries  are  also 
pertinent  in  this  connection.  Who  were  the 
British  subjects  who  had  long  occupied  the 
territory  that  might  through  arbitration  be  sev- 
ered from  the  Queen 's  dominions  ?  How  many 
of  them  began  this  occupancy  during  the  more 
than  forty  years  that  the  territory  had  been 
steadily  and  notoriously  disputed?  Did  they 
enter  upon  this  territory  with  knowledge  of  the 
dispute  and  against  the  warning  of  the  gov- 
ernment to  which  they  owed  allegiance,  or  were 
they  encouraged  and  invited  to  such  entry  by 
agencies  of  that  government  who  had  full  no- 
tice of  the  uncertainty  of  the  British  title  ?  In 
one  case,  being  themselves  in  the  wrong,  they 
were  entitled  to  no  consideration ;  in  the  other, 
the  question  of  loss  and  indemnification  should 
rest  between  them  and  their  government,  which 
had  impliedly  guaranteed  them  against  dis- 
turbance. In  any  event,  neither  case  presented 
a  reason  why  Great  Britain  should  take  or  pos- 
sess the  lands  of  Venezuela ;  nor  did  either  case 
furnish  an  excuse  for  denying  to  Venezuela  a 
fair  and  impartial  adjudication  of  her  disputed 
rights.  By  whom  had  this  territory  "been 

210 


treated  as  a  part  of  the  Colony  of  British  Gui- 
ana"? Surely  not  by  Venezuela,  On  the  con- 
trary, she  had  persistently  claimed  it  as  her 
own,  and  had  "treated"  it  as  her  own  as  far 
as  she  could  and  dared.  England  alone  had 
treated  it  as  a  part  of  British  Guiana ;  her  im- 
mense power  had  enabled  her  to  do  this;  and 
her  decrees  in  her  own  favor  as  against  her 
weak  adversary  undoubtedly  promised  greater 
advantages  than  arbitration  could  possibly 
assure. 


211 


Ill 


The  Secretary  of  State  of  Venezuela,  soon 
after  this  refusal  of  Great  Britain  to  submit 
the  boundary  dispute  to  arbitration,  in  a  de- 
spatch dated  the  second  day  of  April,  1884, 
still  urged  that  method  of  settlement,  citing 
precedents  and  presenting  arguments  in  Its 
favor;  and  in  conclusion  he  asked  the  minister 
of  the  English  Government  at  Caracas  * l  to  have 
the  goodness  to  think  out  and  suggest  any  ac- 
ceptable course  for  attaining  a  solution  of  the 
difficulty."  This  was  followed,  a  few  days 
afterward,  by  another  communication  from  the 
Venezuelan  Secretary  of  State,  repeating  his 
urgent  request  for  arbitration.  From  this  com- 
munication it  may  not  be  amiss  to  make  the  fol- 
lowing quotation: 

Venezuela  and  Great  Britain  possess  the  same 
rights  in  the  question  under  discussion.  If  the  Re- 
public should  yield  up  any  part  of  her  pretensions, 
she  would  recognize  the  superior  right  of  Great 
Britain,  would  violate  the  above-quoted  article  of 
the  Constitution,  and  draw  down  the  censure  of  her 

212 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

fellow-citizens.  But  when  both  nations,  putting 
aside  their  independence  of  action  in  deference  to 
peace  and  good  friendship,  create  by  mutual  consent 
a  Tribunal  which  may  decide  in  the  controversy,  the 
same  is  able  to  pass  sentence  that  one  of  the  two  par- 
ties or  both  of  them  have  been  mistaken  in  their 
opinions  concerning  the  extent  of  their  territory. 
Thus  the  case  would  not  be  in  opposition  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  Republic,  there  being  no  alienation 
of  that  which  shall  have  been  determined  not  to  be 
her  property. 

On  the  tenth  day  of  June,  1884,  arbitration 
was  again  refused  in  a  curt  note  from  Lord 
Granville,  declaring  that  "Her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment adhere  to  their  objection  to  arbitration 
as  a  mode  of  dealing  with  this  question." 

About  this  time  complaints  and  protests  of 
the  most  vigorous  character,  based  upon  alleged 
breaches  of  the  agreement  of  1850  concerning 
the  non-occupation  of  the  disputed  territory 
broke  out  on  both  sides  of  the  controversy,  and 
accusations  of  aggression  and  occupation  were 
constantly  made.  I  shall  not  attempt  to  follow 
them,  as  in  detail  they  are  not  among  the  in- 
cidents which  I  consider  especially  relevant 
to  the  presentation  of  my  theme. 

On  the  thirteenth  day  of  December,  1884, 
Venezuela,  in  reply  to  a  proposition  of  the  Brit- 
ish Government  that  the  boundary  question  and 

213 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

certain  other  differences  should  be  settled  si- 
multaneously, suggested,  in  view  of  the  unwill- 
ingness of  Great  Britain  to  submit  the  boun- 
dary dispute  to  arbitration,  that  it  should  be 
presented  for  decision  to  a  court  of  law,  the 
members  of  which  should  be  chosen  by  the  par- 
ties respectively. 

The  British  Government  promptly  declined 
this  proposition,  and  stated  that  they  were 
not  prepared  to  depart  from  the  arrange- 
ment made  in  1877  to  decide  the  question  by 
adopting  a  conventional  boundary  fixed  by 
mutual  accord  between  the  two  governments. 
This  was  in  the  face  of  the  efforts  which  had 
been  made  along  that  line  and  found  utterly 
fruitless. 

Immediately  following  the  last-mentioned 
proposition  by  Venezuela  for  the  presentation 
of  the  difficulty  to  a  court  of  law  mutually 
chosen,  negotiations  were  entered  upon  for  the 
conclusion  of  a  treaty  between  Great  Britain 
and  Venezuela,  which  should  quiet  a  difference 
pending  between  the  two  countries  relating  to 
differential  duties  and  which  should  also  dis- 
pose of  other  unsettled  questions.  In  a  draft 
of  such  a  treaty  submitted  by  Venezuela  there 
was  inserted  an  article  providing  for  arbitra- 
tion in  case  of  all  differences  which  could  not 

214 


be  adjusted  by  friendly  negotiation.  To  this 
article  Great  Britain  suggested  an  amendment, 
making  such  arbitration  applicable  only  to  mat- 
ters arising  out  of  the  interpretation  or  exe- 
cution of  the  treaty  itself,  and  especially  ex- 
cluding those  emanating  from  any  other  source ; 
but  on  further  representation  by  Venezuela, 
Lord  Granville,  in  behalf  of  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain,  expressly  agreed  with  Venezuela 
that  the  treaty  article  relating  to  arbitration 
should  be  unrestricted  in  its  operation.  This 
diplomatic  agreement  was  in  explicit  terms,  her 
Majesty's  Government  agreeing  "that  the  un- 
dertaking to  refer  differences  to  arbitration 
shall  include  all  differences  which  may  arise 
between  the  High  Contracting  Parties,  and  not 
those  only  which  arise  on  the  interpretation  of 
the  Treaty." 

This  occurred  on  the  fifteenth  day  of  May, 
1885.  Whatever  Lord  Granville  may  have  in- 
tended by  the  language  used,  the  Government  of 
Venezuela  certainly  understood  his  agreement 
to  include  the  pending  boundary  dispute  as 
among  the  questions  that  should  be  submitted  to 
arbitration;  and  all  other  matters  which  the 
treaty  should  embrace  seemed  so  easy  of  ad- 
justment that  its  early  completion,  embodying 
a  stipulation  for  the  final  arbitration  of  the 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

boundary  controversy,  was  confidently  and 
gladly  anticipated  by  the  republic. 

The  high  hopes  and  joyful  anticipations  of 
Venezuela  born  of  this  apparently  favorable 
situation  were,  however,  but  short-lived. 

On  the  twenty-seventh  day  of  July,  1885, 
Lord  Salisbury,  who  in  the  meantime  had  suc- 
ceeded the  Earl  of  Granville  in  Great  Britain's 
Foreign  Office,  in  a  note  to  Venezuela's  envoy, 
declared:  "Her  Majesty's  Government  are  un- 
able to  concur  in  the  assent  given  by  their  prede- 
cessors in  office  to  the  general  arbitration  article 
proposed  by  Venezuela,  and  they  are  unable  to 
agree  to  the  inclusion  in  it  of  matters  other  than 
those  arising  out  of  the  interpretation  or  al- 
leged violation  of  this  particular  treaty." 

No  assertion  of  the  irrevocability  of  the 
agreement  which  Venezuela  had  made  with  his 
predecessor,  and  no  plea  or  argument  of  any 
kind,  availed  to  save  the  enlarged  terms  of  this 
arbitration  clause  from  Lord  Salisbury's  de- 
structive insistence. 

On  the  twentieth  day  of  June,  1886,  Lord 
Bosebery  suggested  for  Great  Britain,  and  as  a 
solution  of  the  difficulty,  that  the  territory 
within  two  certain  lines  which  had  been  already 
proposed  as  boundaries  should  be  equally  di- 
vided between  the  contestants,  either  by  arbitra- 

216 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

tion  or  the  determination  of  a  mixed  commis- 
sion. 

This  was  declined  by  Venezuela  on  the 
twenty-ninth  day  of  July,  1886,  upon  the  same 
grounds  that  led  to  the  declination  of  prior  pro- 
posals that  apparently  involved  an  absolute  ces- 
sion of  a  part  of  her  territory;  and  she  still 
insisted  upon  an  arbitration  embracing  the  en- 
tire disputed  territory  as  the  only  feasible 
method  of  adjustment. 

This  declination  on  the  part  of  Venezuela  of 
Lord  Eosebery's  proposition  terminated  the 
second  attempt  in  point  of  time,  to  settle  this 
vexed  question.  In  the  meantime  the  aggres- 
sive conduct  which  for  some  time  the  officials 
of  both  countries  had  exhibited  in  and  near  the 
contested  region  had  grown  in  distinctness  and 
significance,  until  Great  Britain  had  openly 
and  with  notorious  assertion  of  ownership 
taken  possession  of  a  valuable  part  of  the  ter- 
ritory in  dispute.  On  the  26th  of  October, 
1886,  an  official  document  was  published  in  the 
London  ' '  Gazette ' '  giving  notice  that  no  grants 
of  land  made  by  the  Government  of  Venezuela 
in  the  territory  claimed  by  Great  Britain  would 
be  admitted  or  recognized  by  her  Majesty;  and 
this  more  significant  statement  was  added: 
"A  map  showing  the  boundary  between  Brit- 

217 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

ish  Guiana  and  Venezuela  claimed  by  Her  Maj- 
esty's Government  can  be  seen  in  the  library 
of  the  Colonial  Office,  Downing  Street,  or  at 
the  Office  of  the  Government  Secretary, 
Georgetown,  British  Guiana."  The  boun- 
dary here  spoken  of,  as  shown  on  the  map 
to  which  attention  is  directed,  follows  the 
Schomburgk  line.  Protests  and  demands  in 
abundance  on  the  part  of  Venezuela  followed, 
which  were  utterly  disregarded,  until,  on  the 
thirty-first  day  of  January,  1887,  the  Vene- 
zuelan Secretary  of  State  distinctly  demanded 
of  Great  Britain  the  evacuation  of  the  dis- 
puted territory  which  she  was  occupying  in 
violation  of  prior  agreement  and  the  rights  of 
the  republic,  and  gave  formal  notice  that  unless 
such  evacuation  should  be  completed,  and  ac- 
companied by  acceptance  of  arbitration  as  a 
means  of  deciding  the  pending  frontier  dispute, 
by  the  twentieth  day  of  February,  1887,  dip- 
lomatic relations  between  the  two  countries 
would  on  that  day  cease. 

These  demands  were  absolutely  unheeded; 
and  thereupon,  when  the  twentieth  day  of  Feb- 
ruary arrived,  Venezuela  exhibited  a  long  list 
of  specific  charges  of  aggression  and  wrong- 
doing against  Great  Britain,  and  made  the  fol- 
lowing statement  and  final  protest: 

218 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

In  consequence,  Venezuela,  not  deeming  it  fitting 
to  continue  friendly  relations  with  a  state  which  thus 
injures  her,  suspends  them  from  to-day. 

And  she  protests  before  the  Government  of  Her 
Britannic  Majesty,  before  all  civilized  nations,  be- 
fore the  whole  world,  against  the  acts  of  spoliation 
which  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  has  com- 
mitted to  her  detriment,  and  which  she  will  never  on 
any  consideration  recognize  as  capable  of  altering  in 
the  slightest  degree  the  rights  which  she  has  acquired 
from  Spain,  and  respecting  which  she  will  be  always 
ready  to  submit  to  a  third  power,  as  the  only  way  to 
a  solution  compatible  with  her  constitutional  prin- 
ciples. 

Notwithstanding  all  this,  three  years  after- 
ward, and  on  the  tenth  day  of  January,  1890, 
an  agent  of  Venezuela,  appointed  for  that  pur- 
pose, addressed  a  note  to  Lord  Salisbury,  still 
in  charge  of  Great  Britain's  foreign  relations, 
expressing  the  desire  of  Venezuela  to  renew  dip- 
lomatic relations  with  Great  Britain,  and  re- 
questing an  interview  to  that  end. 

A  short  time  thereafter  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain  expressed  its  satisfaction  that  a 
renewal  of  diplomatic  relations  was  in  pros- 
pect, and  presented  to  the  representative  of 
Venezuela  ' '  a  statement  of  the  conditions  which 
Her  Majesty's  Government  considered  neces- 
sary for  a  satisfactory  settlement  of  the  ques- 
tions pending  between  the  two  countries. ' ' 

219 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

As  the  first  of  these  conditions  it  was  de- 
clared that  "Her  Majesty's  Government  could 
not  accept  as  satisfactory  any  arrangement 
which  did  not  admit  the  British  title  to  the 
territory  comprised  within  the  line  laid  down 
by  Sir  B.  Schomburgk  in  1841 ;  but  they  would 
be  willing  to  refer  to  arbitration  the  claims  of 
Great  Britain  to  certain  territory  to  the  west 
of  that  line." 

Naturally  enough,  this  statement  was  re- 
ceived by  Venezuela  with  great  disappointment 
and  surprise.  Her  representative  promptly  re- 
plied that  his  government  could  not  accept  any 
single  point  of  the  arbitrary  and  capricious  line 
laid  down  by  Sir  R.  Schomburgk  in  1841,  which 
had  been  declared  null  and  void  even  by  the 
Government  of  her  Majesty;  and  that  it  was  not 
possible  for  Venezuela  to  accept  arbitration  in 
respect  to  territory  west  of  that  line.  He  fur- 
ther expressed  his  regret  that  the  conditions 
then  demanded  by  Lord  Salisbury  were  more 
unfavorable  to  Venezuela  than  the  proposals 
made  to  the  former  agent  of  the  republic  prior 
to  the  suspension  of  diplomatic  relations. 

On  the  19th  of  March,  1890,  the  British  Gov- 
ernment reiterated  its  position  more  in  detail. 
Its  refusal  to  admit  any  question  as  to  Great 
Britain's  title  to  any  of  the  territory  within  the 

220 


Schomburgk  line  was  emphatically  repeated, 
and  the  British  claim  was  defined  to  extend 
beyond  any  pretension  which  I  believe  had  ever 
been  previously  made  except  by  Lord  Salisbury 
himself  in  1880.  A  map  was  presented  indicat- 
ing this  extreme  claim,  the  Schomburgk  line, 
and  a  certain  part  of  the  territory  between  the 
boundary  of  this  extreme  claim  on  the  west  and 
the  Schomburgk  line,  which  Great  Britain  pro- 
posed to  submit  to  arbitration,  abandoning  all 
claim  to  the  remainder  of  the  territory  between 
these  last-named  two  lines.  This  scheme,  if 
adopted,  would  give  to  England  absolutely  and 
without  question  the  large  territory  between 
British  Guiana's  conceded  western  boundary 
and  the  Schomburgk  line,  with  an  opportunity 
to  lay  claim  before  a  board  of  arbitration  for 
extensive  additional  territory  beyond  the 
Schomburgk  line. 

This  is  pitiful.  The  Schomburgk  line,  which 
was  declared  by  the  British  Government,  at  the 
time  it  was  made,  to  be  "merely  a  preliminary 
measure,  open  to  further  discussion  between  the 
Governments  of  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela, ' ' 
and  which  had  been  since  largely  extended  in 
some  mysterious  way,  is  now  declared  to  be  a 
line  so  well  established,  so  infallible,  and  so 
sacred  that  only  the  territory  that  England  ex- 

221 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

orbitantly  claims  beyond  that  line  is  enough  in 
dispute  to  be  submitted  to  impartial  arbitration. 
The  trader  is  again  in  evidence.  On  this  basis 
England  could  abundantly  afford  to  lose  en- 
tirely in  the  arbitration  she  at  length  conceded. 
And  yet  Venezuela  was  not  absolutely  dis- 
couraged. Soon  after  the  receipt  of  Great 
Britain's  last  depressing  communication,  she 
appointed  still  another  agent  who  was  to  try 
his  hand  with  England  in  the  field  of  diplomacy. 
On  the  twenty-fourth  day  of  June,  1890,  this 
new  representative  replied  to  the  above  pro- 
posal made  to  his  predecessor  by  her  Majesty's 
Government,  and  expressed  the  great  regret  of 
Venezuela  that  its  recent  proposals  for  a  set- 
tlement of  the  boundary  difficulty  by  arbitration 
affecting  all  the  disputed  territory  had  been 
peremptorily  declined.  He  also  declared  that 
the  emphatic  statement  contained  in  Great 
Britain's  last  communication  in  reference  to 
this  question  created  for  his  government ' '  dif- 
ficulties not  formerly  contemplated, ' '  and  there- 
upon formally  declined  on  behalf  of  Venezuela 
the  consideration  of  the  proposals  contained  in 
said  communication.  This  statement  of  dis- 
couraging conditions  was,  however,  supple- 
mented by  a  somewhat  new  suggestion  to  the 
effect  that  a  preliminary  agreement  should  be 

222 


made  containing  a  declaration  on  the  part  of 
the  Government  of  Venezuela  that  the  river  Es- 
sequibo,  its  banks,  and  the  lands  covering  it 
belong  exclusively  to  British  Guiana,  and  a  dec- 
laration on  the  part  of  her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment that  the  Orinoco  River,  its  banks,  and  the 
lands  covering  it  belong  exclusively  to  Vene- 
zuela, and  providing  that  a  mixed  commission 
of  two  chief  engineers  and  their  staffs  should 
be  appointed  to  make,  within  one  year,  careful 
maps  and  charts  of  the  region  to  the  west  and 
northwest  of  the  Essequibo  River,  toward  the 
Orinoco,  in  order  to  determine  officially  the  ex- 
act course  of  its  rivers  and  streams,  and  the 
precise  position  of  its  mountains  and  hills,  and 
all  other  details  that  would  permit  both  coun- 
tries to  have  reliable  official  knowledge  of  the 
territory  which  was  actually  in  dispute,  en- 
abling them  to  determine  with  a  mutual  feeling 
of  friendship  and  good  will  a  boundary  with 
perfect  knowledge  of  the  case ;  but  in  the  event 
that  a  determination  should  not  be  thus  reached, 
the  final  decision  of  the  boundary  question 
should  be  submitted  to  two  arbitrators,  one  se- 
lected by  each  government,  and  a  third  chosen 
by  the  other  two,  to  act  as  umpire  in  case  of 
disagreement,  who,  in  view  of  the  original  titles 
and  documents  presented,  should  fix  a  boun- 

223 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

dary-line  which,  being  in  accordance  with  the 
respective  rights  and  titles,  should  have  the  ad- 
vantage as  far  as  possible  of  constituting  a 
natural  boundary;  and  that,  pending  such  de- 
termination, both  governments  should  remove 
or  withdraw  all  posts  and  other  indications  and 
signs  of  possession  or  dominion  on  said  terri- 
tory, and  refrain  from  exercising  any  jurisdic- 
tion within  the  disputed  region. 

On  the  24th  of  July,  1890,  Lord  Salisbury 
declined  to  accept  these  suggestions  of  the  Ven- 
ezuelan representative,  and  declared:  "Her 
Majesty's  Government  have  more  than  once 
explained  that  they  cannot  consent  to  submit 
to  arbitration  what  they  regard  as  their  in- 
disputable title  to  districts  in  the  possession  of 
the  British  Colony." 

Is  it  uncharitable  to  see  in  this  reference  to 
"possession"  a  hint  of  the  industrious  man- 
ner in  which  Great  Britain  had  attempted  to 
improve  her  position  by  permitting  coloniza- 
tion, and  by  other  acts  of  possession,  during  the 
half-century  since  the  boundary  dispute  began  ? 

Efforts  to  settle  this  controversy  seem  to 
have  languished  after  this  rebuff  until  March, 
1893,  when  still  another  agent  was  appointed 
by  Venezuela  for  the  purpose  of  reestablishing 
diplomatic  relations  with  Great  Britain,  and 

224 


settling,  if  possible,  the  boundary  trouble  and 
such  other  differences  as  might  be  pending  be- 
tween the  two  countries.  As  a  means  to  that 
end,  this  agent,  on  the  twenty-sixth  day  of  May, 
1893,  presented  a  memorandum  to  the  British 
Government  containing  suggestions  for  such 
settlement.  The  suggestion  relating  to  the  ad- 
justment of  the  boundary  question  rested  upon 
the  idea  of  arbitration  and  did  not  materially 
differ  from  that  made  by  this  agent's  immedi- 
ate predecessor  in  1890,  except  as  to  the  status 
quo,  pending  final  adjustment,  which  it  was 
proposed  should  be  the  same  as  that  existing 
after  the  agreement  of  non-interference  in  the 
disputed  territory  made  by  the  two  govern- 
ments in  1850. 

The  plan  thus  suggested  was  declined  by  the 
Government  of  Great  Britain,  because,  in  the 
first  place,  it  involved  an  arbitration,  "  which 
had  been  repeatedly  declined  by  Her  Majesty's 
Government,"  and,  further,  because  it  was,  in 
the  language  of  the  British  reply,  "  quite  im- 
possible that  they  should  consent  to  revert  to 
the  status  quo  of  1850  and  evacuate  what  has 
for  some  years  constituted  an  integral  portion 
of  British  Guiana." 

A  further  communication  from  the  agent  of 
Venezuela,  offering  additional  arguments  in 
15  225 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

support  of  his  suggestions,  brought  forth  a  re- 
ply informing  him  that  the  contents  of  his  note 
did  not  " appear  to  Her  Majesty's  Government 
to  afford  any  opening  for  arriving  at  an  under- 
standing on  this  question  which  they  could  ac- 
cept. ' ' 

Six  months  afterward,  on  the  twenty-ninth 
day  of  September,  1893,  a  final  communication 
was  addressed  by  the  representative  of  Vene- 
zuela to  the  British  Government,  reviewing  the 
situation  and  the  course  of  past  efforts  to  ar- 
rive at  a  settlement,  and  concluding  with  the 
words : 

I  must  now  declare  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  and 
in  the  name  of  the  Government  of  Venezuela,  that 
it  is  with  the  greatest  regret  that  that  Govern- 
ment sees  itself  forced  to  leave  the  situation  pro- 
duced in  the  disputed  territory  by  the  acts  of  recent 
years  unsettled,  and  subject  to  the  serious  disturb- 
ances which  acts  of  force  cannot  but  produce;  and 
to  declare  that  Venezuela  will  never  consent  to  pro- 
ceedings of  that  nature  being  accepted  as  title-deeds 
to  justify  the  arbitrary  occupation  of  territory  which 
is  within  its  jurisdiction. 

Here  closed  a  period  in  this  dispute,  fifty- 
two  years  in  duration,  vexed  with  agitation, 
and  perturbed  by  irritating  and  repeated  fail- 
ures to  reach  a  peaceful  adjustment.  Instead 

226 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

of  progress  in  the  direction  of  a  settlement  of 
their  boundaries,  the  results  of  their  action 
were  increased  obstacles  to  fair  discussion,  in- 
tensified feelings  of  injury,  extended  assertion 
of  title,  ruthless  appropriation  of  the  territory 
in  controversy,  and  an  unhealed  breach  in  dip- 
lomatic relations. 


227 


IV 


I  have  thus  far  dealt  with  this  dispute  as 
one  in  which  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela, 
the  parties  primarily  concerned,  were  sole  par- 
ticipants. We  have  now,  however,  reached  a 
stage  in  the  affair  which  requires  a  recital  of 
other  facts  which  led  up  to  the  active  and  posi- 
tive interference  of  our  own  Government  in  the 
controversy.  In  discussing  this  branch  of  our 
topic  it  will  be  necessary  not  only  to  deal  with 
circumstances  following  those  already  narrated, 
but  to  retrace  our  steps  sufficiently  to  exhibit 
among  other  things  the  appeals  and  representa- 
tions made  to  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  by  Venezuela,  while  she  was  still  at- 
tempting to  arrive  at  an  adjustment  with  Great 
Britain. 

I  have  already  referred  to  the  first  communi- 
cation made  to  us  by  Venezuela  on  the  subject. 
This,  it  will  be  remembered,  was  in  1876,  when 
she  sought  to  resume  negotiations  with  Great 
Britain,  after  an  interruption  of  thirty-two 
years.  I  have  also  called  attention  to  the  fact 

228 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

that  coincident  with  this  communication  Vene- 
zuela presented  to  Great  Britain  a  willingness 
to  relax  her  insistence  upon  her  extreme  boun- 
dary claim,  based  upon  alleged  right,  and  sug- 
gested that  a  conventional  line  might  be  fixed 
by  mutual  concession. 

Venezuela's  first  appeal  to  us  for  support 
and  aid  amounted  to  little  more  than  a  vague 
and  indefinite  request  for  countenance  and 
sympathy  in  her  efforts  to  settle  her  differ- 
ences with  her  contestant,  with  an  expression 
of  a  desire  that  we  would  take  cognizance  of 
her  new  steps  in  that  direction.  I  do  not  find 
that  any  reply  was  made  to  this  communi- 
cation. 

Five  years  afterward,  in  1881,  the  Vene- 
zuelan minister  in  Washington  presented  to 
Mr.  Evarts,  then  our  Secretary  of  State,  in- 
formation he  had  received  that  British  vessels 
had  made  their  appearance  in  the  mouth  of  the 
Orinoco  River  with  materials  to  build  a  tele- 
graph-line, and  had  begun  to  erect  poles  for 
that  purpose  at  Barima :  and  he  referred  to  the 
immense  importance  to  his  country  of  the  Ori- 
noco ;  to  the  efforts  of  his  government  to  adjust 
her  difficulty  with  Great  Britain,  and  to  the  de- 
lays interposed ;  and  finally  expressed  his  confi- 
dent belief  that  the  United  States  would  not 

229 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

view  with  indifference  what  was  being  done  in 
a  matter  of  such  capital  importance. 

Mr.  Evarts  promptly  replied,  and  informed 
the  Venezuelan  representative  that  "in  view 
of  the  deep  interest  which  the  Government  of 
the  United  States  takes  in  all  transactions  tend- 
ing to  attempted  encroachments  of  foreign  pow- 
ers upon  the  territory  of  any  of  the  republics 
of  this  continent,  this  Government  could  not 
look  with  indifference  to  the  forcible  acquisi- 
tion of  such  territory  by  England,  if  the  mis- 
sion of  the  vessels  now  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Orinoco  should  be  found  to  be  for  that  end. ' ' 

Again,  on  the  thirtieth  day  of  November, 
1881,  our  minister  to  Venezuela  reported  to 
Mr.  Elaine,  who  had  succeeded  Mr.  Evarts  as 
Secretary  of  State,  an  interview  with  the  Presi- 
dent of  Venezuela  at  his  request,  in  which  the 
subject  of  the  boundary  dispute  was  discussed. 
Our  minister  represented  that  the  question  was 
spoken  of  by  the  President  as  being  of  essen- 
tial importance  and  a  source  of  great  anxiety 
to  him,  involving  a  large  and  fertile  territory 
between  the  Essequibo  and  Orinoco,  and  prob- 
ably the  control  of  the  mouth  and  a  consider- 
able portion  of  the  latter  river ;  and  he  alleged 
that  the  policy  of  Great  Britain,  in  the  treat- 
ment of  this  question,  had  been  delay— the  in- 

230 


terval  being  utilized  by  gradually  but  steadily 
extending  her  interest  and  authority  into  the 
disputed  territory;  and  "that,  though  the 
rights  of  Venezuela  were  clear  and  indispu- 
table, he  questioned  her  ability,  unaided  by 
some  friendly  nation,  to  maintain  them." 

In  July,  1882,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen,  successor 
to  Mr.  Elaine,  sent  to  our  representative  at 
Venezuela  a  despatch  to  be  communicated  to 
the  government  of  the  republic,  in  which  he 
stated  that,  if  Venezuela  desired  it,  the  United 
States  would  propose  to  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain  that  the  boundary  question  be 
submitted  to  the  arbitrament  of  a  third  power. 

It  will  be  remembered  that  a  proposition  for 
arbitration  had  been  made  by  Venezuela  to 
Great  Britain  in  February,  1881,  and  that  Great 
Britain  had  refused  to  accede  to  it. 

In  July,  1884,  Mr.  Frelinghuysen  sent  a  con- 
fidential despatch  to  Mr.  Lowell,  our  minister  to 
Great  Britain,  informing  him  that  Guzman 
Blanco,  ex-President  of  Venezuela,  who  had 
recently  been  accredited  as  a  special  envoy 
from  his  country  to  Great  Britain,  had  called 
on  him  relative  to  the  objects  of  his  mission, 
in  respect  of  which  he  desired  to  obtain  the 
good  offices  of  this  Government,  and  that 
doubtless  he  would  seek  to  confer  with  Mr. 

231 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Lowell  in  London.  He  further  informed  Mr. 
Lowell  that  he  had  told  the  Venezuelan  envoy 
that, ' '  in  view  of  our  interest  in  all  that  touches 
the  independent  life  of  the  Republics  of  the 
American  Continent,  the  United  States  could 
not  be  indifferent  to  anything  that  might  im- 
pair their  normal  self-control";  that  "the 
moral  position  of  the  United  States  in  these 
matters  was  well  known  through  the  enun- 
ciation of  the 'Monroe  Doctrine,"  though  for- 
mal action  in  the  direction  of  applying  that 
doctrine  to  a  speculative  case  affecting  Vene- 
zuela seemed  to  him  to  be  inopportune,  and 
therefore  he  could  not  advise  Venezuela  to 
arouse  a  discussion  of  that  point.  He  instructed 
our  minister  to  show  proper  consideration  to 
the  Venezuelan  envoy,  and  to  "take  proper 
occasion  to  let  Lord  Granville  know  that  we 
are  not  without  concern  as  to  whatever  may 
affect  the  interest  of  a  sister  Republic  of  the 
American  Continent  and  its  position  in  the 
family  of  nations." 

In  July,  1885,  the  Venezuelan  minister  to 
the  United  States  addressed  a  communication 
to  Secretary  of  State  Bayard,  setting  forth  the 
correspondence  which  had  already  taken  place 
between  our  Government  and  that  of  Venezuela 
touching  the  boundary  dispute,  and  referring 

232 


to  the  serious  condition  existing  on  account  of 
the  renewed  aggressions  of  Great  Britain. 

Mr.  Bayard  thereupon  sent  a  despatch  on  the 
subject  to  Mr.  Phelps,  our  diplomatic  repre- 
sentative to  England,  in  which,  after  stating 
that  the  Venezuelan  Government  had  never 
definitely  declared  what  course  she  desired  us 
to  pursue,  but,  on  the  contrary,  had  expressed 
a  desire  to  be  guided  by  our  counsel,  he  said: 
' '  The  good  offices  of  this  Government  have  been 
tendered  to  Venezuela  to  suggest  to  Great 
Britain  the  submission  of  the  boundary  dispute 
to  arbitration ;  but  when  shown  that  such  action 
on  our  part  would  exclude  us  from  acting  as 
arbitrator,  Venezuela  ceased  to  press  the  mat- 
ter in  that  direction";  and  the  next  day  after 
writing  this  despatch  Mr.  Bayard  informed  the 
Venezuelan  minister  that  the  President  of  the 
United  States  could  not  entertain  a  request  to 
act  as  umpire  in  any  dispute  unless  it  should 
come  concurrently  from  both  contestants. 

In  December,  1886,  our  minister  to  Vene- 
zuela addressed  a  despatch  to  Mr.  Bayard, 
in  which  he  reported  that  matters  looked  very 
angry  and  threatening  in  Venezuela  on  ac- 
count of  fresh  aggressions  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain  in  the  disputed  territory;  and  he  ex- 
pressed the  fear  that  an  open  rupture  might 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

occur  between  the  two  countries.  He  inclosed 
a  statement  made  by  the  Venezuelan  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs,  containing  a  list  of  griev- 
ances, followed  by  this  declaration:  "Vene- 
zuela, listening  to  the  advice  of  the  United 
States,  has  endeavored  several  times  to  obtain 
that  the  difference  should  be  submitted  to 
the  award  of  a  third  power.  .  .  .  But  such 
efforts  have  proven  fruitless,  and  the  possibil- 
ity of  that  result,  the  only  one  prescribed  by 
our  constitution,  being  arrived  at,  becomes 
more  and  more  remote  from  day  to  day.  Great 
Britain  has  been  constant  in  her  clandestine  ad- 
vances upon  the  Venezuelan  territory,  not  tak- 
ing into  consideration  either  the  rights  or  the 
complaints  of  this  Republic:"  And  he  adds 
the  following  declaration : ' '  Under  such  circum- 
stances the  Government  has  but  two  courses 
left  open:  either  to  employ  force  in  order  to 
recover  places  from  which  force  has  ejected 
the  Republic,  since  its  amicable  representations 
on  the  subject  have  failed  to  secure  redress, 
or  to  present  a  solemn  protest  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  against  so  great  an 
abuse,  which  is  an  evident  declaration  of  war 
—a  provocative  aggression. ' ' 

Thereupon,  and  on  the  twentieth  day  of  De- 
cember, 1886,  a  despatch  was  sent  by  Mr.  Bay- 

234 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

ard  to  Mr.  Phelps,  in  which  the  secretary  com- 
ments on  the  fact  that  at  no  time  theretofore 
had  the  good  offices  of  our  Government  been 
actually  tendered  to  avert  a  rupture  between 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  and  that  our  in- 
action in  this  regard  seemed  to  be  due  to  the 
reluctance  of  Venezuela  to  have  the  Government 
of  the  United  States  take  any  steps  having  rela- 
tion to  the  action  of  the  British  Government 
which  might,  in  appearance  even,  prejudice  the 
resort  to  our  arbitration  or  mediation  which 
Venezuela  desired;  but  that  the  intelligence 
now  received  warranted  him  in  tendering  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  to  promote  an 
amicable  settlement  of  the  difficulty  between 
the  two  countries,  and  offering  our  arbitration 
if  acceptable  to  both  countries— as  he  supposed 
the  dispute  turned  upon  simple  and  readily 
ascertainable  historical  facts. 

Additional  complaints  against  Great  Britain 
on  account  of  further  trespasses  on  Venezue- 
lan territory  were  contained  in  a  note  from 
the  Venezuelan  minister  to  Mr.  Bayard,  dated 
January  4, 1887.  I  shall  quote  only  the  follow- 
ing passage: 

My  Government  has  tried  all  possible  means  to 
induce  that  of  London  to  accept  arbitration,  as  ad- 
vised by  the  United  States;  this,  however,  has  re- 

235. 


suited  in  nothing  but  fresh  attempts  against  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  territory  by  the  colonial  authorities  of 
Demerara.  It  remains  to  be  seen  how  long  my  Gov- 
ernment will  find  it  possible  to  exercise  forbearance 
transcending  the  limits  of  its  positive  official  duty. 

Pursuant  to  his  instructions  from  Mr.  Bay- 
ard, our  minister  to  Great  Britain  formally 
tendered  to  the  English  Government,  on  the 
eighth  day  of  February,  1887,  the  good  offices  of 
the  United  States  to  promote  an  amicable  settle- 
ment of  the  pending  controversy,  and  offered 
our  arbitration,  if  acceptable  to  both  parties. 

A  few  days  afterward  Lord  Salisbury,  on 
behalf  of  Great  Britain,  replied  that  the  atti- 
tude which  had  been  taken  by  the  President  of 
the  Venezuelan  republic  precluded  her  Maj- 
esty's Government  from  submitting  the  ques- 
tion at  that  time  to  the  arbitration  of  any  third 
power. 

The  fact  that  Lord  Salisbury  had  declined 
our  offer  of  mediation  and  arbitration,  was 
promptly  conveyed  to  the  government  of  Vene- 
zuela; and  thereupon,  on  the  fourth  day  of 
May,  1887,  her  minister  at  Washington  ad- 
dressed another  note  to  our  Secretary  of  State 
indicating  much  depression  on  account  of  the 
failure  of  all  efforts  up  to  that  time  made  to 
induce  Great  Britain  to  agree  to  a  settlement 

236 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

of  the  controversy  by  arbitration,  and  express- 
ing the  utmost  gratitude  for  the  steps  taken  by 
our  Government  in  aid  of  those  efforts.  He  also 
referred  to  the  desire  his  government  once  en- 
tertained that,  in  case  arbitration  could  be  at- 
tained, the  United  States  might  be  selected  as 
arbitrator,  and  to  the  fact  that  this  desire  had 
been  relinquished  because  the  maintenance  of 
impartiality  essential  in  an  arbitrator  would 
' '  seriously  impair  the  efficiency  of  action  which 
for  the  furtherance  of  the  common  interests  of 
America,  and  in  obedience  to  the  doctrine  of  the 
immortal  Monroe,  should  possess  all  the  vital- 
ity that  the  alarming  circumstances  demand"; 
and  he  begged  the  secretary  to  instruct  our 
representative  in  London  ''to  insist,  in  the 
name  of  the  United  States  Government,  upon 
the  necessity  of  submitting  the  boundary  ques- 
tion between  Venezuela  and  British  Guiana  to 
arbitration." 

I  have  heretofore  refrained  from  stating  in 
detail  the  quite  numerous  instances  of  quarrel 
and  collision  that  occurred  in  and  near  the  dis- 
puted territory,  with  increasing  frequency,  dur- 
ing this  controversy.  One  of  these,  however, 
I  think  should  be  here  mentioned.  It  seems 
that  in  1883  two  vessels  belonging  to  English 
subjects  were  seized  and  their  crews  taken  into 


custody  by  Venezuelan  officials  in  the  disputed 
region,  for  alleged  violations  of  the  laws  of 
Venezuela  within  her  jurisdiction,  and  that  Eng- 
lish officials  had  assumed,  without  any  judicial 
determination  and  without  any  notice  to  Vene- 
zuela, to  assess  damages  against  her  on  account 
of  such  seizure  and  arrests,  in  an  amount  which, 
with  interest,  amounted  in  1887  to  about  forty 
thousand  dollars.  On  the  seventh  day  of  Oc- 
tober in  that  year,  the  governor  of  Trinidad, 
an  English  island  near  the  mouth  of  the  Ori- 
noco, in  a  letter  to  the  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  for  Venezuela,  declared  that  her  Maj- 
esty's Government  could  not  permit  such  in- 
juries to  remain  unredressed,  or  their  represen- 
tations to  be  disregarded  any  longer,  and 
thereupon  it  was  demanded  that  the  money 
claimed,  with  interest,  be  paid  within  seven  days 
from  the  delivery  of  said  letter.  The  letter 
concluded  as  follows: 

Failing  compliance  with  the  above  demands  Her 
Majesty's  Government  will  be  reluctantly  compelled 
to  instruct  the  Commander  of  Her  Majesty's  naval 
forces  in  the  West  Indies  to  take  such  measures  as 
he  may  deem  necessary  to  obtain  that  reparation 
which  has  been  vainly  sought  for  by  friendly  means ; 
and  in  case  of  so  doing  they  will  hold  the  Venezuelan 
Government  responsible  for  any  consequences  that 
may  arise. 

238 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Venezuela  did  not  fail  to  appreciate  and 
frankly  acknowledge  that,  in  her  defenseless 
condition,  there  was  no  escape  from  the  pay- 
ment of  the  sum  which  England,  as  a  judge 
in  its  own  cause,  had  decreed  against  her.  The 
President  of  the  republic,  however,  in  a  prompt 
reply  to  the  governor's  note,  characterized  its 
terms  as  "offensive  to  the  dignity  of  the  na- 
tion and  to  the  equality  which,  according 
to  the  principles  of  the  rights  of  nations, 
all  countries  enjoy  without  any  regard  to 
their  strength  or  weakness."  Thereupon  he 
sought  the  good  offices  of  our  minister  to  Vene- 
zuela in  an  effort  to  procure  a  withdrawal  of 
the  objectionable  communication.  This  was 
attempted  in  a  note  sent  by  the  American  min- 
ister to  the  governor  of  Trinidad,  in  which  he 
said: 

I  hope  your  Excellency  will  permit  me  to  suggest, 
as  a  mutual  friend  of  both  parties,  the  suspension  or 
withdrawal  of  your  note  of  the  7th  instant,  so  that 
negotiations  may  at  once  be  opened  for  the  immedi- 
ate and  final  settlement  of  the  afore-mentioned 
claims  without  further  resort  to  unpleasant  mea- 
sures. Prom  representations  made  to  me,  I  am  sat- 
isfied that  if  the  note  of  the  7th  instant  is  withdrawn 
temporarily  even,  Venezuela  will  do  in  the  premises 
that  which  will  prove  satisfactory  to  your  Govern- 
ment. 

239 


A  few  days  after  this  note  was  sent,  a  reply 
was  received  in  which  the  governor  of  Trinidad 
courteously  expressed  his  thanks  to  our  min- 
ister for  his  good  offices,  and  informed  him 
that,  as  the  Government  of  Venezuela  regarded 
his  note  of  October  7  "as  offensive,  and  ap- 
peared desirous  of  at  last  settling  this  long- 
pending  question  in  a  friendly  spirit,"  he 
promptly  telegraphed  to  her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment asking  permission  to  withdraw  that  note 
and  substitute  a  less  forcible  one  for  it;  and 
that  he  had  just  been  informed  by  his  home 
government  in  reply  that  this  arrangement 
could  not  be  sanctioned. 

Our  minister  reported  this  transaction  to  his 
home  government  at  Washington  on  the  fourth 
day  of  November,  1887,  and  stated  that  the 
money  demanded  by  Great  Britain  had  been 
paid  by  Venezuela  under  protest. 

Venezuela  may  have  been  altogether  at  fault 
in  the  transaction  out  of  which  this  demand 
arose ;  the  amount  which  England  exacted  may 
not  have  been  unreasonable;  and  the  method 
of  its  assessment,  though  not  the  most  consid- 
erate possible,  has  support  in  precedent;  and 
even  the  threat  of  a  naval  force  may  sometimes 
be  justified  in  enforcing  unheeded  demands. 
I  have  not  adverted  to  this  incident  for  the  pur- 

240 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

pose  of  inviting  judgment  on  any  of  its  phases, 
but  only  to  call  attention  to  the  fact  that  it  was 
allowed  to  culminate  with  seemingly  studied 
accompaniments  of  ruthlessness  and  irritation, 
at  a  time  when  a  boundary  question  was  pend- 
ing between  the  two  nations,  when  the  weaker 
contestant  was  importuning  the  stronger  for 
arbitration,  and  when  a  desire  for  reconcilia- 
tion and  peace  in  presence  of  strained  relations 
should  have  counseled  considerateness  and 
magnanimity— all  this  in  haughty  disregard  of 
the  solicitous  and  expressed  desire  of  the  Gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  to  induce  a  peace- 
ful adjustment  of  the  boundary  dispute,  and  in 
curt  denial  of  our  request  that  this  especially 
disturbing  incident  should  be  relieved  of  its 
most  exasperating  features. 

In  the  trial  of  causes  before  our  courts,  evi- 
dence is  frequently  introduced  to  show  the  ani- 
mus or  intent  of  litigating  parties. 

Perhaps  strict  decorum  hardly  permits  us  to 
adopt  the  following  language,  used  by  the 
Venezuelan  minister  when  reporting  to  our 
Secretary  of  State  the  anticipated  arrival  of  a 
British  war-steamer  to  enforce  the  demand  of 
Great  Britain: 

Such   alarming  news   shows   evidently   that  the 
Government  of  Her  Britannic  Majesty,  encouraged 
16  241 


by  the  impunity  on  which  it  has  counted  until  now 
for  the  realization  of  its  unjust  designs  with  regard 
to  Venezuela,  far  from  procuring  a  pacific  and  satis- 
factory agreement  on  the  different  questions  pend- 
ing with  the  latter,  is  especially  eager  to  complicate 
in  order  to  render  less  possible  every  day  that  equi- 
table solution  which  has  been  so  fully  the  endeavor 
of  my  people. 

On  the  fifteenth  day  of  February,  1888,  the 
Venezuelan  minister,  in  communicating  to  our 
Government  information  he  had  received  touch- 
ing a  decree  of  the  governor  of  Demerara  deny- 
ing the  validity  of  a  contract  entered  into  by  the 
Government  of  Venezuela  for  the  construction 
of  a  railway  between  certain  points  in  the 
territory  claimed  by  Venezuela,  commented  on 
the  affair  as  follows: 

England  has  at  last  declared  emphatically  that 
her  rights  are  without  limit,  and  embrace  whatever 
regions  may  be  suggested  to  her  by  her  insatiate 
thirst  for  conquest.  She  even  goes  so  far  as  to  deny 
the  validity  of  railway  grants  comprised  within  ter- 
ritory where  not  even  the  wildest  dream  of  fancy 
had  ever  conceived  that  the  day  would  come  when 
Venezuela's  right  thereto  could  be  disputed.  The 
fact  is  that  until  now  England  has  relied  upon  im- 
punity. She  beholds  in  us  a  weak  and  unfriended 
nation,  and  seeks  to  make  the  Venezuelan  coast  and 
territories  the  base  of  a  conquest  which,  if  circum- 
stances are  not  altered,  will  have  no  other  Sounds 
than  the  dictates  of  her  own  will. 

242 


Mr.  Bayard,  in  a  despatch  transmitting  this 
to  our  minister  to  England,  says  that  our  Gov- 
ernment has  heretofore  acted  upon  the  assump- 
tion that  the  boundary  controversy  between 
Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  was  one  based  on 
historical  facts,  which  without  difficulty  could 
be  determined  according  to  evidence,  but  that 
the  British  pretension  now  stated  gives  rise  to 
grave  disquietude,  and  creates  the  apprehen- 
sion that  their  territorial  claim  does  not  follow 
historical  traditions  or  evidence,  but  is  appar- 
ently indefinite.  He  refers  to  the  British  Colo- 
nial Office  list  of  previous  years,  and  calls  at- 
tention to  the  wide  detour  to  the  westward  in 
the  boundaries  of  British  Guiana  between  the 
years  1877  and  1887,  as  shown  in  that  record. 
He  suggests  that  our  minister  "express  anew 
to  Lord  Salisbury  the  great  gratification  it 
would  afford  our  Government  to  see  the  Vene- 
zuelan dispute  amicably  and  honorably  settled 
by  arbitration  or  otherwise, "  and  adds:  "If 
indeed  it  should  appear  that  there  is  no  fixed 

243 


limit  to  the  British  boundary  claim,  our  good 
disposition  to  aid  in  a  settlement  might  not  only 
be  defeated,  but  be  obliged  to  give  place  to  a 
feeling  of  grave  concern." 

It  was  about  this  time  that  the  Venezuelan 
minister,  in  a  note  expressing  his  appreciation 
of  our  efforts  to  bring  about  a  settlement  of  the 
dispute,  made  the  following  statement : 

Disastrous  and  fatal  consequences  would  ensue 
for  the  independence  of  South  America  if,  under 
the  pretext  of  a  question  of  boundaries,  Great  Brit- 
ain should  succeed  in  consummating  the  usurpation 
of  a  third  part  of  our  territory,  and  therewith  a 
river  so  important  as  the  Orinoco.  Under  the  pretext 
of  a  mere  question  of  boundaries  which  began  on  the 
banks  of  the  Essequibo,  we  now  find  ourselves  on  the 
verge  of  losing  regions  lying  more  than  five  degrees 
away  from  that  river. 

On  May  1,  1890,  Mr.  Blaine,  Mr.  Bayard's 
successor  as  Secretary  of  State,  instructed  Mr. 
Eobert  T.  Lincoln,  our  minister  to  England, 
"to  use  his  good  offices  with  Lord  Salisbury  to 
bring  about  the  resumption  of  diplomatic  inter- 
course between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela 
as  a  preliminary  step  toward  the  settlement  of 
the  boundary  dispute  by  arbitration. ' '  He  also 
requested  him  "to  propose  to  Lord  Salisbury, 
with  a  view  to  an  accommodation,  that  an  in- 
formal conference  be  had  in  Washington  or  in 

244 


London  of  representatives  of  the  three  pow- 
ers." The  secretary  added:  "In  such  confer- 
ence the  position  of  the  United  States  is  one 
solely  of  impartial  friendship  toward  both  liti- 
gants. ' ' 

In  response  to  this  instruction  Mr.  Lincoln 
had  an  interview  with  Lord  Salisbury.  On  this 
occasion  his  Lordship  said  that  her  Majesty's 
Government  had  not  for  some  time  been  keen 
in  attempts  to  settle  the  dispute,  in  view  of 
their  feeling  of  uncertainty  as  to  the  stability 
of  the  present  Venezuelan  Government  and  the 
frequency  of  revolutions  in  that  quarter;  but 
that  he  would  take  pleasure  in  considering  our 
suggestion  after  consulting  the  Colonial  Office, 
to  which  it  would  first  have  to  be  referred. 
Mr.  Lincoln,  in  giving  his  impressions  derived 
from  the  interview,  says  that  "while  Lord  Salis- 
bury did  not  intimate  what  would  probably  be 
the  nature  of  his  reply,  there  was  certainly  no- 
thing unfavorable  in  his  manner  of  receiving 
the  suggestion";  and  he  follows  this  with  these 
significant  words :  "  If  the  matter  had  been  en- 
tirely new  and  dissociated  with  its  previous 
history,  I  should  have  felt  from  his  tone  that 
the  idea  of  arbitration  in  some  form,  to  put  an 
end  to  the  boundary  dispute,  was  quite  agree- 
able to  him. ' ' 

24  5 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

On  the  26th  of  May,  1890,  Lord  Salisbury 
addressed  a  note  to  Mr.  Lincoln,  in  which  his 
Lordship  stated  that  her  Majesty's  Government 
was  at  that  moment  in  communication  with  the 
Venezuelan  minister  in  Paris,  who  had  been 
authorized  to  express  the  desire  of  his  Govern- 
ment for  the  renewal  of  diplomatic  relations, 
and  to  discuss  the  conditions  on  which  it  might 
be  effected;  that  the  terms  on  which  her  Maj- 
esty's Government  considered  that  a  settlement 
of  the  question  in  issue  between  the  two  coun- 
tries might  be  made,  had  been  communicated  to 
Venezuela's  representative;  that  his  reply  was 
still  awaited,  and  that  the  British  Government 
"  would  wish  to  have  the  opportunity  of  exam- 
ining that  reply,  and  ascertaining  what  pros- 
pect it  would  afford  of  an  adjustment  of 
existing  differences,  before  considering  the  ex- 
pediency of  having  recourse  to  the  good  offices 
of  a  third  party." 

No  mention  was  made,  in  this  communication, 
nor  at  any  time  thereafter,  so  far  as  I  can  dis- 
cover, of  Mr.  Elaine 's  proposal  of  a  conference 
among  representatives  of  the  three  nations  in- 
terested in  an  adjustment. 

Lord  Salisbury,  in  a  despatch  to  the  Eng- 
lish representative  at  Washington,  dated  No- 
vember 11,  1891,  stated  that  our  minister  to 

246 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

England  had,  in  conversation  with  him,  re- 
newed, on  the  part  of  our  Government,  the  ex- 
pression of  a  hope  that  the  Government  of 
Great  Britain  would  refer  the  boundary  dis- 
pute to  arbitration;  that  his  Lordship  had  ex- 
pressed his  willingness  to  submit  to  arbitration 
all  the  questions  which  seemed  to  his  govern- 
ment to  be  fairly  capable  of  being  treated 
as  questions  of  controversy;  that  the  princi- 
pal obstacle  was  the  rupture  of  diplomatic 
relations  caused  by  Venezuela's  act;  and  that 
before  the  Government  of  Great  Britain  could 
renew  negotiations  they  must  be  satisfied  that 
those  relations  were  about  to  be  resumed  with 
a  prospect  of  their  continuance. 

While  our  Government  was  endeavoring  to 
influence  Great  Britain  in  the  direction  of  fair 
and  just  arbitration,  and  receiving  for  our 
pains  only  barren  assurances  and  procrastinat- 
ing excuses,  the  appeals  of  Venezuela  for  help, 
stimulated  by  allegations  of  constantly  increas- 
ing English  pretensions,  were  incessantly  ring- 
ing in  our  ears. 

Without'  mentioning  a  number  of  these  ap- 
peals, and  passing  over  a  period  of  more  than 
two  years,  I  shall  next  refer  to  a  representation 
made  by  the  Venezuelan  minister  at  Washing- 
ton on  March  31,  1894,  to  Mr.  Gresham,  who 

247 


was  then  our  Secretary  of  State.  In  this 
communication  the  course  of  the  controversy 
and  the  alleged  unauthorized  acts  of  England 
from  the  beginning  to  that  date  were  rehearsed 
with  circumstantial  particularity.  The  conduct 
of  Great  Britain  in  refusing  arbitration  was 
again  reprobated,  and  pointed  reference  was 
made  to  a  principle  which  had  been  asserted  by 
the  United '  States,  "that  the  nations  of  the 
American  continent,  after  having  acquired  the 
liberty  and  independence  which  they  enjoy  and 
maintain,  were  not  subject  to  colonization  by 
any  European  power."  The  minister  further 
declared  that  * '  Venezuela  has  been  ready  to  ad- 
here to  the  conciliatory  counsel  of  the  United 
States  that  a  conference,  consisting  of  its  own 
Representative  and  those  of  the  two  parties, 
should  meet  at  Washington  or  London  for  the 
purpose  of  preparing  an  honorable  reestab- 
lishment  of  harmony  between  the  litigants," 
and  that  "Great  Britain  has  disregarded  the 
equitable  proposition  of  the  United  States. ' ' 

On  July  13, 1894,  Mr.  Gresham  sent  a  despatch 
to  Mr.  Bayard,  formerly  Secretary  of  State,  but 
then  ambassador  to  England,  inclosing  the  com- 
munication of  the  Venezuelan  minister,  calling 
particular  attention  to  its  contents,  and  at  the 
same  time  briefly  discussing  the  boundary  dis- 
pute. In  this  despatch  Mr.  Gresham  said : 

248 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

The  recourse  to  arbitration  first  proposed  in  1881, 
having  been  supported  by  your  predecessors,  was 
in  turn  advocated  by  you,  in  a  spirit  of  friendly  re- 
gard for  the  two  nations  involved.  In  the  meantime 
successive  advances  of  British  settlers  in  the  region 
admittedly  in  dispute  were  followed  by  similar  ad- 
vances of  British  Colonial  administration,  contesting 
and  supplanting  Venezuelan  claims  to  exercise  au- 
thority therein. 

He  adds:  "Toward  the  end  of  1887,  the  British 
territorial  claim,  which  had,  as  it  would  seem, 
been  silently  increased  by  some  twenty-three 
thousand  square  miles  between  1885  and  1886, 
took  another  comprehensive  sweep  westward 
to  embrace"  a  certain  rich  mining  district. 
* '  Since  then, ' '  the  secretary  further  states, '  *  re- 
peated efforts  have  been  made  by  Venezuela  as 
a  directly  interested  party,  and  by  the  United 
States  as  the  impartial  friend  of  both  countries, 
to  bring  about  a  resumption  of  diplomatic 
relations,  which  had  been  suspended  in  conse- 
quence of  the  dispute  now  under  considera- 
tion." 

This  despatch  concludes  as  follows : 

The  President  is  inspired  by  a  desire  for  a  peace- 
able and  honorable  adjustment  of  the  existing  dif- 
ficulties between  an  American  state  and  a  powerful 
transatlantic  nation,  and  would  be  glad  to  see  the 
reestablishment  of  such  diplomatic  relations  between 
them  as  would  promote  that  end.  I  can  discover  but 
249 


two  equitable  solutions  to  the  present  controversy. 
One  is  the  arbitral  determination  of  the  rights  of  the 
disputants  as  the  respective  successors  to  the  his- 
torical rights  of  Holland  and  Spain  over  the  region 
in  question.  The  other  is  to  create  a  new  boundary- 
line  in  accordance  with  the  dictates  of  mutual  ex- 
pediency and  consideration.  The  two  Governments 
having  so  far  been  unable  to  agree  on  a  conventional 
line,  the  consistent  and  conspicuous  advocacy  by  the 
United  States  and  England  of  the  principle  of  arbi- 
tration, and  their  recourse  thereto  in  settlement  of 
important  questions  arising  between  them,  makes 
such  a  mode  of  adjustment  especially  appropriate 
in  the  present  instance;  and  this  Government  will 
gladly  do  what  it  can  to  further  a  determination  in 
that  sense. 

In  another  despatch  to  Mr.  Bayard,  dated 
December  1,  1894,  Mr.  Gresham  says: 

I  cannot  believe  Her  Majesty's  Government  will 
maintain  that  the  validity  of  their  claim  to  territory 
long  in  dispute  between  the  two  countries  shall  be 
conceded  as  a  condition  precedent  to  the  arbitration 
of  the  question  whether  Venezuela  is  entitled  to  other 
territory,  which  until  a  recent  period  was  never  in 
doubt.  Our  interest  in  the  question  has  repeatedly 
been  shown  by  our  friendly  efforts  to  further  a  set- 
tlement alike  honorable  to  both  countries,  and  the 
President  is  pleased  to  know  that  Venezuela  will 
soon  renew  her  efforts  to  J5ring  about  such  an  adjust- 
ment. 

Two  days  afterward,  on  December  3,  1894, 
the  President's  annual  message  was  sent  to  the 

250 


Congress,  containing  the  following  reference 
to  the  controversy: 

The  boundary  of  British  Guiana  still  remains  in 
dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  Be- 
lieving that  its  early  settlement  on  some  just  basis 
alike  honorable  to  both  parties  is  in  the  line  of  our 
established  policy  to  remove  from  this  hemisphere 
all  causes  of  difference  with  powers  beyond  the  sea, 
I  shall  renew  the  efforts  heretofore  made  to  bring 
about  a  restoration  of  diplomatic  relations  between 
the  disputants  and  to  induce  a  reference  to  arbitra- 
tion—a resort  which  Great  Britain  so  conspicuously 
favors  in  principle  and  respects  in  practice,  and 
which  is  earnestly  sought  by  her  weaker  adversary. 

On  the  twenty-second  day  of  February,  1895, 
a  joint  resolution  was  passed  by  the  Congress, 
earnestly  recommending  to  both  parties  in  in- 
terest the  President's  suggestion  "that  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela  refer  their  dispute  as 
to  boundaries  to  friendly  arbitration." 

A  despatch  dated  February  23,  1895,  from 
Great  Britain's  Foreign  Office  to  the  English 
ambassador  at  Washington,  stated  that  on  the 
twenty-fifth  day  of  January,  1895,  our  ambas- 
sador, Mr.  Bayard,  had,  in  an  official  interview, 
referred  to  the  boundary  controversy,  and  said 
"that  his  Government  would  gladly  lend  their 
good  offices  to  bring  about  a  settlement  by 
means  of  an  arbitration."  The  despatch  fur- 

251 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

ther  stated  that  Mr.  Bayard  had  thereupon 
been  informed  that  her  Majesty's  Government 
had  expressed  their  willingness  to  submit  the 
question,  within  certain  limits,  to  arbitration, 
but  could  not  agree  to  the  more  extensive  ref- 
erence on  which  the  Venezuelan  Government 
insisted;  that  Mr.  Bayard  called  again  on  the 
twentieth  day  of  February,  when  a  memoran- 
dum was  read  to  him  concerning  the  situation 
and  a  map  shown  him  of  the  territory  in  dis- 
pute; that  at  the  same  time  he  was  informed 
that  the  Venezuelans  had  recently  made  an  ag- 
gression upon  the  territory  of  English  occu- 
pation, and,  according  to  report,  ill-treated 
some  of  the  colonial  police  stationed  there,  and 
that  it  was  the  boundary  defined  by  the  Schom- 
burgk  line  which  had  thus  been  violated  in  a 
marked  manner  by  the  Venezuelans. 
This  despatch  concludes  as  follows: 

On  Mr.  Bayard 's  observing  that  the  United  States 
Government  was  anxious  to  do  anything  in  their 
power  to  facilitate  a  settlement  of  the  difficulty  by 
arbitration,  I  reminded  his  Excellency  that  although 
Her  Majesty's  Government  were  ready  to  go  to  ar- 
bitration as  to  a  certain  portion  of  the  territory 
which  I  had  pointed  out  to  him,  they  could  not  con- 
sent to  any  departure  from  the  Schomburgk  line. 

It  now  became  plainly  apparent  that  a  new 
stage  had  been  reached  in  the  progress  of  our 

252 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

intervention,  and  that  the  ominous  happenings 
embraced  within  a  few  months  had  hastened 
the  day  when  we  were  challenged  to  take  our 
exact  bearings,  lest  we  should  miss  the  course 
of  honor  and  national  duty.  The  more  direct 
tone  that  had  been  given  to  our  despatches  con- 
cerning the  dispute,  our  more  insistent  and 
emphatic  suggestion  of  arbitration,  the  serious 
reference  to  the  subject  in  the  President's  mes- 
sage, the  significant  resolution  passed  by  Con- 
gress earnestly  recommending  arbitration,  all 
portended  a  growth  of  conviction  on  the  part 
of  our  Government  concerning  this  controversy, 
which  gave  birth  to  pronounced  disappoint- 
ment and  anxiety  when  Great  Britain,  concur- 
rently with  these  apprising  incidents,  repeated 
in  direct  and  positive  terms  her  refusal  to  sub- 
mit to  arbitration  except  on  condition  that  a 
portion  of  the  disputed  territory  which  Vene- 
zuela had  always  claimed  to  be  hers  should 
at  the  outset  be  irrevocably  conceded  to 
England. 

During  a  period  of  more  than  fourteen  years 
our  Government,  assuming  the  character  of  a 
mutual  and  disinterested  friend  of  both  coun- 
tries, had,  with  varying  assiduity,  tendered  its 
good  offices  to  bring  about  a  pacific  and  amica- 
ble settlement  of  this  boundary  controversy, 
only  to  be  repelled  with  more  or  less  civility  by 

253 


Great  Britain.  We  had  seen  her  pretensions 
in  the  disputed  regions  widen  and  extend  in 
such  manner  and  upon  such  pretexts  as  seemed 
to  constitute  an  actual  or  threatened  violation 
of  a  doctrine  which  our  nation  long  ago  estab- 
lished, declaring  that  the  American  continents 
are  not  to  be  considered  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  any  European  power;  and  de- 
spite all  this  we  had,  nevertheless,  hoped,  during 
all  these  years,  that  arrangement  and  accom- 
modation between  the  principal  parties  would 
justify  us  in  keeping  an  invocation  of  that  doc- 
trine in  the  background  of  the  discussion.  Not- 
withstanding, however,  all  our  efforts  to  avoid 
it,  we  could  not  be  unmindful  of  the  conditions 
which  the  progress  of  events  had  created,  and 
whose  meaning  and  whose  exigencies  inex- 
orably confronted  us.  England  had  finally  and 
unmistakably  declared  that  all  the  territory 
embraced  within  the  Schomburgk  line  was  in- 
disputably hers.  Venezuela  presented  a  claim 
to  territory  within  the  same  limits,  which  could 
not  be  said  to  lack  strong  support.  England 
had  absolutely  refused  to  permit  Venezuela's 
claim  to  be  tested  by  arbitration ;  and  Venezuela 
was  utterly  powerless  to  resist  by  force  Eng- 
x  land 's  self -pronounced  decree  of  ownership.  If 
this  decree  was  not  justified  by  the  facts,  and  it 

254 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

should  be  enforced  against  the  protest  and  in- 
sistence of  Venezuela  and  should  result  in  the 
possession  and  colonization  of  Venezuelan  ter- 
ritory by  Great  Britain,  it  seemed  quite  plain 
that  the  American  doctrine  which  denies  to  Eu- 
ropean powers  the  colonization  of  any  part  of 
the  American  continent  would  be  violated. 

If  the  ultimatum  of  Great  Britain  as  to  her 
claim  of  territory  had  appeared  to  us  so  thor- 
oughly supported  upon  the  facts  as  to  admit  of 
small  doubt,  we  might  have  escaped  the  respon- 
sibility of  insisting  on  an  observance  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  the  premises,  on  our  own 
account,  and  have  still  remained  the  disinter- 
ested friend  of  both  countries,  merely  content- 
ing ourselves  with  benevolent  attempts  to  recon- 
cile the  disputants.  We  were,  however,  far 
from  discovering  such  satisfactory  support  in 
the  evidence  within  our  reach.  On  the  contrary, 
we  believed  that  the  effects  of  our  acquiescence 
in  Great  Britain 's  pretensions  would  amount  to 
a  failure  to  uphold  and  maintain  a  principle 
universally  accepted  by  our  Government  and 
our  people  as  vitally  essential  to  our  national 
integrity  and  welfare.  The  arbitration,  for 
which  Venezuela  pleaded,  would  have  adjudged 
the  exact  condition  of  the  rival  claims,  would 
have  forever  silenced  Venezuela's  complaints, 

255 


and  would  have  displaced  by  conclusive  sen- 
tence our  unwelcome  doubts  and  suspicions; 
but  this  Great  Britain  had  refused  to  Venezuela, 
and  thus  far  had  also  denied  to  us. 

Recreancy  to  a  principle  so  fundamentally 
American  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  on  the  part 
of  those  charged  with  the  administration  of  our 
Government,  was  of  course  out  of  the  question. 
Inasmuch,  therefore,  as  all  our  efforts  to  avoid 
its  assertion  had  miscarried,  there  was  nothing 
left  for  us  to  do  consistently  with  national 
honor  but  to  take  the  place  of  Venezuela  in  the 
controversy,  so  far  as  that  was  necessary,  in 
vindication  of  our  American  doctrine.  Our 
mild  and  amiable  proffers  of  good  offices,  and 
the  hopes  we  indulged  that  at  last  they  might 
be  the  means  of  securing  to  a  weak  sister  re- 
public peace  and  justice,  and  to  ourselves  im- 
munity from  sterner  interposition,  were  not 
suited  to  the  new  emergency.  In  the  advanced 
condition  of  the  dispute,  sympathy  with  Ven- 
ezuela and  solicitude  for  her  distressed  condi- 
tion could  no  longer  constitute  the  motive 
power  of  our  conduct,  but  these  were  to  give 
way  to  the  duty  and  obligation  of  protecting 
our  own  national  rights. 

Mr.  Gresham,  who  since  the  fourth  day  of 
March,  1893,  had  been  our  Secretary  of  State, 

256 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

died  in  the  latter  days  of  May,  1895.  His  love 
of  justice,  his  sympathy  with  every  cause  that 
deserved  sympathy,  his  fearless  and  disinter- 
ested patriotism,  and  his  rare  mental  endow- 
ments, combined  to  make  him  a  noble  American 
and  an  able  advocate  of  his  country's  honor. 
To  such  a  man  every  phase  of  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  dispute  strongly  appealed;  and  he 
had  been  conscientiously  diligent  in  acquainting 
himself  with  its  history  and  in  considering  the 
contingencies  that  might  arise  in  its  future  de- 
velopment. Though  his  death  was  most  la- 
mentable, I  have  always  considered  it  a  provi- 
dential circumstance  that  the  Government  then 
had  among  its  Cabinet  officers  an  exceptionally 
strong  and  able  man,  in  every  way  especially 
qualified  to  fill  the  vacant  place,  and  thoroughly 
familiar  with  the  pending  controversy—  which 
seemed  every  day  to  bring  us  closer  to  momen- 
tous duty  and  responsibility. 

Mr.  Olney  was  appointed  Secretary  of  State 
early  in  June,  1895;  and  promptly  thereafter, 
at  the  suggestion  of  the  President,  he  began, 
with  characteristic  energy  and  vigor,  to  make 
preparation  for  the  decisive  step  which  it 
seemed  should  no  longer  be  delayed. 

The  seriousness  of  the  business  we  had  in 
hand  was  fully  understood,  and  the  difficulty  or 


17 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

impossibility  of  retracing  the  step  we  contem- 
plated was  thoroughly  appreciated.  The  ab- 
solute necessity  of  certainty  concerning  the 
facts  which  should  underlie  our  action  was,  of 
course,  perfectly  apparent.  Whatever  our  be- 
liefs or  convictions  might  be,  as  derived  from 
the  examination  we  had  thus  far  given  the 
case,  and  however  strongly  we  might  be  per- 
suaded that  Great  Britain's  pretensions  could 
not  be  conceded  consistently  with  our  mainte- 
nance of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  it  would,  never- 
theless, have  been  manifestly  improper  and 
heedless  on  our  part  to  find  conclusively 
against  Great  Britain,  before  soliciting  her 
again  and  in  new  circumstances  to  give  us  an 
opportunity  to  judge  of  the  merits  of  her 
claims  through  the  submission  of  them  to  arbi- 
tration. 

It  was  determined,  therefore,  that  a  commu- 
nication should  be  prepared  for  presentation 
to  the  British  Government  through  our  ambas- 
sador to  England,  detailing  the  progress  and 
incidents  of  the  controversy  as  we  appre- 
hended them,  giving  a  thorough  exposition  of 
the  origin  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  the  rea- 
sons on  which  it  was  based,  demonstrating  our 
interest  in  the  controversy  because  of  its  rela- 
tion to  that  doctrine,  and  from  our  new  stand- 

258 


point  and  on  our  own  account  requesting  Great 
Britain  to  join  Venezuela  in  submitting  to  ar- 
bitration their  contested  claims  to  the  entire 
territory  in  dispute. 

This  was  accordingly  done;  and  a  despatch 
to  this  effect,  dated  July  20,  1895,  was  sent 
by  Mr.  Olney  to  her  Majesty's  Government 
through  Mr.  Bayard,  our  ambassador. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine  may  be  abandoned ;  we 
may  forfeit  it  by  taking  our  lot  with  nations 
that  expand  by  following  un-American  ways; 
we  may  outgrow  it,  as  we  seem  to  be  outgrow- 
ing other  things  we  once  valued ;  or  it  may  for- 
ever stand  as  a  guaranty  of  protection  and 
safety  in  our  enjoyment  of  free  institutions; 
but  in  no  event  will  this  American  principle 
ever  be  better  defined,  better  defended,  or  more 
bravely  asserted  than  was  done  by  Mr.  Olney 
in  this  despatch. 

After  referring  to  the  various  incidents  of 
the  controversy,  and  stating  the  conditions  then 
existing,  it  was  declared: 

The  accuracy  of  the  foregoing  analysis  of  the  ex- 
isting status  cannot,  it  is  believed,  be  challenged.  It 
shows  that  status  to  be  such,  that  those  charged  with 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  are  now  forced  to 
determine  exactly  what  those  interests  are  and  what 
course  of  action  they  require.  It  compels  them  to  de- 

259 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

cide  to  what  extent,  if  any,  the  United  States  may 
and  should  intervene  in  a  controversy  between,  and 
primarily  concerning,  only  Great  Britain  and  Vene- 
zuela, and  to  decide  how  far  it  is  bound  to  see  that 
the  integrity  of  Venezuelan  territory  is  not  impaired 
by  the  pretensions  of  its  powerful  antagonist. 

After  an  exhaustive  explanation  and  vindi- 
cation of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  after  assert- 
ing that  aggressions  by  Great  Britain  on  Vene- 
zuelan soil  would  fall  within  its  purview,  the 
despatch  proceeded  as  follows: 

While  Venezuela  charges  such  usurpation,  Great 
Britain  denies  it;  and  the  United  States,  until  the 
merits  are  authoritatively  ascertained,  can  take  sides 
with  neither.  But  while  this  is  so,— while  the  United 
States  may  not,  under  existing  circumstances  at 
least,  take  upon  itself  to  say  which  of  the  two  parties 
is  right  and  which  is  wrong, — it  is  certainly  within 
its  right  to  demand  that  the  truth  be  ascertained. 
Being  entitled  to  resent  and  resist  any  sequestration 
of  Venezuelan  soil  by  Great  Britain,  it  is  necessarily 
entitled  to  know  whether  such  sequestration  has  oc- 
curred or  is  now  going  on.  ...  It  being  clear,  there- 
fore, that  the  United  States  may  legitimately  insist 
upon  the  merits  of  the  boundary  question  being  de- 
termined, it  is  equally  clear  that  there  is  but  one 
feasible  mode  of  determining  them,  viz.,  peaceful  ar- 
bitration. 

The  demand  of  Great  Britain  that  her  right 
to  a  portion  of  the  disputed  territory  should  be 

260 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

acknowledged  as  a  condition  of  her  consent  to 
arbitration  as  to  the  remainder,  was  thus  char- 
acterized : 

It  is  not  perceived  how  such  an  attitude  can  be 
defended,  nor  how  it  is  reconcilable  with  that  love 
of  justice  and  fair  play  so  eminently  characteristic 
of  the  English  race.  It  in  effect  deprives  Venezuela 
of  her  free  agency  and  puts  her  under  virtual  du- 
ress. Territory  acquired  by  reason  of  it  will  be  as 
much  wrested  from  her  by  the  strong  hand  as  if  oc- 
cupied by  British  troops  or  covered  by  British  fleets. 

The  despatch,  after  directing  the  presenta- 
tion to  Lord  Salisbury  of  the  views  it  contained, 
concluded  as  follows: 

They  call  for  a  definite  decision  upon  the  point 
whether  Great  Britain  will  consent  or  decline  to 
submit  the  Venezuelan  boundary  question  in  its 
entirety  to  impartial  arbitration.  It  is  the  earnest 
hope  of  the  President  that  the  conclusion  will  be 
on  the  side  of  arbitration,  and  that  Great  Britain 
will  add  one  more  to  the  conspicuous  precedents  she 
has  already  furnished  in  favor  of  that  wise  and  just 
mode  of  settling  international  disputes.  If  he  is  to 
be  disappointed  in  that  hope,  however,— a  result  not 
to  be  anticipated,  and  in  his  judgment  calculated  to 
greatly  embarrass  the  future  relations  between  this 
country  and  Great  Britain,— it  is  his  wish  to  be  made 
acquainted  with  the  fact  at  such  early  date  as  will 
enable  him  to  lay  the  whole  subject  before  Congress 
in  his  next  annual  message. 

261 


VI 


The  reply  of  Great  Britain  to  this  commu- 
nication consisted  of  two  despatches  addressed 
by  Lord  Salisbury  to  the  British  ambassador 
at  Washington  for  submission  to  our  Govern- 
ment. Though  dated  the  twenty-sixth  day  of 
November,  1895,  these  despatches  were  not  pre- 
sented to  our  State  Department  until  a  number 
of  days  after  the  assemblage  of  the  Congress 
in  the  following  month.  In  one  of  these  com- 
munications Lord  Salisbury,  in  dealing  with 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  right  or  propri- 
ety of  our  appeal  to  it  in  the  pending  contro- 
versy, declared:  "The  dangers  which  were 
apprehended  by  President  Monroe  have  no  rela- 
tion to  the  state  of  things  in  which  we  live  at 
the  present  day."  He  further  declared: 

But  the  circumstances  with  which  President  Mon- 
roe was  dealing  and  those  to  which  the  present 
American  Government  is  addressing  itself  have  very 
few  features  in  common.  Great  Britain  is  imposing 
no  "system"  upon  Venezuela  and  is  not  concerning 
herself  in  any  way  with  the  nature  of  the  political 
institutions  under  which  the  Venezuelans  may  pre- 
262 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

fer  to  live.  But  the  British  Empire  and  the  Repub- 
lic of  Venezuela  are  neighbors,  and  they  have  dif- 
fered for  some  time  past,  and  continue  to  differ,  as 
to  the  line  by  which  their  dominions  are  separated. 
It  is  a  controversy  with  which  the  United  States  have 
no  apparent  practical  concern.  .  .  .  The  disputed 
frontier  of  Venezuela  has  nothing  to  do  with  any 
of  the  questions  dealt  with  by  President  Monroe. 

His  Lordship,  in  commenting  upon  our  posi- 
tion as  developed  in  Mr.  Olney's  despatch,  de- 
fined it  in  these  terms:  "If  any  independent 
American  state  advances  a  demand  for  terri- 
tory of  which  its  neighbor  claims  to  be  the 
owner,  and  that  neighbor  is  a  colony  of  an  Eu- 
ropean state,  the  United  States  have  a  right  to 
insist  that  the  European  state  shall  submit  the 
demand  and  its  own  impugned  rights  to  arbi- 
tration. ' ' 

I  confess  I  should  be  greatly  disappointed  if 
I  believed  that  the  history  I  have  attempted  to 
give  of  this  controversy  did  not  easily  and 
promptly  suggest  that  this  definition  of  our 
contention  fails  to  take  into  account  some  of 
its  most  important  and  controlling  features. 

Speaking  of  arbitration  as  a  method  of  ter- 
minating international  differences,  Lord  Salis- 
bury said : 

It  has  proved  itself  valuable  in  many  cases,  but 
it  is  not  free  from  defects  which  often  operate  as 

263 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

a  serious  drawback  on  its  value.  It  is  not  always  easy 
to  find  an  arbitrator  who  is  competent  and  who,  at 
the  same  time,  is  wholly  free  from  bias;  and  the 
task  of  insuring  compliance  with  the  award  when  it 
is  made  is  not  exempt  from  difficulty.  It  is  a  mode 
of  settlement  of  which  the  value  varies  much  accord- 
ing to  the  nature  of  the  controversy  to  which  it  is 
applied  and  the  character  of  the  litigants  who  ap- 
peal to  it.  Whether  in  any  particular  case  it  is  a 
suitable  method  of  procedure  is  generally  a  delicate 
and  difficult  question.  The  only  parties  who  are 
competent  to  decide  that  question  are  the  two  parties 
whose  rival  contentions  are  in  issue.  The  claim  of  a 
third  nation  which  is  unaffected  by  the  controversy 
to  impose  this  particular  procedure  on  either  of  the 
two  others  cannot  be  reasonably  justified  and  has 
no  foundation  in  the  law  of  nations. 

Immediately  following  this  statement  his 
Lordship  again  touched  upon  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine for  the  purpose  of  specifically  disclaiming 
its  acceptance  by  her  Majesty's  Government  as 
a  sound  and  valid  principle.  He  says: 

It  must  always  be  mentioned  with  respect,  on 
account  of  the  distinguished  statesman  to  whom  it 
is  due  and  the  great  nation  who  have  generally 
adopted  it.  But  international  law  is  founded  on 
the  general  consent  of  nations;  and  no  statesman, 
however  eminent,  and  no  nation,  however  powerful, 
are  competent  to  insert  into  the  code  of  international 
law  a  novel  principle  which  was  never  recognized 
before,  and  which  has  not  since  been  accepted  by  the 
Government  of  any  other  country.  The  United 

264 


States  have  a  right,  like  any  other  nation,  to  inter- 
pose in  any  controversy  by  which  their  own  interests 
are  affected;  and  they  are  the  judge  whether  those 
interests  are  touched  and  in  what  measure  they 
should  be  sustained.  But  their  rights  are  in  no  way 
strengthened  or  extended  by  the  fact  that  the  con- 
troversy affects  some  territory  which  is  called 
American. 

In  concluding  this  despatch  Lord  Salisbury 
declared  that  her  Majesty's  Government  "fully 
concur  with  the  view  which  President  Monroe 
apparently  entertained,  that  any  disturbance 
of  the  existing  territorial  distribution  in  that 
hemisphere  by  any  fresh  acquisitions  on  the 
part  of  any  European  state  would  be  a  highly 
inexpedient  change.  But  they  are  not  prepared 
to  admit  that  the  recognition  of  that  expedi- 
ency is  clothed  with  the  sanction  which  belongs 
to  a  doctrine  of  international  law.  They  are 
not  prepared  to  admit  that  the  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  necessarily  concerned  in  any 
frontier  dispute  which  may  arise  between  any 
two  of  the  states  who  possess  dominions  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere;  and  still  less  can  they 
accept  the  doctrine  that  the  United  States  are 
entitled  to  claim  that  the  process  of  arbitration 
shall  be  applied  to  any  demand  for  the  sur- 
render of  territory  which  one  of  those  states 
may  make  against  another." 

265 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

The  other  despatch  of  Lord  Salisbury,  which 
accompanied  the  one  upon  which  I  have  com- 
mented, was  mainly  devoted  to  a  statement  of 
facts  and  evidence  on  Great  Britain's  side  in 
the  boundary  controversy ;  and  in  making  such 
statement  his  Lordship  in  general  terms  desig- 
nated the  territory  to  which  her  Majesty's  Gov- 
ernment was  entitled  as  being  embraced  within 
the  lines  of  the  most  extreme  claim  which  she 
had  at  any  time  presented.  He  added : 

A  portion  of  that  claim,  however,  they  have  al- 
ways been  willing  to  waive  altogether;  in  regard  to 
another  portion  they  have  been  and  continue  to  be 
perfectly  ready  to  submit  the  question  of  their  title 
to  arbitration.  As  regards  the  rest,  that  which  lies 
within  the  so-called  Schomburgk  line,  they  do  not 
consider  that  the  rights  of  Great  Britain  are  open 
to  question.  Even  within  that  line  they  have  on  va- 
rious occasions  offered  to  Venezuela  considerable 
concessions  as  a  matter  of  friendship  and  concilia- 
tion and  for  the  purpose  of  securing  an  amicable 
settlement  of  the  dispute.  If,  as  time  has  gone  on, 
the  concessions  thus  offered  have  been  withdrawn, 
this  has  been  the  necessary  consequence  of  the  grad- 
ual spread  over  the  country  of  British  settlements, 
which  Her  Majesty's  Government  cannot  in  justice 
to  the  inhabitants  offer  to  surrender  to  foreign  rule. 

In  conclusion  his  Lordship  asserts  that  his 
Government  has 

repeatedly  expressed  their  readiness  to  submit  to 
arbitration  the  conflicting  claims  of  Great  Britain 

266 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

and  Venezuela  to  large  tracts  of  territory  which 
from  their  auriferous  nature  are  known  to  be  of 
almost  untold  value.  But  they  cannot  consent  to 
entertain,  or  to  submit  to  the  arbitration  of  another 
power  or  of  foreign  jurists  however  eminent,  claims 
based  on  the  extravagant  pretensions  of  Spanish  offi- 
cials in  the  last  century  and  involving  the  transfer 
of  large  numbers  of  British  subjects,  who  have  for 
many  years  enjoyed  the  settled  rule  of  a  British 
colony,  to  a  nation  of  different  race  and  language, 
whose  political  system  is  subject  to  frequent  dis- 
turbance, and  whose  institutions  as  yet  too  often 
afford  very  inadequate  protection  to  life  and  prop- 
erty. 

These  despatches  exhibit  a  refusal  to  admit 
such  an  interest  in  the  controversy  on  our  part 
as  entitled  us  to  insist  upon  an  arbitration  for 
the  purpose  of  having  the  line  between  Great 
Britain  and  Venezuela  established;  a  denial  of 
such  force  or  meaning  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
as  made  it  worthy  of  the  regard  of  Great  Brit- 
ain in  the  premises ;  and  a  fixed  and  continued 
determination  on  the  part  of  her  Majesty's 
Government  to  reject  arbitration  as  to  any  ter- 
ritory included  within  the  extended  Schom- 
burgk  line.  They  further  indicate  that  the  exis- 
tence of  gold  within  the  disputed  territory  had 
not  been  overlooked;  and  they  distinctly  put 
forward  the  colonization  and  settlement  by 
English  subjects  in  such  territory,  during  more 
than  half  a  century  of  dispute,  as  creating  a 

267 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

claim  to  dominion  and  sovereignty,  if  not 
strong  enough  to  override  all  question  of  right 
and  title,  at  least  so  clear  and  indisputable  as  to 
be  properly  considered  as  above  and  beyond  the 
contingencies  of  arbitration. 

If  we  had  been  obliged  to  accept  Lord 
Salisbury's  estimate  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine, 
and  his  ideas  of  our  interest,  or  rather  want 
of  interest,  in  the  settlement  of  the  boundary 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  his  de- 
spatches would  have  certainly  been  very  de- 
pressing. It  would  have  been  unpleasant  for 
us  to  know  that  a  doctrine  which  we  had  sup- 
posed for  seventy  years  to  be  of  great  value 
and  importance  to  us  and  our  national  safety 
was,  after  all,  a  mere  plaything  with  which  we 
might  amuse  ourselves;  and  that  our  efforts 
to  enforce  it  were  to  be  regarded  by  Great 
Britain  and  other  European  nations  as  meddle- 
some interferences  with  affairs  in  which  we 
could  have  no  legitimate  concern. 

The  reply  of  the  English  Government  to  Mr. 
Olney's  despatch,  whatever  else  it  accom- 
plished, seemed  absolutely  to  destroy  any  hope 
we  might  have  entertained  that,  in  our  changed 
position  in  the  controversy  and  upon  our  inde- 
pendent solicitation,  arbitration  might  be  con- 
ceded to  us.  Since,  therefore,  Great  Britain 

268 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

was  unwilling,  on  any  consideration,  to  coop- 
erate with  Venezuela  in  setting  on  foot  an  in- 
vestigation of  their  contested  claim,  and  since 
prudence  and  care  dictated  that  any  further 
steps  we  might  take  should  be  proved  to  be  as 
fully  justified  as  was  practicable  in  the  circum- 
stances, there  seemed  to  be  no  better  way  open 
to  us  than  to  inaugurate  a  careful  independent 
investigation  of  the  merits  of  the  controversy, 
on  our  own  motion,  with  a  view  of  determining 
as  accurately  as  possible,  for  our  own  guidance, 
where  the  divisional  line  between  the  two  coun- 
tries should  be  located. 

Mr.  Olney's  despatch  and  Lord  Salisbury's 
reply  were  submitted  to  the  Congress  on  the 
seventeenth  day  of  December,  1895,  accompa- 
nied by  a  message  from  the  President. 

In  this  message  the  President,  after  stating 
Lord  Salisbury's  positions  touching  the  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  declared: 

Without  attempting  extended  argument  in  reply 
to  these  positions,  it  may  not  be  amiss  to  suggest  that 
the  doctrine  upon  which  we  stand  is  strong  and 
sound,  because  its  enforcement  is  important  to  our 
peace  and  safety  as  a  nation,  and  is  essential  to  the 
integrity  of  our  free  institutions  and  the  tranquil 
maintenance  of  our  distinctive  form  of  government. 
It  was  intended  to  apply  to  every  stage  of  our  na- 
tional life,  and  cannot  become  obsolete  while  our 

269 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Republic  endures.  If  the  balance  of  power  is  justly 
a  cause  for  jealous  anxiety  among  the  governments 
of  the  Old  World  and  a  subject  for  our  absolute 
non-interference,  none  the  less  is  the  observance  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine  of  vital  concern  to  our  people 
and  their  Government. 

Speaking  of  the  claim  made  by  Lord  Salis- 
bury that  this  doctrine  had  no  place  in  interna- 
tional law,  it  was  said  in  the  message:  "The 
Monroe  Doctrine  finds  its  recognition  in  those 
principles  of  international  law  which  are  based 
upon  the  theory  that  every  nation  shall  have  its 
rights  protected  and  its  just  claims  enforced." 

Referring  to  the  request  contained  in  Mr. 
Olney's  despatch  that  the  entire  boundary  con- 
troversy be  submitted  to  arbitration,  the  fol- 
lowing language  was  used: 

It  will  be  seen  from  the  eofrespondence  herewith 
submitted  that  this  proposition  has  been  declined  by 
the  British  Government  upon  grounds  which  in  the 
circumstances  seem  to  me  to  be  far  from  satisfactory. 
It  is  deeply  disappointing  that  such  an  appeal,  actu- 
ated by  the  most  friendly  feelings  toward  both  na- 
tions directly  concerned,  addressed  to  the  sense  of 
justice  and  to  the  magnanimity  of  one  of  the  great 
powers  of  the  world,  and  touching  its  relations  to 
one  comparatively  weak  and  small,  should  have  pro- 
duced no  better  results. 

The  course  to  be  pursued  by  this  Government  in 
view  of  the  present  condition  does  not  appear  to 

270 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

admit  of  serious  doubt.  Having  labored  faithfully 
for  many  years  to  induce  Great  Britain  to  submit 
their  dispute  to  impartial  arbitration,  and  having 
been  finally  apprised  of  her  refusal  to  do  so,  nothing 
remains  but  to  accept  the  situation,  to  recognize  its 
plain  requirements,  and  deal  with  it  accordingly. 
Great  Britain's  present  proposition  has  never  thus 
far  been  regarded  as  admissible  by  Venezuela, 
though  any  adjustment  of  the  boundary  which  that 
country  may  deem  for  her  advantage  and  may  enter 
into  of  her  own  free  will  cannot,  of  course,  be  ob- 
jected to  by  the  United  States.  Assuming,  however, 
that  the  attitude  of  Venezuela  will  remain  un- 
changed, the  dispute  has  reached  such  a  stage  as  to 
make  it  now  incumbent  upon  the  United  States  to 
take  measures  to  determine  with  sufficient  certainty 
for  its  justification  what  is  the  true  divisional  line 
between  the  Republic  of  Venezuela  and  British 
Guiana.  The  inquiry  to  that  end  should,  of  course, 
be  conducted  carefully  and  judicially;  and  due 
weight  should  be  given  to  all  available  evidence, 
records,  and  facts  in  support  of  the  claims  of  both 
parties. 

After  recommending  to  the  Congress  an  ade- 
quate appropriation  to  meet  the  expense  of  a 
commission  which  should  make  the  suggested 
investigation  and  report  thereon  with  the  least 
possible  delay,  the  President  concluded  his 
message  as  follows : 

When  such  report  is  made  and  accepted,  it  will, 
in  my  opinion,  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to 
resist  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  ag- 

271 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

gression  upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appropria- 
tion by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exercise  of 
governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory  which 
after  investigation  we  have  determined  of  right  be- 
longs to  Venezuela. 

In  making  these  recommendations  I  am  fully  alive 
to  the  responsibility  incurred,  and  keenly  realize  all 
the  consequences  that  may  follow. 

I  am,  nevertheless,  firm  in  my  conviction  that 
while  it  is  a  grievous  thing  to  contemplate  the  two 
great  English-speaking  peoples  of  the  world  as  being 
otherwise  than  friendly  competitors  in  the  onward 
march  of  civilization,  and  strenuous  and  worthy  ri- 
vals in  all  the  arts  of  peace,  there  is  no  calamity 
which  a  great  nation  can  invite  which  equals  that 
which  follows  a  supine  submission  to  wrong  and  in- 
justice, and  the  consequent  loss  of  national  self-re- 
spect and  honor,  beneath  which  are  shielded  and 
defended  a  people's  safety  and  greatness. 

The  recommendations  contained  in  this  mes- 
sage were  acted  upon  with  such  promptness 
and  unanimity  that  on  the  twenty-first  day  of 
December,  1895,  four  days  after  they  were  sub- 
mitted, a  law  was  passed  by  the  Congress  au- 
thorizing the  President  to  appoint  a  commis- 
sion ''to  investigate  and  report  upon  the  true 
divisional  line  between  the  Republic  of  Vene- 
zuela and  British  Guiana, ' '  and  making  an  am- 
ple appropriation  to  meet  the  expenses  of  its 
work. 

On  the  first  day  of  January,  1896,  five  of  our 
272 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

most  able  and  distinguished  citizens  were  se- 
lected to  constitute  the  commission;  and  they 
immediately  entered  upon  their  investigation. 
At  the  outset  of  their  labors,  and  on  the  fif- 
teenth day  of  January,  1896,  the  president  of 
the  commission  suggested  to  Mr.  Olney  the  ex- 
pediency of  calling  the  attention  of  the  Govern- 
ments of  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  to  the 
appointment  of  the  commission,  adding:  "It 
may  be  that  they  would  see  a  way  entirely  con- 
sistent with  their  own  sense  of  international 
propriety  to  give  the  Commission  the  aid  that 
it  is  no  doubt  in  their  power  to  furnish  in  the 
way  of  documentary  proof,  historical  narra- 
tive, unpublished  archives,  or  the  like."  This 
suggestion,  on  its  presentation  to  the  Govern- 
ment of  Great  Britain,  was  met  by  a  most  cour- 
teous and  willing  offer  to  supply  to  our  com- 
mission every  means  of  information  touching 
the  subject  of  their  investigation  which  was 
within  the  reach  of  the  English  authorities; 
and  at  all  times  during  the  labors  of  the  com- 
mission this  offer  was  cheerfully  fulfilled. 

In  the  meantime,  and  as  early  as  February, 
1896,  the  question  of  submitting  the  Venezue- 
lan boundary  dispute  to  mutual  arbitration 
was  again  agitated  between  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain. 

18  273 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

Our  ambassador  to  England,  in  a  note  to 
Lord  Salisbury,  dated  February  27,  1896,  after 
speaking  of  such  arbitration  as  seeming  to  be 
"almost  unanimously  desired  by  both  the 
United  States  and  Great  Britain,"  proposed, 
in  pursuance  of  instructions  from  his  Govern- 
ment, "an  entrance  forthwith  upon  negotia- 
tions at  Washington  to  effect  this  purpose,  and 
that  Her  Majesty's  Ambassador  at  Washington 
should  be  empowered  to  discuss  the  question  at 
that  capital  with  the  Secretary  of  State."  He 
also  requested  that  a  definition  should  be  given 
of  "settlements"  in  the  disputed  territory 
which  it  was  understood  her  Majesty's  Govern- 
ment desired  should  be  excluded  from  the  pro- 
posed submission  to  arbitration. 

Lord  Salisbury,  in  his  reply  to  this  note, 
dated  March  3,  1896,  said: 

The  communications  which  have  already  passed 
between  Her  Majesty's  Government  and  that  of  the 
United  States  have  made  you  acquainted  with  the 
desire  of  Her  Majesty's  Government  to  bring  the 
difference  between  themselves  and  the  Republic  of 
Venezuela  to  an  equitable  settlement.  They  there- 
fore readily  concur  in  the  suggestion  that  negotia- 
tions for  this  purpose  should  be  opened  at  Washing- 
ton without  unnecessary  delay.  I  have  accordingly 
empowered  Sir  Julian  Pauncefote  to  discuss  the 
question  either  with  the  representative  of  Venezuela 

274 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

or  with  the  Government  of  the  United  States  acting 
as  the  friend  of  Venezuela. 

With  this  transfer  of  treaty  negotiations  to 
Washington,  Mr.  Olney  and  Sir  Julian  Paunce- 
fote,  the  ambassador  of  Great  Britain  to 
this  country,  industriously  addressed  them- 
selves to  the  subject.  The  insistence  of  Great 
Britain  that  her  title  to  the  territory  within  the 
Schomburgk  line  should  not  be  questioned,  was 
no  longer  placed  by  her  in  the  way  of  submit- 
ting the  rights  of  the  parties  in  the  entire  dis- 
puted territory  to  arbitration.  She  still  in- 
sisted, however,  that  English  settlers  long  in 
the  occupancy  of  any  of  the  territory  in  con- 
troversy, supposing  it  to  be  under  British  do- 
minion, should  have  their  rights  scrupulously 
considered.  Any  difference  of  view  that  arose 
from  this  proposition  was  adjusted  without  se- 
rious difficulty,  by  agreeing  that  adverse  hold- 
ing or  prescription  during  a  period  of  fifty 
years  should  make  a  good  title,  and  that  the  ar- 
bitrators might  deem  exclusive  political  control 
of  a  district,  as  well  as  actual  settlement,  suf- 
ficient to  constitute  adverse  holding  or  to  make 
title  by  prescription. 

On  the  10th  of  November,  1896,  Mr.  Olney 
addressed  a  note  to  the  president  of  the  com- 
mission which  had  been  appointed  to  investi- 

275 


gate  the  boundary  question  on  behalf  of  our 
Government,  in  which  he  said:  "The  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  are  in  entire  accord 
as  to  the  provisions  of  a  proposed  treaty  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Venezuela.  The  treaty 
is  so  eminently  just  and  fair  as  respects  both 
parties— so  thoroughly  protects  the  rights  and 
claims  of  Venezuela— that  I  cannot  conceive  of 
its  not  being  approved  by  the  Venezuelan  Pres- 
ident and  Congress.  It  is  thoroughly  approved 
by  the  counsel  of  Venezuela  here  and  by  the 
Venezuelan  Minister  at  this  Capital. ' '  In  view 
of  these  conditions  he  suggested  a  suspension 
of  the  work  of  the  commission. 

The  treaty  was  signed  at  Washington  by  the 
representatives  of  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela 
on  the  second  day  of  February,  1897.  No  part 
of  the  territory  in  dispute  was  reserved  from 
the  arbitration  it  created.  It  was  distinctly 
made  the  duty  of  those  appointed  to  carry  out 
its  provisions,  "to  determine  the  boundary-line 
between  the  Colony  of  British  Guiana  and  the 
United  States  of  Venezuela." 

The  fact  must  not  be  overlooked  that,  not- 
withstanding this  treaty  was  promoted  and  ne- 
gotiated by  the  officers  of  our  Government,  the 
parties  to  it  were  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela. 

276 


Tbe  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

This  was  a  fortunate  circumstance,  inasmuch 
as  the  work  accomplished  was  thus  saved  from 
the  risk  of  customary  disfigurement  at  the 
hands  of  the  United  States  Senate. 

The  arbitrators  began  their  labors  in  the  city 
of  Paris  in  January,  1899,  and  made  their 
award  on  the  third  day  of  October  in  the  same 
year. 

The  line  they  determined  upon  as  the  boun- 
dary-line between  the  two  countries  begins  in 
the  coast  at  a  point  considerably  south  and  east 
of  the  mouth  of  the  Orinoco  River,  thus  giving 
to  Venezuela  the  absolute  control  of  that  im- 
portant waterway,  and  awarding  to  her  valua- 
ble territory  near  it.  Running  inland,  the  line 
is  so  located  as  to  give  to  Venezuela  quite  a 
considerable  section  of  territory  within  the 
Schomburgk  line.  This  results  not  only  in  the 
utter  denial  of  Great  Britain's  claim  to  any 
territory  lying  beyond  the  Schomburgk  line, 
but  also  in  the  award  to  Venezuela  of  a  part  of 
the  territory  which  for  a  long  time  England 
had  claimed  to  be  so  clearly  hers  that  she  would 
not  consent  to  submit  it  to  arbitration. 

Thus,  we  have  made  a  laborious  and  patient 
journey  through  the  incidents  of  a  long  dis- 
pute, to  find  at  last  a  peaceful  rest.  As  we 

277 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

look  back  over  the  road  we  have  traversed,  and 
view  again  the  incidents  we  have  passed  on  our 
way,  some  may  be  surprised  that  this  contro- 
versy was  so  long  chronic,  and  yet,  in  the  end, 
yielded  so  easily  to  pronounced  treatment.  I 
know  that  occasionally  some  Americans  of  a 
certain  sort,  who  were  quite  un-American  when 
the  difficulty  was  pending,  have  been  very  fond 
of  lauding  the  extreme  forbearance  and  kind- 
ness of  England  toward  us  in  our  so-called 
belligerent  and  ill-advised  assertion  of  Ameri- 
can principle.  Those  to  whom  this  is  a  satisfac- 
tion are  quite  welcome  to  it. 

My  own  surprise  and  disappointment  have 
arisen  more  from  the  honest  misunderstanding 
and  the  dishonest  and  insincere  misrepresenta- 
tion, on  the  part  of  many  of  our  people,  re- 
garding the  motives  and  purposes  of  the  in- 
terference of  the  Government  of  the  United 
States  in  this  affair.  Some  conceited  and  dog- 
gedly mistaken  critics  have  said  that  it  was 
dreadful  for  us  to  invite  war  for  the  sake  of  a 
people  unworthy  of  our  consideration,  and  for 
the  purpose  of  protecting  their  possession  of 
land  not  worth  possessing.  It  is  certainly 
strange  that  any  intelligent  citizen,  professing 
information  on  public  affairs,  could  fail  to  see 
that  when  we  aggressively  interposed  in  this 

278 


controversy  it  was  because  it  was  necessary  in 
order  to  assert  and  vindicate  a  principle  dis- 
tinctively American,  and  in  the  maintenance  of 
which  the  people  and  Government  of  the  United 
States  were  profoundly  concerned.  It  was 
because  this  principle  was  endangered,  and  be- 
cause those  charged  with  administrative  re- 
sponsibility would  not  abandon  or  neglect  it, 
that  our  Government  interposed  to  prevent  any 
further  colonization  of  American  soil  by  a  Eu- 
ropean nation.  In  these  circumstances  neither 
the  character  of  the  people  claiming  the  soil 
as  against  Great  Britain,  nor  the  value  of  the 
lands  in  dispute,  was  of  the  least  consequence 
to  us ;  nor  did  it  in  the  least  concern  us  which  of 
the  two  contestants  had  the  best  title  to  any 
part  of  the  disputed  territory,  so  long  as  Eng- 
land did  not  possess  and  colonize  more  than 
belonged  to  her— however  much  or  however 
little  that  might  be.  But  we  needed  proof 
of  the  limits  of  her  rights  in  order  to  determine 
our  duty  in  defense  of  our  Monroe  Doctrine; 
and  we  sought  to  obtain  such  proof,  and  to 
secure  peace,  through  arbitration. 

But  those  among  us  who  most  loudly  repre- 
hended and  bewailed  our  vigorous  assertion 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  were  the  timid  ones 
who  feared  personal  financial  loss,  or  those  en- 

279 


The  Venezuelan  Boundary  Controversy 

gaged  in  speculation  and  stock-gambling,  in 
buying  much  beyond  their  ability  to  pay,  and 
generally  in  living  by  their  wits.  The  patriot- 
ism of  such  people  traverses  exclusively  the 
pocket  nerve.  They  are  willing  to  tolerate  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  or  any  other  patriotic  princi- 
ple, so  long  as  it  does  not  interfere  with  their 
plans,  and  are  just  as  willing  to  cast  it  off  when 
it  becomes  troublesome. 

But  these  things  are  as  nothing  when  weighed 
against  the  sublime  patriotism  and  devotion  to 
their  nation's  honor  exhibited  by  the  great  mass 
of  our  countrymen— the  plain  people  of  the 
land.  Though,  in  case  of  the  last  extremity, 
the  chances  and  suffering  of  conflict  would  have 
fallen  to  their  lot,  nothing  blinded  them  to  the 
manner  in  which  the  integrity  of  their  country 
was  involved.  Not  for  a  single  moment  did 
their  Government  know  the  lack  of  their  strong 
and  stalwart  support. 

I  hope  there  are  but  few  of  our  fellow-citi- 
zens who,  in  retrospect,  do  not  now  acknow- 
ledge the  good  that  has  come  to  our  nation 
through  this  episode  in  our  history.  It  has  es- 
tablished the  Monroe  Doctrine  on  lasting  foun- 
dations before  the  eyes  of  the  world;  it  has 
given  us  a  better  place  in  the  respect  and  consid- 
eration of  the  people  of  all  nations,  and  espec- 

280 


ially  of  Great  Britain;  it  has  again  confirmed 
our  confidence  in  the  overwhelming  prevalence 
among  our  citizens  of  disinterested  devotion  to 
American  honor;  and  last,  but  by  no  means 
least,  it  has  taught  us  where  to  look  in  the  ranks 
of  our  countrymen  for  the  best  patriotism. 


281 


DATE  DUE 


HFC    2 

6  1963. 

DEC     2 

~MGJ   j& 

Ffetf  1  0 

1981 

JAN  d     1 

964  3 

NOV  9      1967 

vnv    9  tis7  X 

NOV  2  4  1&67 

2  7  Ml  4 

GAYLORD 

PRINTED  IN  U.S.A. 

FACUJT?.. 


